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ABSTRACT
EXPLORING THE BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE FEDERAL FLOOD MITIGATION IN THE
MISSISSIPPI RIVER REGION
Linda Bailey
August 1, 2017
This dissertation is a comprehensive study of flood mitigation in the Mississippi River
region as it is impacted by federal flood policies and programs. The study begins with a historical
narrative of flooding events and flood mitigation that provided the impetus for federal flood
mitigation in the late 1920s. The historical narrative sheds light on issues related to federalism,
path dependency, dynamic growth, and socio-culture influence during the development of flood
mitigation policy. Growth machine theory is used to describe how inequality and disparate
access to political power has worked to exacerbate flood disaster outcomes and how this dynamic
is legitimately perpetuated via federal policies. The second half of the dissertation is focused on
a comprehensive evaluation of current mitigation planning mandates, programs, and planning
tools.
The dissertation is divided into six chapters, covering the historical development,
theoretical implications, a critique of current practices, and future recommendations for federal
flood mitigation. Chapter One provides a basic overview of the issues related to federal flood
mitigation and the potential shortcomings of the current system. Chapter Two delves into a
historical narrative that provides a rich account of early responses to flooding and how federal
flood policy developed from these experiences. Chapter Three discusses the theoretical
explanations as to why exacerbated disaster impacts are a result of policy actor influences. It also
covers the literature involving present mitigation planning practices. Chapter Four describes the
methods used in this study to comprehensively assess mitigation planning and programs. Chapter
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Five discusses the findings and implications derived from the comprehensive assessment of
mitigation practices. Finally, Chapter Six provides a discussion of how current federal flood
mitigation policy is influenced by growth machine dynamics as evidenced through these findings.
It also provides insight for improving current practices and makes recommendations for further
study.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The need for federal flood control in the United States originated in the lower region of
the Mississippi River in the 1800s and found legitimacy at the beginning of the 20th Century.
Political feasibility for federal flood control has consistently been met with resistance at various
levels and by various stakeholders. This resistance basically manifests itself in ways that seem
legitimate and there is no resolution that can possibly satisfy everyone. However, a federal flood
control system is ineffective if it does not integrate a coordinated effort at all levels of
government and with all stakeholders. Lacking a coordinated effort, the flood control system
may even contribute to greater vulnerability by providing citizens a sense of false security within
the floodplain resulting in higher losses and greater recovery costs.
While floodplain areas are only a small portion of the national landscape as a whole, it
commands to be addressed as one of the most concerning and costly areas to mitigate for flooding
events. Many hazard researchers will argue that the U.S. government actually does more to
contribute to flooding than to mitigate for it. While the federal government sets the guidelines for
floodplain management, local jurisdictions are the primary regulators of the floodplain. There are
very few constraints on their land use decisions at the state or federal level. Thus, development in
the floodplain continues unimpeded and appears to be reinforced within the existing political
structure.
Growth machine politics play a strong role in this process. Many claim that local
jurisdictions or local elites attempt to secure expensive federal funded structural flood mitigation
projects in order to provide these high-dollar project contracts to elite constituents. Secondly,
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these local officials seek to develop the area behind the levees and floodwalls in order to bring in
more revenue for local coffers. It is not necessarily the case that these land use decisions are wise
choices and in the best interest of the community. Local officials will champion the idea that
development is necessary to provide more benefit for the whole community. However,
most of the benefit will reside with those elites hawking development contracts and developing
these risky areas while the majority of the community is paying the high cost of assuming this
risk.
In 1945, Gilbert F. White, often referred to as the “father of floodplain management”
wrote a dissertation titled Human Adjustments to Floods, and this became a seminal piece of work
that claimed there was too much emphasis faced on structural methods of flood mitigation and
not enough consideration of non-structural methods such as land use regulation and insurance
(White, 1945). His work echoes the sentiment that large, expensive, structural projects were
being appropriated despite evidence that flood costs continued to increase (White, 1945). White
(1945) argued for a comprehensive approach to the flood problem with target reduction as a goal
and to reduce the need for federal relief. By 1968, his suggestions were being employed through
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 which was an attempt to provide insurance for
structures in the floodplain and incentivize local government to create ordinances enforcing
minimum standards of retrofitting structures in the floodplain.
How did this legislation impact the flood problem? Did it reduce flood costs? Karen
O’Neil (2006, 173) argues that the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) actually subsidized
construction in the floodplain as a result of this program. Flood costs continue to rise and
according to the Government Accountability Office (2013) the NFIP at that time was in debt to
the U.S. Treasury to the tune of 24 billion dollars.
This research seeks to answer some basic questions. How does the path dependent
development (historical underpinnings) of flood mitigation in this region impact present
mitigation initiatives? Does a regional analysis provide a better understanding of persistent
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problems in floodplain management? Does the cost of flooding continue to rise despite
implementing both structural and non-structural mitigation? Did non-structural mitigation
policies and programs implemented over time reduce the cost of flooding? More specifically, did
mandating local governments to create hazard mitigation plans reduce the cost of flooding? Are
local governments still too primarily focused on structural mitigation as the answer to flood
mitigation?
Mitigation is “the effort to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of
disasters” (FEMA, 2015). Flood mitigation is specific to reducing impacts from flood disasters.
Structural mitigation encompasses such things as building floodwalls, floodgates, levees, and
other major land adjustments or barriers that attempt to control the flow of water away from areas
to protect property from flooding. Non-structural mitigation refers to types of strategies or actions
that contribute to flood disaster impact reductions such as land use policies, insurance programs,
incentive programs, education, outreach, studies, zoning, enforcement and other administrativetype functions. Hazard mitigation plans are planning tools designed to assist state, tribal and
local governments identify hazard risks, collaborate with local stakeholders in risk reduction,
identify strategies and actions to reduce risk, prioritize mitigation actions, and identify funding
sources (FEMA, 2015).
Recently, disaster researchers have honed in on the idea that growth machine dynamics
may be the “unifying theoretical paradigm” (Tierney, 2010) explaining how economic and
political forces exacerbate our vulnerability to hazards. Looking at flooding specifically, growth
machine dynamics seem to be the most plausible explanation for our inability to reduce costs
associated with flooding disasters.
Previously, hazard researcher Dennis Mileti (1999, 12) advocated the idea of a “global
systems perspective” in order to achieve more comprehensive mitigation planning. He explained
that three major systems-- the natural environment, the built environment, and the social
environment and the interactions among these systems should be our major focus for reducing
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disaster costs (Mileti, 1999, 12). Mileti (1999) expands the systems approach from partially
holistic (Easton, 1953) to completely holistic-- highly interconnected and more comprehensive.
He believes that by looking from a global systems perspective, there is a shift from the traditional
systems model creating an overall system that is “greater than, and different from, the sum of its
parts” versus “the whole is equal to the sum of its parts” (Mileti, 1999, 106-107).
Mileti (1999, 13) declares that social factors have, for the most part, been overlooked and
their power has been underestimated. He claims that change in social values will result in a more
effectively mitigated environment (Mileti, 1999, 13). Mileti (1999, 17) argues that traditional
system theorists’ “overemphasis on stability” results in “labeling the change and process as
negative”. Actually, growth machine dynamics dominate our social culture so significantly that it
creates the instability that ultimately causes systems to fail regardless of whether the feedback is
negative or perceived as positive. The feedback could be a false positive when the growth
machine processes mask vulnerabilities. Therefore, systemic approaches are dependent on
eradicating growth machine dynamics from the social culture. Thus growth machine dynamics
dominate as the overarching theory in how hazard or flood vulnerability manifests and renders
mitigation efforts ineffective.
In sum, along with identifying the most persistent problems in floodplain management,
this research contributes to the growing consensus that growth machine theory best identifies how
these problems manifest. Hence this research attempts to answer the question: Is it the case that
growth machine dynamics are continuing to render the federal flood control system ineffective?
The research study focuses on 10 states and 108 counties that border the Mississippi
River from the upper to lower bounds within the United States. Using the Mississippi River
region as the region of analysis is very important not only to show how federal flood mitigation
policies and programs developed historically; but also this region exemplifies the importance of
considering path dependency in this system and how flood mitigation is bounded. Path
dependency is best defined as having the condition in which “where we go next depends not only
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on where we are now, but also upon where we have been” (Liebowitz and Margolis, 2000, 981).
Historical flooding in the Mississippi River region played an integral role in influencing federal
involvement in flood controls. The use of levees was a practice adapted from Europe by early
settlers in Louisiana and these early manipulations of flood water are one of several means that
created a path dependent condition that impacted the circumstances we have now.
This study will first attempt to describe the historical underpinnings which resulted in a
path dependent condition within the region. The path dependent condition specific to this area
then influenced the development of federal policy prescriptions for flood mitigation. Path
dependency is also symptomatic of growth machine dynamics therefore it is necessary to examine
the history of settlement in order to understand how growth machine politics influences overall
design and limits to a comprehensive flood mitigation system.
Next, there is a review of the literature associated with flooding, growth machine theory
and systems theory as they relate to flooding. Primary to this analysis is a discussion of the
works of Gilbert F. White (1945) and his significant contribution to flood mitigation study.
White (1945) theorized that as the amount of structural mitigation increased, so did the costs
associated with flooding. He argued for a target reduction strategy that focused on non-structural
mitigation as the most effective way to reduce the cost of flooding (White, 1945). This research
expounds on his work and brings it forward. This study attempts to answer a secondary question:
Does the cost of flooding continue to rise despite engaging in both structural and non-structural
mitigation initiatives?
In the process of conducting this study, this researcher attempted to collect and evaluate
the state and county all-hazard mitigation plans from these ten states and 108 counties. First, a
time-series analysis was conducted to determine whether or not flood costs decreased with the
implementation of all-hazard mitigation plans under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.
Secondly, this study identifies flood mitigation goals and actions in hopes to gain insight on
community preparedness and needs. Looking specifically at flood mitigation goals and actions

5

allows us to make determinations on the trends in flood mitigation planning and to explain
whether or not these trends are being influenced by growth machine dynamics. Gilbert White
(1945) argued that despite all efforts to mitigate flooding using structural methods, the cost of
flooding continued to rise. He pointed to the problem of the “status quo” influencing mitigation
efforts in a way that was making flood mitigation efforts futile. Today we would describe
White’s (1945) “status quo” to be growth machine dynamics influence. White (1945) argued that
the way forward to reduce flooding would be through target reduction measures in the form of
policy and programs rather than large expensive dirt-moving and wall-building structural
projects. In this research study, non-structural mitigation action items refer to any action that
relates to target reduction such as policies and programs that incentivize identifying and
retrofitting or moving repetitive flooding properties in the floodplain; adequately insuring
properties within the floodplain; using technology and other tools to identify hazard areas in need
of attention; and education and outreach to inform and prepare populations near or within the
floodplain.
Using content analysis, each flood mitigation action was evaluated to determine if it was
considered a structural or non-structural mitigation action item and then further categorized by
the type of action in order to develop a composite picture of flood mitigation actions used within
this region. The analysis was intended to determine several things. First, what are the main types
of flood mitigation actions used within the whole region within the focus of the study? Second, is
there evidence of a structural mitigation preference over non-structural mitigation? Third, are
these flood mitigation actions similar across the entire region or do they vary based on
geographical location? Fourth, are there any other patterns within these mitigation plan actions
that might provide better insight into determining how growth machine dynamics may be
impacting the course of mitigation planning? Finally, this data was compared to a national survey
of local officials conducted by FEMA regarding their opinions of the flood mitigation needs and
overall preparedness.
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In addition, several other types of data were also collected to paint a more comprehensive
picture of the region and flooding problems within this region. For one, 50 years of flooding
disaster data was collected to determine frequency and costs associated with flooding within the
region. The data allowed the researcher to look at flood frequency and property damage costs at
the county level and identify counties with greater flooding risks and higher costs.
Demographic and housing characteristics were studied to determine who may live in the
floodplain and whether there may be greater vulnerabilities related to these populations.
Specifically, we wanted to look at some variables related to greater social vulnerability that were
available at both the county level data and census tract level. Based on ad hoc interactions with
local emergency managers who claim they are unable to identify who exactly is in the floodplain,
GIS mapping more clearly identified this population. The data was contrasted to the SoVI
(Clutter et al., 2012), a social vulnerability index created by Susan Clutter and others at the
University of South Carolina. The SoVI is a measure of social vulnerability to all hazards at the
county level. Therefore, if we looked at the county SoVI scores and county level ACS data and
compare it to data available at the census tract level, would we find pockets of vulnerabilities that
would not otherwise be identified? Would this be useful information for local emergency
managers to distinguish greater social vulnerabilities specifically related to flooding? Secondly,
at what level of analysis, e.g. county, census tract, census block, can social vulnerability be
measured?
Finally, data associated with the National Flood Insurance Program and Community
Rating System gathered from a FEMA database was evaluated for county participation rates. The
information was used to make determinations about non-structural mitigation actions specific to
program participation and repetitive loss within state and local hazard mitigation plans.
Particularly, is there evidence that counties are participating in these incentivized programs? If
not, are there clues to why these programs are under-utilized? Does the growth machine dynamic
interfere with program effectiveness?
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Research on mitigation plan quality has continued to grow since the late 1990s.
Evaluating plan quality is challenging due to wide variability and changes in guidance coming
from the federal government. The federal government mandated (DMA, 2000) counties to have
mitigation plans beginning in 2000 and ordered updates in these plans at five year intervals. It is
reasonable to argue mitigation plan standardization could not be realized in the ten year period
that we have focused on. On the other hand, after ten years, we should expect greater
participation and greater focus on accountability. In fact, we should be accomplished in
participation and solely focused on the many ways these plans can be more impactful. This study
will recommend the ways we can accomplish this. Not only do we need to be concerned with the
internal validity of the plans themselves and the effectiveness of top-down guidance, but also
ways in which information from the plans can be gathered and utilized from the bottom-up to
create a functional feedback loop for better results. Herein lies great potential to resolve some of
disconnects between different levels of government, provide more effective oversight and greater
accountability, and diffuse some growth machine influence on the process.
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CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER REGION
The Natural Environment and the Mississippi River
To understand the enormity of what we are dealing with in terms of flood management
on the Mississippi River, it is helpful to provide a comprehensive description of the Mississippi
River system, the fourth largest river in the world.
The headwaters begin in a small stream in Minnesota. From here it takes about 90 days
for a drop of water to flow out the mouth of the Mississippi River into the Gulf of Mexico. It
drains 41 percent of 48 contiguous states, which is a total of 1,245,000 square miles. It accepts
the flows of various rivers and streams in 31 states and two Canadian provinces and serves as the
natural border for ten states. In river miles, it extends just over 2,300 miles long given its
curviness and meandering nature.
The upper Mississippi River flows through Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois. The upper
portion of the river, or the river head, is fed by waterfalls and cradled within a gorge. This
portion of the river is rocky and has higher elevation drops per mile. Here the river cannot be
traveled by other means than a canoe or kayak until it reaches the area around Minneapolis,
Minnesota.
In the 1930-40s a lock and dam system was built that allows for water to pool in order to
make it deep enough for navigation. The lock and dam system is a stair step design where each
dam holds back and pools the water rather than allowing to run freely with natural waterfalls and
rapids. The upper portion of the river is known for vast wildlife refuges in the natural wetland
areas. The wetlands serve as overflow basins for the river when it floods. The dividing point
between the upper and lower river is at the confluence of the Ohio River near Cairo, Illinois.
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From Cairo, Illinois the river develops a faster current and has far less elevation slope.
This portion of the river is mitigated differently (mainly by levee) because it does not have dams
to pool the water. The river, guided by levees, flows faster allowing it to scour the bottom which
makes it deeper and heavy with sediment which gives it a muddy appearance. It is an obscure
fact that the river’s sandy landscape was formed by the river rather than the river actually cutting
through the land (Loyola University Wetland Resource Center, 2011). The river has a lower
alluvial valley of 35,000 square miles which is 650 miles long and 25-125 miles wide. The lower
valley lies within the following seven states: Missouri, Illinois, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas,
Mississippi, and Louisiana.
In the delta region of the Mississippi River, the river has a tendency to change course
about every 1,000 years. There are five previous recorded changes in the river that actually built
Louisiana (Figure 2.1). The first change resulted in the formation of the Atchafalaya River and
secondly the Teche region. From here, the river flops to the direction of New Orleans and creates
the eastrn region of Louisiana. The third shift created St. Bernard; the fourth created Lafourche,
and the fifth shift formed Plaquemine. The river is in the sixth route developing what we call the
“bird’s foot” and the present mouth of the Mississippi River.
The river attempts to take the shortest and steepest route to the Gulf of Mexico. By the
early 1930s, this became a topic of expert discussion (Kelman, 2006) as Old River had
established a continuous easterly flow taking on more and more of the Mississippi River and
directing this volume into the Atchafalaya River. Presently the Atchafalaya River is about 150
miles shorter and steeper than the Mississippi River’s present route towards Baton Rouge and
New Orleans; therefore, the river naturally attempted to shift and completely join the
Atchafalaya.
Flooding impacts on the Mississippi River by natural forces are due to more frequent and
intense rains in both the upper and lower portions but also by higher volumes of snowmelt in the
upper river. Therefore, river flooding would also be affected by climate change. If precipitation
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is greater in warmer atmospheres, the lower portion of the river might be more likely to have
episodes of flooding. In the 1993 floods, the upper Mississippi experienced massive and
catastrophic flooding which would have been detrimental to the lower Mississippi if it were not
for drought conditions affecting the area below Cairo, Illinois.
The Human System on the Mississippi River: Settlement, Growth, and Economic Traits
Dennis Mileti (1999) notes that if people’s characteristics were more homogenous, then
disaster mitigation would be easier and we would suffer fewer losses. If homogenous conditions
were the case, we would have a more simplified and standard way to mitigate because we would
only be dealing with the “magnitude” of the natural hazard (Mileti, 1999). However, the human
system variables associated with the Mississippi River System are numerous and complex. These
include population sizes, socioeconomic conditions, political views, diverse purposes for using or
residing near the river, and different cultural perceptions at different areas along the river. Thus,
our characteristics and interests are incredibly diverse which makes it far more difficult to create
mitigation initiatives satisfactory for everyone. In addition, there will always be a degree of
uncertainty that we cannot completely account for in the decision-making process.
There are over 125 established communities on the river’s edge and some are more
populated than others with heavily populated metropolitan areas such as New Orleans, Louisiana
(1,235,650), Memphis, Tennessee (646,889), St. Louis, Missouri (319,294), Minneapolis/St. Paul,
Minnesota (891,218) dotting the river landscape (U.S. Census, 2010). In addition, the river is
steeped in culture with distinguished differences between the northern and southern ends and
rural and urban areas. It can even be said there are cultural differences on opposite sides of the
river.
Racial inequality and poverty have plagued regions along the river. Given this fact,
politics and wealth influence have made significant impacts on mitigation of the river system.
According to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2001) the Mississippi Delta is one of the
poorest regions in the United States with a population of 8.3 million and has more counties than
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anywhere else in the U.S. to contain a majority percentage of black population. The Delta has a
17 percent unemployment rate and growing with 50.5 percent of the population living below
poverty level (USCCR, 2001). Rural poverty is exacerbated in the lower region of the
Mississippi River and can partially be attributed to discrimination against blacks that continues to
present day. Black discrimination could not be more accentuated than during the 1927 floods
when over 30,000 black plantation workers were forced into concentration camps on the river
working day and night to build protection on the levees (Barry, 1997). Many of these men were
lost in the flooding as they were stranded and abandoned atop the levees as human sandbags. The
official death toll is very misleading and inaccurate given the nature of inequality in 1927 and
blacks were not counted in the census of fatalities (Barry, 1997).
Settlement in the southern region of the Mississippi River began with the 1717 French
settlement on the crescent shaped land adjacent to the Mississippi River. This ridge was formed
by sediment deposits from the river where it takes a sharp turn east to northeast before it flows
straight south for 100 miles into the Gulf of Mexico. Thus L’Isle de la Nouvelle Orléans (The
Island of New Orleans—at the time believed to be surrounded by water), later became New
Orleans. There was speculation among settlers from Indiana and Kentucky territories that travel
by river could lead them to the Gulf of Mexico and river trade would be foundational to
development of the American Colonies. Unfortunately, Spain declared full control of the
Mississippi River cutting northern colonists off from the lower portion of the Mississippi. The
1803 Louisiana Purchase (costing just over 11 million dollars) secured the right to public use for
travel the length of the Mississippi without intervention by the Spanish. The purchase prompted
increased trade and travel on the river. From this point, New Orleans was on its way to
becoming the largest trade route in and out of the U.S. colonies. Living on the delta of the fourth
longest river in the world would be profitable and rewarding, but it also meant dealing with many
risks and hazards associated with the natural environment.
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Presently, the upper portion of the Mississippi River serves the region’s 30 million people
as a resource for power plant operations, delivery and export of goods (70-85 million tons of
cargo annually), and various other things that enable the public and industry to survive (USGS,
2007). The 1,200,000 acres of floodplains have been adapted for pasture and agriculture use as
well. Likewise, the lower Mississippi River has a huge agricultural niche within its basin. The
rich and fertile soils left from upstream sediments provide for millions of acres of winter wheat,
corn, soybeans, cotton, sugarcane, sorghum and rice. The Atchafalaya basin provides a
livelihood for about 1,100 commercial fishermen who provide 82 million pounds of crawfish
(McCain et al., 2007) which makes up nearly 95 percent of the national crawfish harvest for the
food and restaurant industry. The lower Mississippi River serves to provide fertilizer, chemicals,
petroleum, lumber and pulp, gravel, steel, and coal throughout the river system.
Over 400 million tons of bulk cargo is distributed along the river system with 200 million
of this tonnage being gasoline and petroleum products (Nienaber, 2007). 448 million tons of
cargo is exported annually through the Port of New Orleans accounting for $37 billion dollars of
the national economy (Stanford, 2011). In grains alone, 1.1 billion bushels of corn, 385 million
bushels of soy beans, and 32 million bushels of wheat that make up 90 percent of grain exports
are carried down the river (Kruse, 2004). The Mississippi River is a vital link to the economy
serving as the most efficient means of transportation. Barges can carry 1,500 tons of bulk
products which is far greater capacity than any other method of transportation.
The Constructed Environment
The constructed environment defined by Mileti (1999) consists of housing, utilities,
transportation, technology, communications, critical facilities and engineered structures.
Tributaries and river connections making trade possible gave rise to great American cities
scattered along its riverbanks. Railroads and automobiles contributed and complicated the
American connection with the river. We built bridges, dams, and levees to protect these cities
from floods. Within these cities as population densities grew so did the amount of impermeable
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surfaces that allow more runoff into the river system. Pumping stations and holding ponds help
manage flooding within cities but poorly maintained infrastructures often leave cities vulnerable
when their measures are obsolete or in need of upgrades and repairs.
Dependence on the Mississippi River resulted in the need to make changes by building
diversion structures such as levees, carve-outs or canals in order to protect settlements or improve
navigation. As a result of these changes, there were unintended consequences that led to an
ongoing management system which would monitor and remedy problems arising from those
alterations. These conditions makes the system path dependent (Collier and Collier, 1991) which
limits the course or changes possible after a previous major action is taken.
Historical Underpinnings: Public Space, Power, and Path Dependency
The history behind flood control becomes an entertaining story beyond the informative.
The historical narrative describing how settlement occurred around the river, how we used the
river, and the changes made to the river establishes that the growth machine dynamics have
created a path dependent system that also contributes to increasing vulnerability to catastrophic
flood disasters. Comprehensive evaluation of the flooding problem, the theories behind flooding
problems, and the social influences that perpetuate and exacerbate the flooding problem are
examined.
Consider who controlled the river, the space in front of the river and who established
where riparian rights end and public space begins? Kelman (2006) argues that these are the main
issues that have played a predominate role in flood mitigation since the infancy of the United
States. The nation has a culture steeped in individualism and strong respect for private property
rights. The role of government in the interest of flood control and public safety has been highly
controversial; and over time, there have been many changes depending on the zeitgeist.
Time and path dependency are key elements in developing an understanding of how the
federal flood control system originated. The historical to contemporary settlement and
development in the Mississippi River provides a rich foundation to overall discussion of
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transformations in addressing flooding problems. Since colonial times, the battle between
preservation of nature and development of the riverbanks has ensued. Shortly after the Louisiana
Purchase, privatizing the riverfront in New Orleans became an issue that reached national
importance. Prior to selling Louisiana, the French had sold parcels of land abutting the riverfront.
Here the transition from French governing to U.S. territory and governance was clunky even
though U.S. government relied heavily on French and English law. The prevailing attitude in the
infant U.S. was one of “reverence for property rights” while the prevailing attitude in New
Orleans was one of “committing to civil law heritage” (Kelman, 2006, 41).
Early 1800s riverfront property deeds contained a covenant that required the landowner
to maintain a levee along the riverbank. Levee policy was further codified by state government in
Louisiana Act 154 (1813) and Louisiana Act 156 (1817) to ensure the police juries had authority
to sue landowners for work performed as a result of levee maintenance negligence (Poe, 2006,
62). In populated areas, this became problematic with owners because they felt too much of the
burden was on them to protect not only their own land but those owning land behind them. They
felt this should be a shared endeavor.
In rural areas upstream from New Orleans, building or maintaining the levee was even
more problematic and complicated. First, the terrain along the riverfront in an undeveloped state
was very dense with vines, trees and undergrowth. The river created its own natural levee
forming a ridge as it overtopped the banks, then dropped heavy sediment first and cascaded the
rest in a graded fashion until the slope gave way to marshy floodplain and backcountry (Poe,
2006). Huge swaths of giant cane or canebrakes within the undergrowth helped sustain the
levee as the knotty fibrous root systems formed mats beneath the surface holding the sediment in
place (Poe, 2006). The land in an undeveloped state was so dense that settling proved difficult as
the only possible access was by the waterway. The land easiest to clear was the land closest to
the river that had dried, thus owners built their homes, slave quarters, barns, and livestock pens
along the ridge (Poe, 2006). The homes were elevated to allow air circulation and to protect them
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from flooding, snakes and vermin (Poe, 2006). The most difficult laborious land to clear was that
of the backcountry which remained damp and heavy and very mineral rich and perfect for cotton
farming (Poe, 2006). Flooding occurred often and carried bugs that destroyed crops and stagnated
water pools that incubated mosquitos, thus yellow fever epidemics were rampant. Likewise, river
erosion often took chunks of the riverbanks forcing settlers to rebuild homes and levees further
back on their properties and often at a lower level than previously.
In 1803 New Orleans, as the result of the Mississippi River’s sediment building nature, a
land mass had formed on the east bank upstream from the crescent “C” (today’s French Quarter)
between the river and the private property line of Jean Gravier, a wealthy landowner of
Faubourge St. Mary (Kelman, 2006). During periods of low water, this muddy sediment bank,
the batture, was considered public use and served as a community promenade as it dried out in the
summer months. The batture provided an access point for flat boats and fishing and was often
used by locals to extract sediment for personal needs on their own property (Kelman, 2006).
Jean Gravier, owner of Faubourge St. Mary (today’s New Orleans central business
district) had become increasingly territorial over the batture and set up his own barriers to prevent
public access (Kelman, 2006). The locals had pretty much disregarded Gravier and attributed
much of his behavior as being that of an eccentric old fool. On the other hand, Gravier had
decided that this batture held potential profit for him if he could lay claim then market the land
for development and improvements (Kelman, 2006). In Gravier’s mind, while the river “giveth
and taketh away” this was the hazard of owning property that abuts a river. Therefore, he
believed the land gifted by nature was solely his riparian property (Kelman, 2006).
In 1807 Gravier had sought out the recently transplanted New York attorney Edward
Livingston for collaboration and challenged the local council to acknowledge his riparian rights
to the batture (Kelman, 2006). Livingston had left New York in a state of disgrace after his
subordinate embezzled $50,000 from the city treasury while Livingston was holding public office
(Kelman, 2006). Not only did his dealings in New York sour with the city but also ran afoul with
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President Jefferson during the Hamilton-Burr political conflict in New York. Like several of his
colleagues and business associates in New York, Livingston has sought refuge in New Orleans to
escape his past. In exchange for his legal services, Gravier offered Livingston a parcel of land on
the batture to develop for himself (Kelman, 2006, 28).
Up to this point, local law held that the riverbank was owned by the public, therefore, the
batture was perceived as public space and Gravier’s property right ended at the edge of the
batture (Kelman, 2006, 28). Local elites were outraged at Livingston’s attempt to privatize the
batture and grew infuriated when justices of the territory ruled in favor of Gravier and Livingston
(Kelman, 2006, 30). As Livingston attempted to develop his portion of the batture, locals
organized into mobs and disrupted the work. The conflict between Livingston and the locals
continued to escalate to a dangerous level thus Livingston turned to the territory Governor
William Claiborne to enforce his rights established by the territory justices (Kelman, 2006, 31).
In the United States, the Federal Government owns the land beneath navigable waters up
to the high water mark. Therefore, while Livingston was arguing for the territory justices to
enforce his rights, the local council called on the Governor to help defuse the conflict by
establishing the batture as riverbed sediment in federal jurisdiction (Kelman, 2006). President
Jefferson then intervened for two reasons. First, was the fact that Jefferson’s animosity towards
Livingston played a huge role in taking away Livingston’s claim to the batture (Kelman, 2006).
Second, he took the position that riverbanks are public space trusted to the people of the nation
(Kelman, 2006).
Livingston would eventually regain control of this property. Using Manhattan as example
of how the local council handed out land grants to develop their waterfront and save their city’s
beleaguered financial condition, Livingston appealed to locals that it was in their best interest to
have someone develop the property and maximize the economic benefit for the public good
(Kelman, 2006, 40). Livingston filed two suits, one against Jefferson in Federal Circuit Court for
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ordering him evicted and one in New Orleans district court against the marshal, Le Breton
D’Orgenois, that evicted him (Kelman, 2006, 44).
While Livingston lost his case in federal circuit court, he won his case in New Orleans as
D’Orgenois had nothing but the merits of the case to stand on. The local government, Counseil de
Ville, continued to fight with Livingston creating injunctions against him meanwhile granting
other riparian proprietors favor until they haggled Livingston into donating part of the batture to
the city, allowed sediment to be removed by citizens for personal use, and forced him to build a
levee to protect the property (Kelman, 2006, 47).
The battle over public space on the batture changed the landscape and the “public
character” of the riverfront (Kelman, 2006, 49). Losing control of the riverfront led the general
public to be extremely concerned about how problems associated with the natural force of the
river would be dealt with (Kelman, 2006). They felt that there would be both economic and
environmental disasters as a result of losing control of the riverfront. This critical juncture or
pivotal point created crucial change and lasting legacy (Collier and Collier, 1991) as power was
gained by the growth machine dynamic and diminished for regular citizens.
Historical Underpinnings: River Navigation and Controls
While serving as Minister to France under the Jefferson administration, Robert
Livingston, Edward’s older brother was instrumental in the Louisiana Purchase. Basically this
purchase included not only Louisiana, but also a large swath of land west of the Mississippi River
beyond the region that bordered the river such as Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, and parts of
Minnesota. The Louisiana Purchase allowed the U.S. free and clear access to the Mississippi
River. Though the purchase itself was questionable as being unconstitutional, there was little
dissent with the rhetoric that this provided all people within the nation free rights to access and
use of the river which in turn would provide the economic growth to launch the U.S. into
becoming a powerful wealthy nation.
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Contrarily, Robert Livingston then switched his position on a shared public river once he
joined forces with Robert Fulton and Nicholas Roosevelt to form the Fulton Group, who
successfully invented the first commercial steamboat (Kelman, 2006). The Fulton Group
appealed to Governor Claiborne to pass legislation that gave them sole access to the river and its
tributaries within the Louisiana territory (Kelman, 2006, 53). Kelman (2006, 54) explains that
during this time period, granting monopolies allowed the country to develop infrastructure and
garner revenue for federal, state, and local government that otherwise was impossible to attain. In
this period, monopolies stood for the common good and best use of public space. The private
sector provided the capital and groundwork for infrastructure thus spurring economic growth in
exchange for healthy profits and exclusive control of that area. Though it seemed hypocritical for
Claiborne to support Fulton Group’s request for a monopoly, given his previous intervention in
the New Orleans riverfront, he championed the cause (Kelman, 2006, 53).
There was reluctance among the citizens and local flatboat traders to embrace the Fulton
steamboats as the logistical means to improve upon their present trading conditions. The
economic boom promised by the Fulton Group did not materialize (Kelman, 2006, 56). Local
people in the Louisiana viewed the Livingston brothers as greedy eastern outsiders and their
unpopularity limited their power despite their monopoly on the river (Kelman, 2006, 57). In the
meantime, Henry Shreve of Pennsylvania had garnered enough capital to improve upon the
Fulton steamboat invention building two steamboats with greater capabilities for upriver travel as
far as Louisville, Kentucky in a matter of record time-- 25 days (Kelman, 2006, 58).
Rather than publically and forcefully challenging Shreve’s use of the river, Livingston,
the ever unpopular outsider, was careful to challenge Shreve’s use of the river indirectly. He
solicited a retainer from all local attorneys so Shreve would have no representation when
Livingston took him in court (Kelman, 2006, 57). The skirmishes between Shreve and
Livingston escalated and Shreve’s attorney was successful in garnering enough public support for
Shreve, that the Fulton monopoly was abolished as the local court ruled they had no jurisdiction
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to enforce Shreve off the river (Kelman, 2006, 59). At this point, commerce on the Mississippi
River began to grow exponentially as the river was once again held in common by the public.
Historical Underpinnings: Changes to the Natural Landscape Increase Flooding
River erosion was exacerbated by the onslaught of steamboats and the enormous amount
of wood needed to fuel their engines. Since space was limited given the large cargo holds, the
steamboats would carry no more than a day’s worth of lumber on board to fuel the engines;
therefore, “wood hawks” or loggers would cut and score wood for sale along the riverbanks (Poe,
2006). Flooding was beneficial for wood hawks as they cut wood in lowlands and then during
high water, floated their loads and often cut holes in levees to move their wood to the riverside
(Poe, 2006, 73).
Flooding brought about more debris, and debris made river navigation hazardous for
steamboats, three-fifths of steamboat losses were attributed to debris accidents (Poe, 2006, 53).
Therefore, there was a growing need to keep navigation open and deal with debris and natural
sediment building that created sandbars and obstructions. Who would be responsible for
maintaining navigation? The federal government would eventually step in and assist with
navigation mitigation (Klein and Zellmer, 2007; Kelman, 2006) after the Supreme Court affirmed
that regulating navigation lies within congressional authority (see Gibbons v. Ogden).
Following the flood in 1825, former Livingston foe and established navigation expert
Henry Shreve argued that all the timber from the edge of the riverbank up to 300-400 yards back
should be removed in order to prevent tree debris from entering the river (Poe, 2006, 53). The
federal government began commissioning Shreve and his crews to do navigation maintenance on
the river. Within a span of six months, Shreve’s crews had cut 10,000 trees from the riverbanks
and this would prove to be devastating and irreversible damage to the Mississippi River by
exacerbating bank erosion (Poe, 2006).
In 1831, Shreve was also responsible for cutting a canal at Trumbel’s Bend to improve
travel time to New Orleans. This canal known as Old River sometimes flowed east to west when
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the Red River was high and then west to east if the Mississippi River level was higher. Shreve’s
shortcut proved to be problematic as experts learned more about the river later.
Growing trade had increased settlements on the river and individual efforts to build
levees provided protections from river flooding. There was little to no coordination on levee
building and this protection was not very reliable. By the 1820s the State of Louisiana had
established a comprehensive levee system where landowners were required to maintain their
portion of the levee at their own expense within the standards prescribed by law (Poe, 2006). The
local Parish Judge provided oversight for the system and police juries who had to construct or
repair neglected levees sued the landowner for work and repair costs (Poe, 2006).
Leveeing was a European practice brought over by the French and the most ancient
practice in response to flooding (Poe, 2006). Basically it was the only method considered
because it was all early settlers knew. However, the more complex the levee system became, the
greater the problem of flooding. Levees increased the height of the water within the channel. As
a result when they were overtopped, or worse, as they were breached, they created larger
disasters. In Louisiana, the velocity of the water was not strong enough to scour and deepen the
channel, therefore the higher they built the levee, the higher the water rose as the sediment
increased below in the riverbed.
Historical Underpinnings: Increased Flooding and Need for Levee Cooperation
Locals and especially planters along the riverbanks found themselves in an unsustainable
situation with several issues resulting. They often could not afford to maintain the levee or were
disgruntled with sacrificing the land. They complained of the lack of cost sharing with neighbors
behind them and sacrificing the labor that could be used for planting (Poe, 2006). Levee districts
developed within communities but the problems continued to grow. Lack of uniform standards
for levee building went across state lines and states were forbidden by the U.S. Constitution from
entering into compacts without Congress approval (Poe, 2006). Thus, the levee problem had
reached a point where locals wanted federal intervention.
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Federal infrastructure development or internal improvements was a highly controversial
issue during national elections throughout the first half of the 1800s and one of the main issues
that led us into the Civil War. The South and the Northeast had two very different economies.
The Northeast was heavily industrialized and the South was primarily agrarian. Regional
competition grew over western expansion, national markets and labor, international trading,
transportation links, and Congressional power. Some infrastructure projects were endorsed by
Congress under the auspices of national defense and economic development. The South felt
slighted by the Northeast and upper Midwest as they made east to west trading routes with federal
money that didn’t seem to provide enough benefit to the South (O’Neill, 2006, 46-47).
Perhaps these routes potentially limited the South in this growing regional competition
(sectionalism) for federal money for internal improvements. It is disputed in various scholarly
circles as to whether regional economic differences led to the Civil War or whether it was
primarily the issue of slavery. It is hard to extract from the circumstances that the need for free
slave labor in order to sustain the Southern economy was a matter of economic disparity. The
free labor capitalism movement in the Northeast and Midwest was a progressive ideal.
The South continued to press for federal support to build the levees. They argued that the
levees would improve the channel for navigation by scouring and deepening the river bottom thus
help rid the river of snags thus improving the economic conditions for the whole country (Poe,
2006). Second, territories in the North and upriver drained into the lower territory causing the
flooding. They argued their means for drainage was a negative externality on the South.
Therefore, the cost of flood control should be shared by everyone given that this was a national
waterway (Poe, 2006). Third, federally owned public lands in Louisiana bordered the river and
therefore Congress should be responsible to build levees “in its capacity as a landowner” (Poe,
2006, 56).
Based on these three primary arguments for federal levee support, the South had growing
support from business elite, levee districts, state, and local governments throughout the South.
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Advocacy conventions had grown in popularity in the late 1840-50s. The most notorious was the
1845 Mississippi River Improvement Convention in Memphis led by John Calhoun which
demanded attention to Southern infrastructure to be connected to the upper Midwest including a
levee system and a canal to be built from the Great Lakes to the Mississippi River (Kelman, 2006;
O’Neill, 2006; Poe, 2006). They were heavily opposed by those in Upper Midwest and the
Northeast. Therefore in 1847 in Chicago, they held the largest convention of the time with the
intent to snub the South (O’Neill, 2006; Poe, 2006).
The 1849-50 flood created a major levee breach at the Suavé Plantation (also known as
Sauvé Crevasse) just 15 miles upriver from New Orleans. High water left over 12,000 people
homeless and 200 city blocks in New Orleans flooded for weeks (Kelman, 2006, 162; Klein and
Zellmer, 2007, Poe, 2006). The flooding brought about national attention to the levee problem
and growing pressure on Congress to do something. In an attempt to appease the South, Congress
created the 1850 Swamp Land Act which conveyed all uncultivated federal lands bordering the
river to the South. These lands also needed levee protection. Therefore, their intent was for
Louisiana to parcel out the lands and build a levee system from the sale profits (Poe, 2006).
Prior to the Civil War, the levee system had started to develop into more than 740 miles
(Poe, 2006) and most of this is attributed to the development of levee districts and state oversight.
While the levees were pretty much continuous, they were still inadequate and weak. Numerous
breaches and repetitive flooding was taxing Louisiana unduly as the State attempted to build a
war cache. When the South entered the Civil War, the State did away with public works and all
efforts to maintain the levees (Poe, 2006).
Historical Underpinnings: Breaking the Levees to Win the War
In the beginning of the Civil War, the Union Army quickly took control of most all the
Mississippi River and made their way deep into the South rendering Louisiana powerless quite
early on. Dominance on the river allowed the Union to maneuver more effectively to take
Vicksburg which was a Confederate stronghold. Cutting levees in order to move the Union

23

military closer to attack on Vicksburg resulted in hundreds of miles of flooding in Louisiana (Poe,
2006). Within four years of the beginning of the Civil War, the levee system was totally
decimated. Adding insult to injury, the Union soldiers had been using the levee to bury corpses
(Poe, 2006). The South was wretched and crippled by the end of the war. Devastation from the
war had, among things, taken the majority of able bodied men and demolished the economy.
With broken levees and fairly continuous flooding, recovery from the war was difficult. It
prevented landowners from producing crops and many were losing their lands to debt created
from crop failures. Yellow fever and cholera epidemics were rampant. Mindful not to minimize
the impact of “violence and racism” on the Reconstruction, Cynthia Poe (2006) argues that
flooding dealt a really significant impact as it “exacerbated” effects and conflicts.
Those hit the hardest though were the newly freed people. Sharecropping and wagebased contracts actually made life worse for them than being under the possession and care of
plantation owners (Poe, 2006). Under the new labor system both freed people and plantation
owners suffered debt and crop failures. However, differential problems resulted and created
greater disparity. Landowners were going into greater debt for labor, seeds, failed crops; and at
the same time, dealing with major tax increases to rebuild their communities. When crops failed,
freed people were broke, homeless, and further destitute than before. If they rented or acquired
land to live on, their homes were more likely to be within lower elevation flood prone areas.
Freed people also lacked education so they had few options for employment. They lacked credit
or suffered disadvantageous terms of credit and where often in competition with white farmers.
Overall, they were pushed towards a state of fixed dependency on government aid (Poe, 2006).
Many of the freed people began to steal livestock, food, and supplies from white landowners and
tore down bridges and used the wood for fuel (Poe, 2006). Thus flooding exacerbated poverty
thus created more tension between blacks and whites.
Several state initiatives to build the levees back failed after the war. The states tried
generating revenue for levee rebuilding by selling bonds but the program collapsed. The states
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then tried to create a public-private partnership with a local levee building company but then
failed to appropriate the money to pay contractors (Poe, 2006).
Political corruption and greed ran rampant as Reconstruction aid never seemed to touch
the people. While both Democrats and Republicans alike engaged in corrupt practices in the
South, it was all blamed on the Republican North and sectionalist bias (Poe, 2006). As Poe (2006,
183) states, “the experience of flooding and the experience of Reconstruction were one.” The
attitude in the North was that the South needed to suffer the consequences of their own making.
Historical Underpinnings: Levees Only Policy
The second recommendation of the 1850 Swamp Act was to authorize two separate
studies of the Mississippi River flood problem but completion of these surveys were hampered by
the war. Two engineers, Charles Ellet a civil engineer and Captain Andrew Humphreys were
commissioned to survey and develop a prescription for flood mitigation. This infamous battle is
eloquently presented in John Barry’s 1997 book The Rising Tide of a battle between a civil and a
military engineer. Ultimately, Humphreys fell behind Ellet due to illness, therefore, Ellet was
published first in 1852 (Kelman, 2006; Poe, 2006; Barry, 1997). In his report, Ellet endorsed
creating floodways, reservoirs, carve outs and levees as a means to mitigate flooding.
Humphreys actually had arrived at the same conclusions but before he finished his work
both he and Ellet were called to duty in the Civil War (Barry, 1997). After the war, Humphreys
returned to the task of completing his survey. Humphreys, a rather inflated and bombastic fellow,
could not merely support Ellet’s findings and allow Ellet to surpass him (Barry, 1997). His
contribution had to squash Ellet in order to maintain the notoriety that he felt he deserved (Barry,
1997). Therefore, he “corrupted” his findings and wrote in support of a “levees only policy”
based on costs being too great to pursue Ellet’s grandiose ideas (Barry, 1997). Ellet was killed in
the war therefore he could not defend his work (Barry, 1997). Local government then endorsed
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the “levees only” ideal and made it policy. Humphreys became the Chief of the Corps of
Engineers until the power of the Corps was diminished by the Mississippi River Commission.
By 1879, it was determined that river management needed to be directed from a
centralized authority. The Mississippi River Commission was established and consisted of three
Corps of Engineers representatives—a president, one from the U.S. Coast and Geodatic Survey
and three civilians of which two must be engineers (Barry, 1997). The appointments would be
made by the President and confirmed by Congress. Due to lack of funding appropriations, little
was accomplished under this initiative (Barry, 1997).
Historical Underpinnings: The 1927 Great Flood Gives Rise to “Project Flood”
Again major flooding occurred in lower Mississippi and the losses were great in 1882,
1912, 1913 and then most significantly in 1927. The flooding in 1927 devastated the Delta region
and is known as the most disastrous in history. Over 600,000 people were left homeless and the
disputed death toll is 1,000 (Barry, 1997). Again, death toll numbers can be contested based on
racial divisions. The Delta region was a catastrophic mess.
Many felt President Coolidge was hiding from the public when he refused to visit the
devastation. Known as “Silent Cal,” he was very brooding and quiet, a man of few words. He
felt that visiting the devastation would be equal to political grandstanding. At the same time, he
also believed that flood recovery was strictly a matter of personal responsibility. Like many
presidents before him, President Coolidge’s address to the 70th Congress was adamant that the
federal government was not in the business of protecting people from “Acts of God” and natural
hazards such as floods (70th Congress Digest 46, 1928). Herbert Hoover was sent to the South to
direct flood relief operations and deal with racial discord. Hoover gained the confidence of many
Southern blacks who remained stranded in refugee camps while many others navigated north to
Chicago to find better racial relations and work. Hoover rallied Southern blacks in flood
reconstruction efforts and promised them their efforts would not soon be forgotten if they helped
elect him to president. He swept the candidacy being highly regarded for his flood relief efforts.
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However, he betrayed the black voters by ignoring civil rights issues and opposing federal antilynching laws and ultimately suffered a loss in reelection.
Headlining in Hoover’s highly dignified entrance to the White House, was the Flood
Control Act of 1928 that ended the “levees only” policy. The massive and comprehensive
mitigation reform would be known as “Project Flood” (Figure 2.2). Project flood provided for
the use of levees, floodways, channel improvements/stabilization, and tributary basin
improvements. In other words, revetments, cutoffs, dikes and dredging would be used for
improvements and stabilization. Dams, reservoirs, pumping plants, and auxiliary channels would
provide for tributary basin improvements.
Levees, floodwalls and control structures constructed by the federal government would
encompass 2,203 miles with 1,607 miles specifically on the Mississippi River and 596 miles on
the Arkansas, Red, and Atchafalaya Rivers (USACE, 2006). These would be maintained by the
local governments except when federal assistance would be needed during major floods.
Inspections would be conducted by local levee districts and the Army Corps of Engineers.
The Flood Control Act of 1928 was the first major piece of legislation that put the federal
government squarely in the middle of protecting the population from natural hazards. The cost
would be greater than any undertaking thus far by the federal government besides World War I
costing $325 million (Klein and Zellmer, 2007). The Act also provided protection for the federal
government against any litigation resulting from flooding and flood damage. In other words, the
federal government provided mainly structural protections against floods and otherwise was not
responsible for outcomes associated with flooding. Therefore, if their structures failed or caused
a greater flood hazard, they were not held liable.
What is attractive about the 1928 Flood Control Act is that it would centralize efforts to
mitigate communities along the riverbank. It provided opportunity to dispel corruption and
inconsistencies within local districts where some areas where marginalized for the sake of
catering to others that were more influential or wealthy. The goal of Project Flood was to build
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the system at least a foot higher than any known previous flood which would be quite
accomplished. On the other hand, it also brought about a false sense of security behind the
floodwalls and levees which resulted in increased development and greater issues later.
Historical Underpinnings: Old River Flow Problem
Also by 1927, the engineers and experts began to realize there was now a constant
westerly flow in Old River and the Atchafalaya was taking on more of the Mississippi River
(Winer, 2010). Shreve’s cut at Trumbel’s Bend had allowed the Mississippi to begin the 1,000
year natural shift and take the steepest and shortest route to the Gulf of Mexico (Winer, 2010).
Sediment would build and a saltwater wedge would turn the “Birdsfoot” mouth of the Mississippi
into a swamp, effectively destroying trade and commerce for New Orleans and along the corridor
leading to and including Baton Rouge.
Old River Controls serves as a mechanism to keep the Mississippi River flowing towards
New Orleans. This structure provides a 70/30 split sending 30 percent down the Atchafalaya
River via Old River and 70 percent to New Orleans and is designed to prevent the river from
completely changing course and taking the Atchafalaya to the Gulf of Mexico (Kelman, 2006). It
was believed that if the government did not take action soon, the river would be totally consumed
by the Atchafalaya by the early 1970s. The Old River Controls structure was completed in 1964.
Old River controls would first be tested in flooding during 1973. In the aftermath, there
was structural damage that scoured out area nearly the size of a football field, but it did hold the
river in place (Kelman, 2006). An auxiliary structure, completed in 1986, was built to provide
support for Old River Controls. Then, in the early 1990s, a hydroelectric plant was built behind it
and some argue that the hydroelectric plant adds protection. However, Harley Winer (2010)
claims that the hydroelectric plant has a “sediment lean” system that disrupts the sediment
controls and sediment is being shifted disproportionately towards New Orleans and causing a
great sediment loss as it falls off the continental shelf into deep waters. The coastal wetlands are
disappearing as a result of this misappropriation of sediment. Winer (2010) says that increased
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sediment load in the Atchafalaya River would result in greater delta growth at both the Wax Lake
Outlet and mouth of the Atchafalaya River.
Winer (2010) is a strong advocate for detailed engineering studies that support changing
legislation to allow the Mississippi River to overtake the Atchafalaya including moving
communities, ports, bridges, and industry that would be in the way of the increased flows.
Winer’s (2010) recommendation would include the entire area of Morgan City and The Port of
Morgan City strategically positioned on the Intercoastal waterway. After the 2011 floods, NASA
provided satellite images (Figure 2.3) of sediment plumes at the mouth of the Mississippi River
beyond New Orleans and at the mouth of the Atchafalaya. These images could possible dispute
claims by Winer (2010).
Historical Underpinnings: Flood Insurance Policy and Non-Structural Policy Focus
The next notable legislation is the creation of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.
The legislative initiative was led by Gilbert F. White who advocated for a more comprehensive
package of flood mitigation including flood insurance and “nonstructural” floodplain
management (Platt, 1995). The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was intended to
mitigate the cost of disaster assistance during flooding by providing a low-cost flood insurance to
floodplain resident. Policy holders would then have a pooled resource in which to draw a benefit
for flood repairs. However, there are problems and abuses related to this program and its
ineffectiveness.
The 1993 flooding on the Missouri River and upper portion of the Mississippi River
brought about a renewed focus on flooding problems along the Mississippi River and specifically
brings to light problems with the NFIP. Those most affected by the flood were in poverty
stricken areas in flood-prone areas or floodways. Over 100,000 homes were destroyed yet there
were only 16,167 claims whereas overall there are 90,000 policies in the nine states affected
(Platt, 1995). What is happening here suggests that the majority of these homes did not have
flood insurance. The majority of the 16,167 claims were for commercial structures or basement
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flooding outside the floodplains (Platt, 1995). Even if communities participate in the NFIP and
make the necessary mitigation requirements, evidence thus far suggests that the NFIP is flawed
and ineffective. People within the floodplain are required to have flood insurance in order to
obtain a mortgage. However, they often drop the flood insurance soon after purchase because
they cannot afford it. If disaster assistance is still made available, these people are often
incentivized not to obtain flood insurance.
Gaming the NFIP is also a problem when it comes to waiting periods for flooding; and
specifically a problem highlighted in the 1993 Flood at Chesterfield, Missouri were an
agricultural levee was “upgraded to a 100 year level of protection” and industry was allowed to
build up behind it without forcing them to purchase the mandatory flood insurance, nor did they
have proper floodplain controls (Platt, 1995). These corporations bought flood insurance just
prior to the five day waiting period so they quickly enjoyed insurance benefits of $13.2 million
accounting for five percent of the entire NFIP claims in nine states (Platt, 1995). In light of this
abuse, the Galloway Report (1984) recommended that the waiting period be extended to 15 days.
Currently, the waiting period has been set at 30 days.
The 1993 flooding was called the worst yet to hit the United States claiming 50 lives and
forcing the evacuation of tens of thousands and destroying 10,000 homes (Larson, 1996).
Flooding was limited to the upper Mississippi River because of severe drought conditions in the
lower Mississippi Delta. Having drought conditions in the south was a very fortunate
circumstance given the differences in socioeconomic conditions between the populations of the
South and North. The flood would have been catastrophic if the entire Mississippi River system
had flooded. Nonetheless, the damage was great and crippled the communities as this 300 year
flood closed ten airports, shut down barge traffic for two months, destroyed bridges, and
effectively halted railroad traffic and destroyed key infrastructure (Larson, 1996).
Discussion of issues and problems resulting from the 1993 flooding is covered in the
“Galloway Report” or Sharing the Challenge: Flood-plain Management into the 21st Century
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(1994) generated by the Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee. The primary
cause that “exacerbated” flood levels were nonfederal agricultural levees and other means farmers
used to control flooding. In some cases farmers had taken wetlands for agriculture use and
prevented the river from overflowing into natural floodplains. Federal levees were nearly
overtopped but they held and the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) was successful in
using reservoirs as intended. Problems included failure of key infrastructure such as wastewater
facilities and sewer backup. Flood waters were contaminated by flooding at superfund sites and
floodplains containing hazardous waste. Total damage from the 1993 flooding was
approximately $16 billion dollars (Galloway Report, 1994).
Recent Major Mississippi River Flooding
The 2011 floods left over three million acres of farmland submerged in water. One of the
most controversial losses of farmland includes a preliminary cost of $85 million (Plume, 2011) to
the floodway at Birdspoint, Missouri. When flood levels rose to 59 feet at Cairo, Illinois, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers placed 115 tons of liquid explosives into 27,000 feet of pipe fuse
plugs within levees at Birdspoint; and then blew them to protect Cairo from total flood
destruction. This decision forced nearly 200 people residing in 90 homes within the floodway to
be evacuated and their property inundated in order to save Cairo (population of 3,000) from total
flood destruction (Gay, 2011).
The Birdspoint-New Madrid floodway has been steeped in controversy since the Flood
Control Act of 1928 authorized the acquisition of easements for the floodway. Approximately
3,000 residents within the area were paid a one-time indemnity of $17 per acre for this land to be
flooded if needed in order to save the nearby town of Cairo, Illinois whose population at that time
was approximately 15,000 (USACE, 2011). In 1937 a few residents armed with guns still
attempted to prevent inundating the floodway. National Guard members were ordered to protect
the USACE as they initiated the explosions.
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During the 2011 flood, residents of the area attempted to block USACE from blowing up
the levees by filing a law suit in Missouri objecting to the use of the floodway claiming it violated
the Missouri Clean Water Act (1981). A federal judge ruled that the USACE was authorized to
breech the levee. However, this decision was appealed and two Missouri senators wrote to the
president requesting that he block USACE from blowing up portions of the levee (Barrett and
Brat, 2011). Flood waters continued to rise steadily and time was a critical element when
USACE finally received orders to open the floodway. It was not an issue of clean water that was
upsetting the residents. They made it clear to the national news media that they were attempting
to block opening the floodway because they felt Cairo, Illinois, a predominately black
community, was a dying city plagued with poverty and drug use (Gay, 2011). These white
farmers within the floodway felt that allowing an impoverished and drug infested Cairo to flood
was more justified that destroying their homes and farmland (Gay, 2011). In a USA Today report
on May 18, 2011 (Frank, 2011) residents and farmers in Missouri asked: “Why is it more
important to save one side and ruin the other?” In a USA Today editorial, Rep. Jo Ann Emerson,
R-Mo. responded, stating currently designed flood control measures and calls for returning the
river to natural conditions “is a high ideal for environmentalists who live in safer places and an
unthinkable violation of property rights and liberty for Americans who have lived beside the river
for more than a century” (see USA Today online edition update 5/18/2011; Frank, 2011).
Once the floodway was inundated, residents then filed a class action lawsuit (Minahan,
2011) against the federal government claiming they were not adequately compensated for their
losses. Farmers complained that while they will be compensated for loss of equipment and
expense related to planting, they would not be compensated for their lost profits.
Communities in the lower Mississippi River would see record flood levels as a result of
what is described as a 500 year flood. Vicksburg flood stage is 43 feet and according to the
National Weather Service (2011) it crested at 57.1 breaking the previous record in 1927 of 56.2
feet. Likewise the flood stage at Natchez was 48 feet and it crested at 61.9 feet beating the prior
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record of 58 feet in 1937 (NWS, 2011). Approximately 5,000 people were forced to evacuate
from these areas (Branston and Finn, 2011).
The Atchafalaya basin in Louisiana was also threatened during the 2011 floods. As with
Birdspoint-New Madrid floodway, the government had purchased easement rights to inundate the
area via the Morganza Spillway. This spillway is designed to take pressure off the Old River
Controls and levees protecting Baton Rouge and New Orleans. The magnitude of 2011 flooding
would have pushed levees beyond their design capacity if not for releasing the water into the
Atchafalaya basin. 25,000 residents were prepared and partially evacuated and approximately
11,000 structures within the floodway were at risk for inundation (Robertson, 2011).
For nearly 20 years the people of Louisiana disputed the use of a spillway. However,
when faced with the realization that levee structures alone would not likely hold during severe
flooding, residents there accepted this realization and scaled back development in the region
(Robertson, 2011). According the USACE the Morganza Spillway, five miles wide and 25 miles
long, can pass 600,000 cubic feet of water per second off the Mississippi River system.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) response was a bit amazing in
some instances. Specifically, there was a well-orchestrated interagency initiative between the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ) to conduct clean-up ahead of a disaster. Containers of paint, bleach pesticides, oil,
antifreeze and other pollutants we effectively removed by residents as they evacuated (Hasten,
2011). Roads were closed and only residents and officials were allowed into the area. Police
officers stood guard next to mobile signs which indicated how much longer residents had to
retrieve items before the road closed. Widespread police presence was an effective measure to
keep sightseers out of the way and prevent further problems.
Coast Guard C-144 aircraft was monitoring the advancing flood waters (Hastens, 2011)
while others inspected and raised heights of levees around oil refineries. In Krotz Springs, the
Alon USA Refinery was being shut-in with the help of the Louisiana National Guard and the oil
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tank levels were reduced just in case the levees were over-topped. Hasten (2011) reported that
167 oil wells were shut in and the State Department of Natural Resources were keeping tabs on
592 other producing oil and gas wells.
One of the most critical events of the 2011 floods was the discovery of a huge sand boil
in the levee near Greenville, Mississippi that threatened to inundate the Yazoo River delta region
and thousands of people. The Corps and local officials organized a crew of inmates and created a
human chain to build a berm constructed of plywood and sandbags while crews dumped tons of
stone into the sand boil to stop erosion (USACE, 2013). Another critical sand boil was
discovered at the confluence of the Ohio River at Cairo early on in the flood fight and was
immediately remedied before the largest water volume had reached the area. The sand boil
appeared to be the largest ever discovered by flood fighting crews in that region (USACE, 2013).
According the USACE (2013) the 2011 floods resulted in 21,203 structures and 43,358
people impacted by the floods and a total loss of 2.8 billion dollars in damages. However, some
argue the cost is closer to $4 billion as Shelby County, Tennessee reported $2 billion in damages
alone. The volume of water flow in the Mississippi had never risen as high as 61 feet at Cairo
before. Mississippi’s Governor Haley Barbour described the flood volume moving through the
flood control system comparable to “a pig moving through a python” (Neuman, 2011). The
entire flood control system would be tested and there were critical concerns that if the Old River
Structure Control did not hold or if there were problems at the Morganza Spillway or Bonnet
Carre Spillway, it would result in a catastrophic event where the Mississippi River would entirely
shift its course. It was the first time that three of four floodways (Birdspoint, Morganza, Bonnet
Carre) were all put into operation together to reduce flood levels. The West Atchafalaya
floodway is the only floodway that has never yet been used.
In 2014, flooding on the Upper Mississippi River barely caught national attention;
however, areas from St. Paul, Minnesota to the Quad Cities at Iowa and Illinois were impacted by
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what was considered a moderate flood. The damage cost estimate for this flood occurrence was
reported to be over one billion dollars (Gerencer, 2015).
Most recently, flooding in the Upper Mississippi River Region in December, 2015 has
resulted in 25 fatalities in Missouri and Illinois (Rice, 2016). Federal authorities identified 19
vulnerable levees at risk for failing in the upper region (Smith, 2015). Overall, eleven levees had
failed and a levee at West Alton, Missouri about 20 miles north of St. Louis was overtopped by
flood waters resulting in the evacuation of 520 residents. 3,700 inmates were moved as flooding
threatened a state prison in southern Illinois and twelve (12) Illinois counties were granted a
disaster declaration (Smith, 2015). The Mississippi River was nearly 15 feet above flood stage in
St. Louis cresting at 42.58 feet which is just shy of the 1993 record. In Missouri, over 7,000
homes were impacted by floods and several wastewater treatment plants were impacted causing a
large amount of sewer to enter the floodwaters and continue on downstream (Smith, 2015).
There were a total of 33 counties with disaster declarations in Missouri. For the most part, the
lower Mississippi Region has fared better with only moderate flooding in Memphis. In
Louisiana, the Bonnet Carre spillway was again opened to reduce the risk of flooding in New
Orleans. The cost of flooding has yet to be determined but preliminary speculation suggests that
over three billion dollars in damages has occurred (Gerencer, 2015).
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CHAPTER THREE
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In order to understand the development of flood control in the United States and what
influences have contributed to contemporary floodplain management problems, there was a wide
range of literature examined to more fully understand the problem. There is a historical pathdependent nature of community development and government efforts towards flood mitigation in
the Mississippi River region. The interaction is dynamic and continuously growing in
complexity. The story of how populations adapted and how flood policy developed in the
Mississippi River region is germane to having a comprehensive picture of the problem.
When we look at theory related to problems associated with flood mitigation, researchers
historically used systems theory to explain this phenomenon. However, there is a paradigm shift
and growing consensus toward growth machine theory as the best explanation. The focus here is
a discussion of systems theory and growth machine theory and whether both are theories of
“middle range” or does growth machine theory provide the most comprehensive explanation for
continued flooding issues?
Also relevant to this research are the contributions from researchers who have conducted
risk evaluation and focused on social vulnerabilities specifically. One of the telling signs here
when examining flood mitigation barriers, is how little consideration we give to social
vulnerabilities. The lack of consideration is evident in our planning tools and overall efforts to
effectively mitigate flood hazards.
Theoretical explanations for flood mitigation failures
Ultimately failure in flood control results in disaster. The current paradigm in the field of
disaster research is that there are two fundamental ideas involved with disasters: 1) disasters are
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inherently a social phenomenon; 2) disaster is a social construct that reflects social change
(Quarantelli, 2005a, 339). Perry (2005, 11) says, “Disaster is characterized as a social disruption
that originates in the social structure and might be remedied through social structure
manipulations” which results in a social change. Some argue that crisis and disaster are different
and should be acknowledged (Boin and Hart, 2006). For example, crisis can occur when social
systems encounter a threat but a disaster is actually a crisis with a “devastating ending” (Boin,
2005).
Perry (2005) contends having a clear definition of disaster that is agreeable to everyone in
the field of disaster research is not as important as having the researcher make explicit their
definition as they begin their work. In this study, the definition of disaster follows Oliver-Smith
(1998) in that disaster is a social construct and a result of vulnerabilities within the social
structure. Basically, disaster occurs as a result of overwhelming local resources and capabilities
in the social structure and disrupts normalcy in the community. What is important to note here is
how vulnerabilities within the social structure become key to the problem of flooding disasters.
We are potentially creating our own flood disasters or, at the very least, potentially creating more
detrimental outcomes by the way we fail to mitigate effectively.
How is it, exactly, that we manage to create circumstances that add to flooding hazards
we face? Several theories have offered perspective in how we negatively impact our outcomes.
According to Kathleen Tierney (2010, 661) most disaster research has been rooted in sociology
theories such as functionalism and systems theory. However, in the 1990s disaster research did
begin to incorporate sociological perspectives regarding inequality and disparity as this relates to
access to political power, but there had yet been a focus on political power as a dynamic force in
the production of disasters (Tierney, 2010, 661). Tierney (2010) suggests that growth machine
theory may well be the “unifying theoretical paradigm” that moves U.S. disaster research in the
same direction as those scientists outside the U.S. who are already focused on political and
economic forces as they exacerbate hazard risk.
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Biologist Ludwig Von Bertalanffy (1950) developed the idea of general systems theory
through his study of living organisms in the 1940s. By the early 1950s he had determined general
systems theory could be applied in sociology to explain social systems. In 1953, David Easton
adapted systems theory to political science by describing a political system as a simple organic or
living system. Easton (1953) described this step-wise process beginning with inputs (demands or
public support) from the environment is fed into the political system. Competition and
compromise produces a solution within the political system (Easton, 1953). This solution,
usually in the form of policy, is then introduced to the environment creating an impact (Easton,
1953). This impact results in a feedback loop that generates new inputs (Easton, 1953).
Easton’s (1953) partially holistic theory of political systems was adapted to disaster
studies and expanded upon by in Disasters by Design written by Dennis Mileti in 1999. Mileti
(1999, 106) emphasizes the increasing complexity of subsystems and their interactions creates a
condition where “the system is greater than, and is different from, the sum of its parts”. Mileti
(1999, 107) differentiates from the traditional systems theory model by arguing that due to this
complexity, “the laws of additivity do not apply” as in the case where the whole is equal to the
sum of its parts. Mileti (1999, 107) argues that the traditional systems theory model is “typically
linear” and “overemphasizes stability” because they usually only involve one “casual factor”.
Traditional systems theory is limiting in that it describes change impact resulting in a negative
feedback loop to create the input cycle again (Mileti, 1999, 107). Mileti (1999, 107) calls for a
completely holistic and “non-linear approach” due to the multitude of variables with varying
degrees of complexity in their interactions.
There is merit to using systems theory to think about the flood control system itself and
the processes within this system. The federal flood protection system contains both hard and soft
infrastructure, thus it is a very highly complex interdependent system. Within these systems are
self-organizing subsystems and usually these systems are evaluated for normal problems and
normal failures. When it comes to risk evaluation, however, there is a problem because these
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systems can “predictably fail in unpredictable ways” which in turn will create “cascading
failures” (Little, 2010, 29; see also Perrow, 1999, 212-220). According to Mileti (1999) instead
of calculating risk using probability distributions, it is better to think in terms of power law
relationships. The failure of only a few subsystems can cause the majority of the damage.
Ultimately, when these systems fail, it results in a non-linear outcome and, therefore, a non-linear
approach to mitigation is needed (Mileti, 1999).
Mileti (1999) does suggest that a nonlinear approach to mitigation is needed. Each
member of the network or subsystem is vital, should be included in mitigation planning, and
given innovative empowerment. These networks would have access to all the information and
trends at all levels—local, state, national, and global. They would have support in the form of
various resources such as technical assistance, information networks, legal authority, political
access, and all things related to their function as the institutional memory of that organization or
subsystem. Mileti (1999) argues that greater research in planning is needed in order to better
understand how planning processes occur within the community and what planning processes
would be most effective.
Mileti (1999) explains that interactions occur both within and between systems. He refers
to the natural, social, and built environment as the primary systems engaged in these interactions
(Mileti, 1999). Systems theory falls short here in that effective flood controls cannot be
accomplished where differential power and motivation exists among actors within and between
these networks.
Growth machine theory does focus on political power as a dynamic force and the
controversies associated with it. Harvey Molotch (1997) coined the word “growth machine” to
describe a relationship between local elites and local officials where their motivations and actions
to draw revenues into the community and personal profits often create a problem of moral
inversion. These partners are constantly vying for external resources and growth-inducing
projects to generate more profit and revenue regardless of whether they may do more harm than
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good for local citizens. Note that when it comes to protecting the health and welfare of the
community, it is the primary responsibility of local government. Therefore, it should be the
priority of the local government to choose projects carefully. However, Freudenburg et al. (2009)
argues that this greedy risk-taking behavior among growth machine leaders has become a
“politically legitimated process” and is actually fostered from the federal level. Ultimately,
federal government enabling results in a “liability crisis” and “circular evasion of responsibility”
at the local level (Freudenburg et al., 2009). Regardless of whether these projects actually make
good sense for land use and regardless of whether they may do more harm than good, they favor
growth machine leaders in three specific ways (Freudenburg et al., 2009, 157). First, the benefits
are concentrated to the elites and political players. Second, the costs of these projects are spread
out among the citizen tax payers thus they are more likely to behave recklessly given that it is
“other people’s money.” Third, the risks are hidden from public view so that the general public is
unaware they’re being put in this compromising situation.
Take mapping the floodplain as an example. The federal government mandates states
and local officials to map the floodplain. Standards and tools used by local government vary as
much as the quality of the maps themselves. Questions and controversies surrounding mapping
methods has resulted in claims that some areas identified as having a one percent probability of
flooding in 100 years have actually already experienced multiple floods within a 50 year period.
Hydrologists actually prefer not to use the term “100-year-flood” because it is misleading and
does not necessarily mean that flooding has a likelihood of occurring once in 100 years (USGS,
2016). Hydrologists actually refer to it as a reoccurrence interval and flooding the causal pattern
for flooding is complicated by various factors and changes in the environment (USGS, 2016).
Despite knowing these flaws, local governments continue to allow and subsidize development
under the guise that federal mandates were met. In turn, these properties are then sold to the
public with no legal recourse against developers when flooding occurs.
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Local growth machine leaders also look for federally funded high-dollar projects such as
levees and floodwalls to allow development to occur behind them. These structural fixes have
historically provided a false sense of security for the community. Given the government cannot
be held liable for failing flood control measures (as established in the Flood Control Act of 1928)
the engineering standards for these structures need to be challenged. Freudenburg et al. (2009,
152) point out that the U.S. policy guidance “effectively calls for engineering estimates to have a
50/50 chance of being proved wrong by floods that occur within the period for which they are
theoretically designed” which are 100-500 year probability floods. The standard in other
countries such as Holland and Germany is based on a 90-95 percent confidence level and are
designed to protect for a 10,000 years probability flood (Klein and Zelmer, 2014). The American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) warns that while levees may reduce the risk of flood, it is an
essential fact that no levee is floodproof (Klein and Zelmer, 2014, 188). Basically, a residence
behind a 100 year levee has a 26 percent chance of being flooded over the course of a 30 year
mortgage (Klein and Zelmer, 2014, 188).
Flooding vulnerabilities are also exacerbated through policies and programs created as
target reduction programs for flooding. Many researchers will argue that the federal government
subsidizes floodplain construction through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) brought
about in the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA 1968). The measure was intended to
promote land-use controls and reduce disaster aid by providing insurance to occupants to cover
their losses. In order for communities to engage in the NFIP program, they were required to
create zoning restrictions, establish building codes, retrofit existing structures, and develop
emergency response plans to respond to flooding. There are no accountability measures or
enforcement to actually ensure communities actually meet these standards. The fact that there are
no accountability measures is exactly the enabling behavior of the federal government. Gilbert
White (1945) who inspired the NFIA 1968, was not oblivious to the problem of growth machine
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dynamics. The problem here is that the NFIP turned out to be much different than White had
intended due to influence from growth machine actors.
In summary, when looking at systems theory and growth machine theory as it relates to
disaster mitigation, and specifically flood mitigation, it becomes more evident that growth
machine has more influence on the process. Growth machine actors are actually creating and
influencing all systems and subsystems. Growth machine actors intervene in the systems model
at all steps in the process—from inputs to decision-making and policy to outputs and impacts on
the environment. Growth machine dynamics have influence within and between these systems
and their interactions. These dynamics also hinder the feedback loop in system by discounting
the potential hazard risk as an “inevitable by-product of economic expansion” (Freudenburg et
al., 2009, 58) and ultimately avoiding responsibility for disastrous outcomes. Thus, Tierney
(2010) is correct in that focus on political power as a dynamic force in the production of disasters
must be advanced.
Attempting comprehensive assessment for flood mitigation
Gilbert White (1945) attempted to comprehensively assess the “flood problem” in a very
broad analysis of the entire United States. He noted that the scope of his work was not to address
the local (White, 1945, 9) or the regional (White, 1945, 102) factors that may be indicative of
specificity problems. White’s (1945) primary thesis was that while appropriations for structural
fixes continued to rise, so did the cost of the flooding problem.
White (1945, 47, 128-203) theorized there were eight major classes of readjustments to
flooding. These eight flood adjustments or mitigation remedies were defined as: 1) land
elevation, 2) flood abatement; 3) flood protection; 4) emergency measures; 5) structural; 6) land
use; 7) relief; and 8) insurance.
Prevailing policy in 1940s, according to White (1945, 47) was focused only on four
primary types of mitigation. These were structural or engineered fixes rather than non-structural
adjustments. For one, flood abatement (land adjustments) addressed those areas outside and
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upstream of the inundation areas which include reforestation, reducing debris flows, agricultural
contour shifts, bank stabilization, and forest fire controls (White, 1945, 132-140). Secondly,
flood protection (White, 1945, 141-163) is defined as engineering devices such as building
floodwalls, levees, cut-offs, and channel improvements. Third, emergency measures (White,
1945, 163-176) included evacuation, flood fighting, and recovery. Today, these would be
described as response phase and short-term recovery phases in the overall system of response to
emergency. Fourth then was the focus on relief (White, 1945, 196-203) measures such as federal
grants and loans to the affected population. According to White (1945, 203) relief subsidies
actually tended to enable flood problems rather than mitigate them.
White (1945, 205-209) concluded that there were “four essentials” where prevailing
public policy fell short in remedying flood problems. First, policy solutions should take into
account all possible types of adjustments that can be made to the flood hazard. Second, a cost
benefit analysis should be conducted and evaluated on a consistent basis; and it should recognize
costs associated with the best or most appropriate remedial action while also considering benefits
such as the welfare of the potentially impacted community (White, 1949). Third, White
suggested that any mitigation action created should include of all possible adjustments or
readjustments that factor into successfully occupying a structure within the floodplain (White,
1949). Therefore, all possible retrofits must accompany the structure. Fourth, White (1949)
suggested that any mitigation action taken should be favorable to the types of land occupancy that
“contributes to effective use of floodplain resources”. In other words, only those needed to be in
the floodplain should be there.
White summarized his findings by saying (1945, 209) that, of the eight possible
adjustments theorized in terms of mitigation, all remedies with exception to land use management
and an insurance program favored preservation of the status quo or enabled the flood problem to
continue. While White’s (1945) assertion was not an explicit indictment of the growth machine, it
clearly points in this direction.
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Moral implications in policy and planning
David Moss (1999) studied the transformation of disaster relief policy and the problem of
taking federal disaster relief for granted. Studying the historical narrative of flooding and flood
policy, the public domain becomes increasingly sympathetic to the expansion of federal disaster
relief. By the 1960’s, Moss (1999, 321) described this federal policy expansion as being one of
“an intricate patchwork of disparate programs and commitments”. Charles Perrow (2007, 45)
elaborates by saying this “taking for granted” of federal aid is actually “the cause” rather than
“the consequence of increased funding”. Perrow (2007, 46) indicts business and local
government for realizing the opportunity to make profits from disasters. As previously addressed,
local government and business are primary growth machine actors. Perrow (2007; see also Berke
and Campanella, 2006) and other hazard researchers allude to the growth machine dynamic by
explaining how federal relief costs are spread to all taxpayers for the concentrated losses of a few.
This type of policy prescription will only work when there is reasonable responsibility placed on
those individuals and businesses receiving such subsidies to retrofit structures, sufficiently insure
property, and limit their presence in flood prone areas. If federal policy does not effectively
motivate businesses and individuals to take personal responsibility to reduce flood costs, the
result is a “moral hazard” (Klein and Zellmer, 2014; Perrow, 2007; Berke and Campanella, 2006;
Moss, 1999).
The discussion of growth machine dynamics throughout this research points to another
term and outcome that is somewhat similar to a moral hazard but is slightly distinguished. A
moral inversion can be defined as behavior or practice we might mistakenly consider as being
good and correct action but in actuality it is very bad (Adams and Balfour, 2014). The problem of
a moral inversion is that it creates what Adams and Balfour (2014, 4) refer to as evil, and more
specifically, as “administrative evil” were the purpose, conditions, and actions resulting in these
outcomes are masked and difficult to perceive as potentially wrong and harmful. Those often
engaged in a moral inversion believe they are actually doing good and benefitting their
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constituents. Much like a moral hazard, a moral inversion results through growth machine culture
and processes result in concentrating the benefit to a few and spreading the risk among the
community or population. Growth machine culture or “status quo” generates the false belief that
through progress and advances in engineering and technology, we can and should build in hazard
risk areas. As Freudenburg et al. (2009, 10) point out, “the problem is that, like some twisted
variation of the Peter Principle, the growth machine can move relentlessly ahead until it reaches
its own level of incompetence” and rarely do the “key” actors concern themselves with what
these limitations might be.
Adams and Balfour (2014) elude to this problem as they discuss how a modern culture of
technical rationality has upended the policy-making process. Basically, through a technical
rationality culture, highly specialized and compartmentalized experts see themselves as ethical
because they are professional rather than vice versa. Adams and Balfour (2014, 37) argue that
ethics education has been marginalized and we face a problem of “moral vacuity” where
professionals are over confident in their objectivity and overly reliant on the scientific mindset to
solve social problems. Technical rationality culture also cultivates a sense of compliance from
subordinates and the general population (Adams and Balfour, 2014, 38) as they grant
unconditional regard for professionals; meanwhile support for advocacy and reform has devolved
so there are fewer challenges to professional expertise.
Basically, the population views growth machine actors as well-meaning community
leaders focused on progress and economic prosperity while holding the community’s best interest
in mind. (Freudenburg et al., 2009). The population does not realize the ways in which disaster is
socially constructed through policies and practices influenced by the growth machine dynamic.
Policy changes and challenges
Within five years of implementation, NFIA 1968 went through several revisions as
Congress realized that flood losses continued to increase and development continued to grow
within the floodplain (Klein and Zellmer, 2014). Revisions to the NFIA in 1973 attempted to
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control some of the loss by requiring all mortgage loans and federally insured loans to be
contingent on purchasing national flood insurance policies for the property.
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 was the strongest attempt to date to
reel in the problems associated with the NFIP and provide financial stability to the program.
Primarily this legislation brought policy holders to bear the actual cost of flooding and raised
premiums accordingly. Some of the main features of Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform
Act (2012) included removing businesses and secondary homes from coverage. Basically, those
wishing to do business and maintain secondary residences in the floodplain should bear their own
costs. Those primary residences in the floodplain would face higher premiums and those
previously grandfathered into the NFIP would no longer receive a subsidized premium. Upon
sale of these homes, the new buyer would take on the property at current costs rather than the
grandfathered rates. However, in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy (2012), there was such an
outcry against the premium increases that the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of
2014 has postponed these policy premium increases until further notice. Again, relief was
politically motivated and politicians from flood prone areas fought premium increases under the
Biggert-Waters Federal Insurance Reform Act (2012).
The problem of premium increases was only the tip of the iceberg following the disaster
of Hurricane Sandy. A secondary disaster evolved from systemic issues within the now defective
and ineffective NFIP. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 established that the most
feasible way for the NFIP to be carried out was to establish a public-private partnership with the
private insurance industry to implement the program (42 U.S. Code § 4001). As evidenced in
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012, there are serious flaws in
this program and its effectiveness. In fact, after Hurricane Sandy, the problems with the NFIP
came to a head with charges of fraud and wide-spread calls for reform (Sullivan, 2016).
In June 2015, Brad Keiserman, FEMA Deputy Associate Administrator for the NFIP,
testified before Congress that the NFIP model was no longer effectively providing for flood
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survivors through the public-private partnership (Keiserman, 2015). Keiserman (2015) claimed
that the 1983 Write Your Own (WYO) Program established between FEMA and the private
insurance industry to allow insurance companies to write and service NFIP policies in their own
name had gone awry. The WYO was allowing insurance companies to charge the federal
government a fee of 33 percent on every premium dollar paid into the program (FEMA, 2015).
In addition, these insurance companies also receive fees for settling claims post-disaster thus
profiting even further (Sullivan, 2016). Insurance profiting is a peculiar outcome that defies
traditional outcomes; usually insurance companies lose money due to payouts after a disaster
event.
Keiserman (2015) argued that there was no possible way the federal government was
staffed to provide effective oversight over the WYO and the approximately 82 private insurance
companies that managed nearly 6 million flood policies purchased under the NFIP. As a result,
the autonomy given to these insurance agencies prevented the NFIP from determining systemic
problems and evaluating program effectiveness (Keiserman, 2015). Basically, the NFIP allowed
the private insurance industry to operate with a blank check and no oversight. According to
Sullivan (2016), in addition to built-in profits from premiums, handling fees, appraisal fees and
other expenses, the private insurance companies were making $3.25 million annually from
flooding disasters (a 29 percent profit margin). Private insurers netted profits of approximately
$400 million from Hurricane Sandy. In addition to the $9.3 billion paid out in claims for
Hurricane Sandy, Keiserman (2015) stated that the NFIP was projected to spend over $1.45
million in legal fees defending the insurance companies while they attempt to settle claimant
court cases that were originally fraudulently denied. Hurricane Sandy victims with NFIP
insurance thus have suffered the expense of being out of their homes for four years and paid
enormous amounts in legal fees to fight the NFIP to pay the full amount they are owed from their
flood policy.
Revisiting comprehensive analysis of the flood problem
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Informed by Meliti (1999) and White (1945) in terms of the idea of comprehensive
planning, this study focuses on the Mississippi River Region, a region notorious with flood
problems and the primary area of reference from which flood policy has developed. The focus of
this study is at a regional level rather than an effort to duplicate White’s (1945) national level
analysis. Conducting a regional analysis is perhaps a better assessment because it is does bring
issues of specificity into focus that White (1945) attempted to avoid. The problem in this study,
however, is determining how large this region should be. Should it include only the lower
Mississippi area or the entire river and its tributaries? White (1945) indicated in his findings that
the lower Mississippi region was one of the two largest regions (urban northeast is the other)
identified with high flood costs and this made studying the Mississippi River region even more
attractive. Ultimately it was decided that the scope of this study would include both the upper
and lower Mississippi in order to examine upper and lower regional differences. Secondly, a
regional study of this size would be more manageable than a national study given the various and
extensive amount of data that would be required.
White’s (1945) analysis also fell short in that all he could measure was federal
appropriations for structural mitigation against flood loss data (1902-1941) collected haphazardly
by the National Weather Bureau and through federal appropriations data. The Weather Bureau
lacked consistency in methods to gather flood loss data as there were often redundancies in
counts and estimations via mailed surveys to local government, newspapers, and shared
information between agencies (White, 1945). Likewise, as in this study, White (1945) struggled
with not being able to differentiate between types of floods such as river, coastal, and flash
flooding. The flood data for this study did not differentiate between flash flooding and river
flooding but does not include any coastal flooding such as that occurring during Hurricane
Katrina. The flood frequency and loss data used in this study was retrieved from a database
designed specifically for disaster research called Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for
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the United States (SHELDUS). Their latest edition actually does distinguish between flash and
river flooding but it was not available at the time of this analysis.
Another opportunity that allows for a more specified focus than that afforded to White in
1945 is the implementation of local planning tools such as the All-Hazard Mitigation Plan
mandated via the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000). DMA 2000 required states and
counties to have hazard mitigation plans in effect in order to be eligible for post-disaster Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program funds, Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM), or Flood Mitigation
Assistance (FMA). Furthermore it tasked the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
to provide guidelines for state and local plans and holds the state responsible for oversight and
coordination of local plans.
In order to make determinations about whether we are closer to effective comprehensive
mitigation planning, a key indicator would be to examine these state and local hazard mitigation
plans mandated by the federal government since 2000. While the mandate helped steer more
state and local governments into participating in mitigation planning, it does not necessarily mean
mandated plans are going to bring about effective comprehensive planning. A content analysis of
these mitigation plans should tell us a great deal about how prepared we are to manage for
flooding and what needs to be done.
If the local level is being empowered and the federal government has created an effective
planning tool, then this regional analysis of Mississippi River Region should shed some light on
it. It should also support FEMA (2014) findings in the Nationwide Survey of Local Officials
(NSLO) conducted annually by FEMA (see http://www.fema.gov/protecting-ourcommunities/local-official-survey-findings-flood-risk). Unfortunately, FEMA did not follow
through with this annual survey beyond 2014 and there is only one year for comparison.
Nonetheless, it does serve to compare a national study to this regional analysis.
The FEMA NSLO report (2014) provided a mixed analysis of mitigation effectiveness
across the nation. The report indicated that three out of four local officials polled believe that
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they have a flooding risk within their community (FEMA, 2014). Findings suggest that local
officials are very aware of their risk factors and thus can mitigate effectively. However, less than
one in ten of these officials actually believe that their community is truly at risk for flooding
(FEMA, 2014). Most local officials reported taking some sort of flood mitigation action
regardless of whether they acknowledge there was a flooding risk within their community or not
(FEMA, 2014). Most concerning is the fact that one in three communities still did not have a
FEMA approved mitigation plan in place (FEMA, 2014). Finally, when it came to determining
what they felt were the five most important mitigation needs addressed for their community they
reported (FEMA, 2014) building drainage improvements (52 percent); elevation (44 percent);
erosion control (41 percent); acquisition (31 percent); and floodproofing (26 percent). According
to FEMA (2014) the most sought after mitigation needs from the federal government are funding
(73 percent); technical expertise (43 percent); flood maps (29 percent); planning assistance (26
percent); and outreach materials (24 percent).
After review of state and local mitigation plans, it appears that these planning tools can
provide insight to principles, processes, choices, and priorities at the local level. These actions
can be categorized into both structural and non-structural items that local governments feel are
needed in order to adequately mitigate for flooding. Based on a content analysis of the action
items, these plans can inform the research as to whether or not FEMA NSLO (2014) effectively
describes the need for flooding mitigation. Secondly, mitigation plan analysis would answer
questions that White (1945) could not—does a regional analysis of flood mitigation provide a
better understanding of what is needed for effective comprehensive mitigation? This research can
also shed light on what White (1945) suspected regarding mitigation measures favoring the
“preservation of the status quo”. Has the status quo changed? If so then the priorities would not
be focused on the same things identified by White (1945): land adjusting, structural fixes,
grants/aid, and emergency response. If this mitigation plan analysis indicates that the focus is
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still primarily the same as it was in 1940, then this should provide support for the hypothesis that
local growth machine dynamics confound the effectiveness of a centralized federal flood system.
Mileti (1999, 144,145) says that the nation’s culture shapes the “selection of loss
reduction strategies” and the focus is primarily on individual preparedness and not at the
neighborhood or community level. The problem of “sanctity of private property” and “right to
accumulate profits” creates a barrier to the government implementing the proper mitigation
initiatives (Mileti, 1999, 145). The problem drills down to local government and what local
government wants to acknowledge and address. Mileti (1999, 136) says basically the processes
that determine what local officials will do is based on who will gain or lose and overall the
majority of evidence points to people being unaware or underestimating vulnerability and
overestimating their ability to cope with a disaster impact. Basically mitigation decision-making
is left to local and state discretion and their attention towards mitigation varies quite a bit. Thus
uneven mitigation will likely be the biggest danger of all. As Mileti (1999) stated previously, the
system and subsystems have strong interactions to contend with and underestimation,
overestimation or lack of awareness can send the entire system into failure-- cascading failures.
What Mileti (1999) inadvertently acknowledged is that political influence from growth machine
dynamics is the root of these uneven mitigation directives at the local level. Therefore, systems
level focus does not fully account for barriers to effective mitigation.
Analyzing mitigation plans and the demographic information of the region can show
where there are potential risks that are either not being addressed due to lack of awareness,
lacking risk methodology or possibly lack of political feasibility. According to Mileti (1999, 102)
data needs, and specifically comprehensive data needs regarding the built and social environment,
are needed in order to improve mitigation.
Evaluating hazard mitigation planning
In the 1981, the Reagan administration reorganized FEMA and through top secret
security directives (NSDD 26) establishing the National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) which
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established a strong relationship with the Department of Defense (Perrow, 2007). FEMA’s focus
shifted from natural hazard preparedness to developing classified technology networks with the
military and building a nuclear war defense system (Perrow, 2007). The result was that state and
local agencies suffered a disconnect from the federal government as top secret planning continued
to expand within the federal level but state and local emergency management were denied access
to much of the communication networks and technology being developed alongside the military
(Perrow, 2007). The shift towards homeland security planning resulted in a roll back on natural
hazard mitigation planning (Perrow, 2007). The Integrated Emergency Management System
(IEMS) was developed as a streamlined approach to natural hazard mitigation planning focused
on commonalities of response to most hazards or “all-hazards mitigation planning” (McLoughlin,
1985). This shift in mitigation planning to an all-hazards approach is the prevailing design for
hazard mitigation. Given that this focus has been predominant for many years now, does the
DMA 2000 initiative give generously enough to natural hazard mitigation? Secondly, does the
commonalities and response focus limit the effectiveness of these plans? Third, does growth
machine dynamics limit the effectiveness of these plans?
Lindell and Perry (2007) point out that all-hazards mitigation planning approach allows
for a more effective and efficient approach to utilizing resources when emergency managers can
identify to what degree each hazard will draw upon these resources. Caruson and MacManus
(2011) claim that lack of empirical research on the effectiveness of an all-hazards approach was
problematic. They wanted to determine if “perceived commonalities” among local officials were
congruent with the “broader theory that where commonality is an organizing principle,
emergency management services improve” (Caruson and MacManus, 2011, 348). What they
found was that there are commonalities in terms of basic needs such as power, water,
transportation, communication health care, etc. but there are differences between metropolitan
and rural communities in terms of vulnerabilities to infrastructure and assets (Caruson and
MacManus, 2011). MSAs, due to having higher population densities-- thus hazard potential is
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concentrated, have more commonalities and better access to resources such as training and
funding but, at the same time, they have greater pressure to utilize resources more efficiently
(Caruson and MacManus, 2011). Caruson and MacManus (2011, 366) argue that more work
needs to be done to determine whether commonality theory actually does save money and
produce better results where there is a “high degree of convergence”.
Berke and Campanella (2006) argue that barriers to effective local mitigation planning
can be blamed on both the federal and state government. The state government does not mandate
the development of local comprehensive plans and the federal government does not provide
enough support for local planning (Berke and Campanella, 2006).
Covington and Simpson (working paper, 2006) provided a comprehensive overview of all
disaster literature focused on disaster preparedness and developed four main categories regarding
the role of disaster planning for communities and agencies: 1) fundamental features of disaster
preparedness; 2) disaster preparedness metrics; 3) policy issues; and 4) recommendations. They
argue that there are two phases of planning that must be achieved (development and
implementation) in order to create a comprehensive preparedness measure (Covington and
Simpson, 2006). However, in order to accomplish this, consistency and accuracy in data
collection must be determined; objective indicators must be agreed upon by both researchers and
practitioners; and an agreed upon model design needs to be developed and tested (Covington and
Simpson, 2006). Their focus is strictly on the planning tool itself, and not necessarily based on
collaboration and competition between policy actors that influence this process.
The federal Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) of 2000 was an attempt to shift mitigation
planning towards a more comprehensive design by integrating various projects, programs, and
regulatory initiatives (Godschalk et al., 1999; Burby et al., 1999). These enhancements to the
original 1988 Stafford Act was an attempt to bring about greater compliance at the state and local
level thus attempting to reign in some of the growth machine politics. In order to be eligible for
post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funds, Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM),
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or Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) there must be hazard mitigation plans in place at the state
and local level (Berke et al., 2009, 5, 26). Furthermore, in the FEMA guidelines for state plans,
the state is responsible for oversight and coordination of local plans (Berke et al., 2009, 26).
Since hazard mitigation planning was mandated in 2000, the literature on plan quality has
started to expand. It seems to originate in the mid 1990s with Berke and French (1994) and
Burby and May (1997) addressing what should be three basic core components—facts, goals, and
their mandates. Since 1999, urban/regional planning scholars have begun to address more in
terms of quality of the plans such as organization of the plan (Berke, 1999), plan principles
(Berke, 1999), and plan evaluation and monitoring (Berke et al., 1999; Godschalk et al., 1999;
Norton, 2005). Others have examined consistency within the plan (Norton, 2005) and linking
hazard mitigation plans to other strategic planning mechanisms in place (Brody et al., 2003;
Brody et al. 2004; Termorshizen, 2007).
To date, the most extensive work on all-hazard mitigation plan quality has been Berke et
al.’s (2009) assessment tool for measuring state hazard mitigation plans and Lyles et al.’s (2012)
focus on developing an assessment for local mitigation plans. The Lyles et al. (2012) evaluation
method is directed towards evaluating coastal jurisdictions but claim that core principles can be
applied across planning domains. They use two conceptual dimensions: direction setting and
action-oriented principles (Lyles et al., 2012, 3). Direction setting principles involve establishing
a clear plan direction such as developing: 1) facts regarding local conditions and needs; 2) goals;
and 3) actions and supportive policies to ensure planning goals are achieved (Lyles et al., 2012).
Action oriented principles involve addressing the four main components of the plan: 1)
stakeholders participation or all people and agencies impacted; 2) inter-organizational
coordination; 3) implementation; and 4) monitoring and evaluation (Lyles et al., 2012). In all,
seven principles are evaluated: facts, goals, policies, participation, inter-agency coordination,
implementation and monitoring (Lyles et al., 2012, 3). These principles are closely aligned with
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FEMA “Blue Book” guidelines categorized into four main sections: planning; risk evaluation;
mitigation strategies; and plan maintenance (FEMA, 2008).
Lyles et al. (2012, 9) found that local hazard mitigation plan quality was “moderate to
weak overall” and there is wide variability “across the principles of plan quality” and the states
involved in the study sample. Their findings support those found by other researchers who have
also mitigation plans in other areas (Kang et al., 2010; Berke and Godschalk, 2009). Given this
finding, it could be that plan quality and plan enforcement continue to be hampered by the growth
machine dynamics and influence by those political actors on the planning process.
Other shortcomings in mitigation planning
Cutter et al. (2000) argue that the FEMA guidelines for risk assessment falls short in
defining hazard vulnerability by only looking at the presence or absence of a natural hazard risk.
The best tool available for determining social vulnerability is the Social Vulnerability Index
(SoVI) created by Cutter et al. (2003) and through several revisions has developed into a measure
that examines 30 socioeconomic variables collected from five year estimates in the American
Community Survey and the 2010 Census that contribute to social vulnerability. Interestingly,
seven significant components of this measure account for 72 percent of variance in the data: race,
class, wealth, elderly, Hispanic, Native American, special needs, and service industry
employment (Cutter et al., 2010). This county level data was created using a principle
components analysis which reduces the data into statistically significant components for
comparison nationwide. The SoVI 2006-10 (Cutter et al., 2013) shows three levels of risk rating
based using three quartiles where high and low risk is established as two standard deviations from
the mean (medium risk).
While the SoVI 2006-10 (Cutter et al., 2013) could be used by local planners for an
improved risk analysis, it does not fall within FEMA requirements. Further, there are limitations
to this analysis in that it does not show pockets of social vulnerability down to the census track
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level. County level data can obscure true social characteristics in or near the floodplain when the
overall county level demographics are vastly unequal.
Another more recently developed indicator by Cutter et al. (2010) is called the Disaster
Resilience Index (DRI) which is a composite score of social, economic, institutional,
infrastructure, and community capacities. Overall, there are 36 variables addressing the potential
resilience of each community. However, there are assumptions within these variables such as
“percent population covered by a recent hazard mitigation plan” that a positive rating could
contribute to better resiliency. The DRI (Cutter et al., 2010, 7) does not consider the quality of
the mitigation plan, the variables within the subcomponent of “institutional” such as “percent of
population covered by Citizen Corps programs” or the variable “percent population participating
in CRS for flood” fall within the scope of an effective mitigation plan. A comprehensive
evaluation of effective mitigation, reduced vulnerability, or increased resiliency may not be
assessed well by this measure especially if the mitigation planning process done at the local level
is not robust in the first place.
The Cutter et al. (2010) study also included three community case studies to support the
significant of the DRI using the metropolitan area of Memphis, Tennessee for one. The economic
and infrastructural resilience of Shelby County was high. Cutter et al. (2010, 17) did point out
that some limitations to the DRI are that national data sources were often out of date and
inadequate to establish true local characteristics. A review of the Shelby County mitigation plan
(including Memphis) indicates that there is considerable need for infrastructure improvement for
effective flood control. Therefore, if we overlay the region of focus (Mississippi River Region)
with indices such as the SoVI or DRI, we still would not have an adequate understanding or
comprehensive analysis of flood hazard mitigation needs. We might even be led to believe an
area is less vulnerable than it actually is.
When considering the economic resilience of a community as being a positive in
accordance with the DRI (Cutter et al., 2010), if the mitigation plan does not account for the
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economic characteristics, does not identify the diversity of those characteristics, or does not
include action items within the mitigation plan that address mitigating the private sector, it does
not necessarily establish that there is truly economic resilience. Mitigation planning needs to
include an analysis of private sector readiness and create action items that promote public-private
partnerships in preparedness and private sector outreach initiatives. The economic characteristics
and specifically addressing the private sector in mitigation planning is one area where a
subsystem failure could potentially be devastating. Looking within the action items of local
hazard mitigation plans and determining how many action items address the private sector would
indicate whether the economic sector is being considered an integral part of mitigation planning.
This study will also establish whether or not local hazard mitigation plans are actively engaging
in mitigating the private sector. Absence of this element would be suggestive of growth machine
dynamics in play in that these elites are ignoring or refusing to participate in the planning process.
This study considers the institutional subcomponent in the DRI (Cutter et al., 2010) in
terms of variables such as the extent the community participates in the Community Rating System
(CRS) and promotes the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). These programs were based
on the recommendations of Gilbert F. White (1945) and legislated into existence through the
NFIA (1968) as part of the non-structural mitigation actions that were necessary to reduce flood
costs. The primary means of cultivating these programs is through local government and local
planning initiatives which would include community engagement activities and other community
actions. Local hazard mitigation plans should provide clues as to whether there is community
involvement in these programs and the extent to their effectiveness. Also community
participation in the CRS and NFIP can be determined based on data obtained from FEMA
databases accounting for flood insurance policies and CRS participation. If the community does
not seem to be actively participating in these mandates and planning processes, then it seems
feasible to question whether or not the growth machine dynamics are exerting influence in this
process.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHOD
This study seeks to comprehensively examine the mitigation efforts at the federal, state,
and local level to look at the true characteristics of flood mitigation planning, evidence of policy
and programs in action or lack of, and describe the social demographics at the census tract level
where the population is most at risk in the county. Along with pointing out persistent problems in
floodplain management, this research attempts to answer the question: Is there evidence that
growth machine dynamics continue to render the federal flood control system ineffective?
Secondly, despite implementing both structural and non-structural mitigation does the cost of
flooding continue to rise?
This research begins with the following hypotheses:
H1: As the number of flood mitigation actions increased due to the implementation of federal
mitigation plan mandates, the costs associated with flooding decreased.
H2: Counties that have followed the federal mandate to implement all-hazard mitigation plans
have experienced a greater reduction in flood costs than counties without all-hazard mitigation
plans.
H3: Counties with a greater number of non-structural mitigation actions associated with the
NFIP have experienced a greater reduction in flood costs than counties without non-structural
actions associated with the NFIP.
H4: Counties with a greater number of non-structural mitigation actions associated with
repetitive loss reduction have experienced a greater reduction in flood costs than counties without
repetitive loss reduction non-structural mitigation actions.
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H5: Counties that participate in the non-structural mitigation CRS initiative have experienced a
greater reduction in flood costs than counties who do not participate in the CRS initiative.
H6: Counties whose hazard mitigation plans have a higher the ratio of flood mitigation actions
relative to other hazard mitigation actions have lowered damage costs related to flooding. .
H7: Populations near or within the floodplain have higher concentrations of social vulnerabilities
than those populations outside the floodplain.
In addition to exploring these hypotheses that are focused on the effectiveness of these
mitigation mandates, some exploratory research was done to examine other factors that might
contribute to the flooding problem. Exploratory efforts specifically focused on some of the social
characteristics that may be present within the region that are correlated to inequality and those
populations who have less political power. These selected social characteristics may be
confounding any attempts to effectively mitigate the region against disastrous flooding and may
create greater vulnerabilities with their presence. In addition, is it possible that these
characteristics could be concealed in a way that prevents effective mitigation? Furthermore, if
there is evidence that these social characteristics that create greater vulnerabilities are present,
then it lends to evidence that growth machine dynamics are at the root of these conditions.
A comprehensive search for all-hazard mitigation plans from ten states and 108 counties
bordering the Mississippi River was conducted from August 15, 2013 to April 15, 2014 by online
searches in local government webpages, calls, and emails to state and local emergency
management agencies. Altogether, ten state plans and 62 county or local multi-jurisdictional
plans were retrieved for this study. Even though all-hazard mitigation plans were mandated in the
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 in order to receive federal funding for post disaster mitigation,
not all counties have managed to create mitigation plans or meet the required updating process
within five years. For the most part, there have been few changes in these plans during updates.
Therefore, using outdated plans still provides sufficient information regarding mitigation actions.
In order to capture a more comprehensive picture, if an all-hazard plan has been created and even
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though it may be outdated (usually as a result of lack of available funding), the mitigation plan
was included in this analysis. Arkansas is the only state in which there were no county plans
available. A comprehensive list of states and their counties within the study and their ratio of
flood mitigation actions to overall mitigation actions expressed as a percent is provided in the
appendix (Figure 4.1 – 4.11).
Content analysis was used to evaluate mitigation actions in the mitigation strategy section
of each all-hazard mitigation plan. Each mitigation action was first evaluated to determine
whether the action was specifically aimed at flood mitigation. The total number of mitigation
actions overall and flood mitigation actions specifically to determine the ratio of flood mitigation
items to others. Two separate master lists of mitigation actions were made—one for the state
plans and one for counties/local level plans. Mitigation actions were then categorized by
structural and non-structural actions. Structural actions include building flood walls, levees,
widening or enlarging culverts, raising roads, adjusting bridge ramps, and similar actions that
involved construction activities or adjusting the natural landscape. Non-structural actions are
actions that are achieved through administrative processes and include such examples as technical
support and education and outreach.
Non-structural actions were categorized by similar function. A total of 18 types of nonstructural actions were identified (Figure 4.12) and categories (Figure 4.13). Non-structural and
structural action items were then calculated and compared in order to make determinations about
mitigation needs at local, state, and regional levels. This data will also be compared to the NSLO
findings reported by FEMA in 2014.
FEMA has generated a database called Flood Insurance Policies and Community Rating
System Participation. This database provides a list of counties and cities within each state that
participate in the CRS program, the class rating of that community, and the number of National
Flood Insurance policies in effect for that county or community. There is also a state percentage
rate for community participation which is measured by total community participation divided by
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total communities available for participation. This data will be gleaned to determine county or
community level of participation in non-structural mitigation programs and compared to the
jurisdiction repetitive losses information provided within the local hazard mitigation plans.
The Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database of the United States (SHELDUS)
Version 10.0 launched as of August 2012 was used to determine flooding frequency and property
damage costs for a period of 50 years for each of the 108 counties in the study. It was determined
that the best possible way to manage and present this data would be by ten year period (1960-69,
1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-10). This data was used to determine flood frequency and
property damage costs to make determinations about the impact of historical policy changes and
mandates for mitigation. This database provides data for all natural hazard disaster declarations
within the county. Therefore, the number of disaster types will help inform the research as to
how much flood hazard is involved in each area in comparison to other natural hazard risks.
Further analysis included a comparison of flood frequency and costs in counties with and without
mitigation plans in attempt to determine if planning mandates have impacted the cost or
frequency of flooding and whether there are local, state or regional differences in flood trends.
Given the disparity of these preliminary results, it was difficult to establish that
mitigation planning was having an impact on flood costs. One thought was to return to the raw
data and break out the flood costs by each year, rather than by decade, and then run several
multiple regression discontinuity models to see if any patterns would emerge.
In the first regression discontinuity model (Model 1), the dependent variable was
established as “allcountyyes” which is the reported property damage cost gleaned from
SHELDUS from each year in the period 1980 through 2010 (31 total years) for all counties
having a mitigation plan (n = 62). The variable “timeline” is coded numerically as one through
thirty-one (1 - 31). The “time-plan” independent variable indicates the two periods in time—zero
(0) for the years prior to mandated mitigation planning (1980 - 1999) and one (1) for the years in
which these counties had a mitigation plan in place. Third, the independent variable
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“timeafterplan” was created with a value of zero (0) for all time prior to the mitigation planning
mandate and the numbers one (1) through eleven (11) for the period 2000 – 2010.
The second regression discontinuity model (Model 2) is much similar to the first model
but in this analysis, the focus is all counties without a mitigation plan (n = 46). The dependent
variable “allcountiesno” is the reported property damage cost using SHELDUS data for each
county without a mitigation plan for the same time period as the first model. The “timeline” and
“timeafterplan” variables are the same as the first model. The “time-plan” variable indicates the
two periods in time—zero (0) for the years prior to mandated mitigation planning (1980 – 1999)
and one (1) for the years in which these counties were mandated to have a plan in place although
they do not.
The third (Model 3) and fourth (Model 4) regression continuity models were drafted to
explore in greater detail if there were any regional differences between the upper and lower
Mississippi River counties. Using the same variables as the first model, plan data from all
counties above the confluence of the Ohio River and Mississippi River were used in the third
model—Upper Mississippi (Plan-Yes) with the only difference being that the dependent variable
is labeled “cost”. The fourth model is comprised of all counties with plans below the confluence
of the Ohio River and Mississippi River.
Several statistical analysis methods were considered for exploring factors discussed in
this study such as the SoVI; CRS classification and participation; and mitigation actions within
the mitigation plans to make determinations about their influence on flood costs. Due to the
small sample size and variability of flooding, it was not possible to attempt a multivariate or
factor analysis of these variables. Even if one of these factors show significance in the years
following the 2000 mandate, the variability of flooding by year and when plans were
implemented would significantly limit the usefulness of these determinations. Therefore, the most
useful way to evaluate this data is merely to quantify and compare their prevalence in mitigation
planning; determine whether different areas within the region express different types of
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mitigation needs; and to compare flood mitigation needs in this region to the needs reported by
local officials in the from the FEMA national survey.
The 2010 U.S. Census and 2012 American Community Survey (5 year estimates) were
used to collect social and housing characteristics on populations within the 108 counties and
census tracts bordering the Mississippi River. Arc GIS software was used in order to build maps
to visually compare differences between the variables at the county and census tract level to
determine if there are pockets of vulnerabilities buffering the river that would not otherwise be
observed using county level data. This data can be used to contrast and compare to vulnerability
indicators such as the SoVI (Cutter et al, 2012) and to advance the argument that mitigation
planning should include a survey of social vulnerabilities in the risk assessment. The variables
selected for use in this section of the study were those that could be obtained at both the county
and census tract level. These eight variables are poverty (all races), white poverty, black poverty,
renter versus owner occupied housing, median income, housing built before 1969, elderly
population overall, and elderly poverty.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYSIS
Mitigation Planning Impact on Flood Costs
Multiple regression discontinuity models were used to determine the accuracy of the
independent variables at predicting flood costs. Model 1 (Figure 5.1) in this analysis is focused
specifically on counties with mitigation plans and their influence on flooding costs. The
dependent variable was established as [allcountyyes] which is the reported property damage cost
gleaned from SHELDUS from each year in the period 1980 through 2010 (31 total years) for all
counties having a mitigation plan [n = 62]. The independent variables are first-- the consecutive
years from 1980 through 2010 [Timeline] and coded consecutively [1-31]; second-- plan mandate
years [Time-Plan] with zero [0] for the years prior to mandated mitigation planning (1980 –
1999) and one [1] for the years in which the plan mandate occurs (2000 – 2010); third-- time as a
variable [TimeAfterPlan] with a value of zero [0] for time prior to the mandate and then
numbered consecutively [1-11] for the mandate years (2000 – 2010). Regression results indicate
that the overall model does not significantly predict flood cost, R^2 = .015, R_adj^2 = -.095, F
(3, 27) = 1.36, p ≤ .938.
Model 2 (Figure 5.2) is all counties without a mitigation plan [n = 46]. This dependent
variable is established as [allcountiesno] again using property damage cost from SHELDUS data
for each county in the same period. The independent variables are, again, first—the consecutive
years from 1980 through 2010 [Timeline] and coded consecutively [1-31]; second—plan mandate
years [Time-Plan] with [0] for the years prior to mandated mitigation planning (1980 – 1999) and
one [1] for the years in which the plan mandate occurs (2000 – 2010); third—time as a variable
[TimeAfterPlan] with a value of zero [0] for time prior to the mandate and then numbered
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consecutively [1-11] for the mandate years (2000 – 2010). Regression results indicate that this
overall model is also does not significantly predict flood cost, R^2 = .019, R_adj^2= -.090, F (3,
27) = .171, p ≤ .915.
However, the coefficients table for Model 1 (Table 5.1) and Model 2 (Table 5.2), the
standardized coefficient for “timeafterplan” for counties that have a plan (plan = yes) and in
Model 2 the coefficient for “timeafterplan” for counties that do not have a plan (plan = no) are
telling. Both predicted-value curves in the models have similar upwardly slopes. But looking
closer at the data, the standardized coefficient for “plan yes” = .187 and “plan no” = .07 suggests
that the coefficient for “plan yes” is 2.5 times greater than the coefficient for “plan no”. In terms
of real dollars, this result suggests that in counties with mitigation plans the cost of flooding
increased by $3,200,873 each subsequent year from when planning was mandated. At the same
time, counties without mitigation plans after the mandate only had an increase of $1,920,725 each
subsequent year. We should actually expect this result to be the opposite of what the data
indicates or at least these results should be similar. The fact that flooding costs increase at a rate
2.5 times higher in counties with mitigation plans than counties without mitigation plans would
lend you to believe that having a mitigation plan actually increased the cost of flooding.
A plausible explanation for this result is that counties with mitigation plans are reporting
more flood damage than the counties without plans. Counties with plans in effect are eligible for
available FEMA post disaster mitigation funding whereas those counties without plans are not in
compliance and, therefore, post disaster funding would not be approved.
In Model 3 (Figure 5.3) and Model 4 (Figure 5.4), the discontinuity design was also used
to explore if there were differences between counties with plans in the upper and lower regions of
the Mississippi River. Both designs have significant challenges due to the limitations of smaller
sample size and also, potentially, flooding behavior itself.
Model 3 is a multiple regression discontinuity model exploring the upper region of the
Mississippi River, specifically the area above the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi River at
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Cairo, Illinois. Regression was conducted to determine the accuracy of the independent variables
at predicting flood costs. The dependent variable was established as [cost] which is the reported
flood property damage cost gleaned from SHELDUS from each year in the period 1980 through
2010 (31 total years) for all counties having a mitigation plan in the upper region [n = 37] of the
Mississippi River. The independent variables are first-- the consecutive years from 1980 through
2010 [Timeline] and coded consecutively [1-31]; second-- plan mandate years [Time-Plan] with
zero [0] for the years prior to mandated mitigation planning (1980 – 1999) and one [1] for the
years in which the plan mandate occurs (2000 – 2010); third-- time as a variable [TimeAfterPlan]
with a value of zero [0] for time prior to the mandate and then numbered consecutively [1-11] for
the mandate years (2000 – 2010). Regression results indicate that the overall model does not
significantly predict flood cost, R^2 = .011, R_adj^2 = -.099, F (3, 27) = 1.43, p ≤ .255.
Model 4 (Figure 5.4) is also a multiple regression discontinuity model exploring the
lower region of the Mississippi River which is defined as the area below the confluence of the
Ohio River and Mississippi River at Cairo, Illinois. Again, regression was conducted to determine
the accuracy of the independent variables in predicting flood costs. The dependent variable was
established as [cost] which is the reported flood property damage cost gleaned from SHELDUS
from each year in the period 1980 through 2010 (31 total years) for all counties having a
mitigation plan in the lower region [n = 25] of the Mississippi River. The independent variables
are first-- the consecutive years from 1980 through 2010 [Timeline] and coded consecutively [131]; second-- plan mandate years [Time-Plan] with zero [0] for the years prior to mandated
mitigation planning (1980 – 1999) and one [1] for the years in which the plan mandate occurs
(2000 – 2010); third-- time as a variable [TimeAfterPlan] with a value of zero [0] for time prior to
the mandate and then numbered consecutively [1-11] for the mandate years (2000 – 2010).
Regression results indicate that the overall model does not significantly predict flood cost, R^2 =
.012, R_adj^2 = -.099, F (3, 27) = .101, p ≤ .958.
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It was anticipated that the models again would lack significance given the wide
variability of flooding and sample size (See Table 5.3, 5.4). Comparing the slopes of Model 3
(Figure 5.3) and Model 4 (Figure 5.4), there were some major differences. The slope in Model 3
(Figure 5.3) in the mandated period was very similar to the slope in Model 1 (Figure 5.1) which
suggests that flooding costs increased at the beginning of the mandate period. However, the slope
in Model 4 (Figure 5.4) showed a drastic decline in flood cost in the mandated period. In real
dollars, counties with plans in the upper region reported a cost increase of $5,195,403 each
subsequent year (standardized coefficient = .721) whereas the lower region counties with plans
had a yearly decrease of $1,994,530 (standardized coefficient = -.127). How might this
discrepancy be explained?
Model 3 and Model 4 discontinuity design have significant challenges due to the
limitations of smaller sample size and also potentially flooding behavior itself. There were more
counties identified with plans (n = 37) in the upper region than the lower region (n = 25) in the
sample. The upper and lower regions do not necessarily flood at the same time or in the same
frequency. For example, in the 1993 Great Flood, the upper region experienced catastrophic
flooding while the lower river region, in a state of drought, was not impacted at all. Secondly,
when flooding occurs in the lower region, it can be due to receiving higher volume flood waters
from the upper region and/or from the Ohio River. A large volume of water from the Ohio River
pouring in to the Mississippi River alone will often create flood conditions in the lower region.
Analysis of Flood Costs and Flood Mitigation
State Flood Costs
Using the SHELDUS data provided from 1960 – 2009, the ten states within the sample
were evaluated for property damage costs due to flooding (Table 5.5). Iowa has the highest flood
costs over the 50 year period, primarily due to the Great Flood of 1993 ($702 million). The
second and third highest flooding states were Illinois ($363,993,661) and Louisiana
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($363,770,517). Kentucky has the lowest cost ($13.8 million) over the 50 year period and
remains the lowest during the 2000-2009 period which is after mitigation planning was mandated.
What is alarming here is that after mitigation planning was mandated, over half of these
states have suffered the majority of their overall 50 year flood costs in the 2000-2009 period. For
example, Minnesota has a total 50 year flood cost of $267 million and the losses suffered in 20002009 totaled $242 million or 91 percent of all costs; Tennessee had a 50 year overall loss of $131
million and $115 million (88 percent) in the 2000-2009 period; Wisconsin has a total 50 year
flood cost of $183 million and $146 million (80 percent) in the 2000-2009 period; Arkansas’s 50
year flood cost totaled $23 million and had $15 million (65 percent) flood cost in the 2000-2009
period.
Also using SHELDUS data, the total amount of flood disaster declarations could be
evaluated from the same 50 year period from 1960-2009 (Table 5.6) The total amount of flood
disaster events increased most dramatically in Wisconsin (50 to 160 disasters), Minnesota (29 to
89 disasters), Tennessee (51 to 80 disasters), and Mississippi (78 to 125 disasters) from the 1990s
decade to 2000-09.
Overall, disaster declarations (Table 5.6) and property damage (Table 5.5) due to
flooding on the Mississippi River border has continued to increase despite the mitigation planning
mandates of Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. Two specific exceptions, Iowa and Illinois did see
a decrease in both disaster declarations and property damage due to flooding in their Mississippi
River border counties (MRBCs) from the ten year period 1990-1999 prior to the enactment of the
Disaster Mitigation Act period from 2000 to 2010. In Missouri, the number of disaster
declarations in border counties went down but property damage costs increased; meanwhile the
opposite occurred in Kentucky MRBCs—two more disaster declarations but a decrease in the
cost of property damage.
State Mitigation Planning Overview
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A content analysis of state hazard mitigation plans (Table 5.7) revealed that the majority
of state plans do have specific flood action items and these action items range from zero to 57
percent of total action items. Iowa has the best ratio of flood action items (57 percent) in their
mitigation plan, followed by Minnesota (56 percent) and Mississippi (43 percent). Louisiana did
not have any mitigation actions related to flooding in their state plan.
State plans were evaluated for structural mitigation (Table 5.8) and non-structural
mitigation (Table 5.9) action items. Minnesota and Iowa has evenly distributed the number of
structural and non-structural flood mitigation actions, while the majority of states focus solely on
non-structural mitigation. These results suggest that states perhaps see their role as providing
administrative and technical support to their counties and not one that focuses heavily on
structural improvements. It appears that the state relies heavily on funding non-structural
mitigation actions either through the general fund, or as part of the administrative role of county
emergency managers.
Given that structural mitigation actions are usually high dollar construction projects, it
appears that the states leaves it up to the local government to barter with the federal government
for structural project funding. While this is not stated explicitly in state plans, this assumption is
made based on looking at county plans to see where they indicate their potential funding
resources for all mitigation actions.
It also suggests that states view their role in mitigation planning in terms of broad strokes.
Mainly, their action strategies lack specificity in terms of non-structural mitigation projects
outside of promoting awareness of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and Community
Rating System (CRS). Every state but Louisiana specifically addressed promoting the NFIP, and
all states but Wisconsin, Illinois and Louisiana mentioned the CRS in their non-structural
mitigation action items (Table 5.9). Also notable is the fact that six out of ten states addressed
repetitive loss properties in the action items; the four states that did not address repetitive loss are:
Illinois, Wisconsin, Louisiana, and Mississippi (Table 5.9).
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County/Parish Mitigation Planning Overview
A content analysis was conducted on 64 all hazard mitigation plans from counties
bordering the Mississippi River. A total of 2,562 all hazard mitigation items were evaluated and
1,062 flood mitigation specific action items were identified. These flood mitigation action items
were then divided into structural action items (509) that accounted for 48 percent of flood
mitigation actions (Table 5.10) and non-structural action items (553) that accounted for 52
percent of flood mitigation actions (Table 5.11).
Structural mitigation need in MRBCs (Table 5.10) was most prevalent in Illinois (236
items) followed by Louisiana (121 items). All MRBCs showed the greatest need for road repairs
and elevation (81 items) followed by widening culverts (75 items), fixing sewers (45 items),
stabilizing banks with armour (33 items), repair/replace bridges (32 items) and building
floodwalls and levees (30). Illinois specifically seemed to skew the data for the most prevalent
types of structural mitigation. Specific to Louisiana, there is a critical need for building pumping
stations (25 items) and retrofitting structures (18 items); and Tennessee specifically needs
retention ponds and reservoirs (18 items). The number one issue by State differs somewhat:
Wisconsin (stabilizing banks); Minnesota (floodwalls and levees); Iowa (fix sewers); Illinois and
Missouri (road repair/elevation); Kentucky and Mississippi (move buildings out of floodplain);
Tennessee (retention ponds/reservoirs); Louisiana (pumping stations).
Non-structural mitigation needs (Table 5.11) are also skewed by the high number of item
needs in Illinois. The highest non-structural mitigation need (in all states) is conducting studies
on the floodplain to determine what can be done to mitigate issues (92 items). In fact, all state
MRBCs indicate the top three issues are 1) conducting studies, 2) promoting the NFIP, and 3)
trying to get maintenance approved (clean debris from waterways and drains). All state MRBCs,
with exception to Tennessee, show a need to address repetitive loss property issues (ranked fourth
as an issue) and specifically they indicate this need is to identify these properties in the
floodplain. Working towards policy remedies was another popular non-structural item (ranked
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fifth, total 48) with exception to Kentucky and Tennessee (no need reported). Overall, education
and outreach ranked sixth with a total of 45 action items related to this initiative (no need:
Tennessee, Mississippi). The most concerning items noted during the analysis, because they are
foundational for mitigation, are the needs for warning improvements (Wisconsin, Illinois,
Missouri, and Mississippi); evacuation and shelter planning (Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri)
and make response plans (Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri). The CRS program as an MRBC action
item (total 12) only had relevance in three states (Illinois, Missouri, and Louisiana).
Content Analysis: State & County Profiles of Flooding Costs and Mitigation Planning
Minnesota & Counties
The total amount of flood costs for the fifty year period (1960-2010) in the Minnesota
counties bordering the Mississippi River was 266.8 million dollars (Table 5.12). The period from
2000 to 2010 accounts for 91 percent ($242.3 million) of this total. Flooding in August, 2007
accounts for 34 percent (over $82 million) of this period and is confined to three counties—
Houston, Winona, and Wabasha. The second worst year for flooding occurred in 2001 ($77.7
million) accounting for 32 percent of flooding in this decade with 13 counties reported flood
damages primarily in the months of April and May.
Comparisons were made between counties with and without mitigation plans to the
amount of total disaster declarations per decade (Table 5.13) and also total property damage
(Table 5.12) by decade. Minnesota had an increased amount of flood disaster in the 13 MRBCs
from 29 flood disasters in the 1990s to 89 total flood disaster from 2000 to 2010 (Table 5.13). Of
the total number of disasters in the 2000 to 2010 period, 46 of these declarations were in counties
with no mitigation planning. The three counties with the most flooding frequency, flood disaster
declarations, and highest cost for flooding from 2000 – 2010 are Houston County (21 disaster
declarations/$54.1 million), Winona County (17/$49 million), and Wabasha County (16/$25.1
million) accounting for over half (53 percent) of all flood costs within this decade. Houston and
Wabasha are two of six counties without a hazard mitigation plan. Overall, Minnesota counties
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without mitigation plans experienced 53 percent (1.28 million) of flooding costs in this 2000 –
2010 decade. Counties with plans also reported more flooding disasters and more total flooding
costs than the total of all previous years combined. The average flood cost per disaster was
$74,000 prior to the year 2000, from here costs jumped $2.65 million to an average $2.72 million
per occurrence. Counties in specific where it is alarming to see such an increase in the average
cost per disaster declaration is: Winona County, $2.88 million; Houston, $2.58 million; and
Wabasha, $1.57 million.
Looking at the Minnesota state and counties mitigation plans, in the state plan there were
a total of 18 mitigation actions listed and flood mitigation actions (10) accounting for 56 percent
of total actions. This suggests the state does pay ample attention to the problem of flooding. The
state evenly divided the need for structural (5) and nonstructural mitigation (5). Counties plans
overall have a lower ratio (15 percent) with 61 flood mitigation actions out of an overall total of
416 total mitigation actions. Of these actions, the counties reported 17 structural actions and 44
nonstructural actions.
Does the state plan and county plans appear to agree on the priority mitigation needs (see
Table 5.14)? Both agree that they need structural mitigation actions such as culverts, levees,
dams, and floodwalls. The State identified bank stabilization, bridges, and reforesting/greening as
a need while the counties indicated a strong need for warning systems, elevating structures in the
floodplain, and flood gates. The State and counties agree on studies, NFIP, and repetitive loss
funding being top five priorities. The State cited the community rating system and education and
outreach being among the top five while the counties asked for technical support and equipment
funding. The State seems to be more cognizant of flooding problems and is encouraging counties
to adapt the Community Rating System, however none of the counties have flood mitigation
action items related to this federal initiative.
Counties indicate that they would seek funding for structural projects primarily from the
federal government while providing a 25 percent matching from their local funds. Funding for
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nonstructural mitigation actions would be requested from federal, state, and local governments.
Overall the counties cited 19 actions seeking federal funding sources; eight (8) actions seeking
state funding sources; and 32 actions seeking local funding. In some actions, all levels of
government were listed as possible funding sources.
Wisconsin & Counties
In Wisconsin, 80 percent of flooding from the entire 50 year period of study (1960 –
2010) can be attributed to the 2000 – 2010 period, or after the DMA 2000 mandate for mitigation
planning began (Table 5.15). Flooding jumped to $146.1 million from $8.2 million in the
previous decade (18 times higher). Vernon County ($53.5 million - no mitigation plan) makes up
37 percent of the total for that period, followed by Crawford County ($35.5 million, 24 percent,
with mitigation plan) and Grant County ($18.3 million, 13 percent, with mitigation plan).
Grant and Crawford counties have flooded every year in this last decade except for 2005
and 2006. The majority of flooding occurred in 2001 ($25.5 million), 2007 ($73.8 million), and
2008 ($26.8 million). Those Mississippi River border counties without plans account for $88.5
million ($35 million excluding Vernon County) of the total $146 million in property damage
costs from 2000 to 2010. Those Wisconsin MRBCs that do not have mitigation plans have
historically had more property damage losses. Comparing 1990s to the 2000s period, flood costs
increased in mitigated river border counties by 96 percent and 93 percent in unmitigated river
border counties. The cost of flooding (Table 5.15) and number of disaster declarations (Table
5.16) increased significantly in both mitigated and unmitigated MRBCs in Wisconsin. The
average cost per disaster occurrence increased by $1.05 million in the 2000 – 2010 period from
$40,000 per occurrence to $1.09 million average per disaster declaration. In Vernon County, the
average cost per disaster declaration is $6.69 million followed by $1.25 million in Crawford
County.
The Wisconsin state plan has 17 flood related mitigation actions (17 percent) of a total 98
mitigation actions overall. None of those flood mitigation actions are structural in nature. Three
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counties have mitigation plans with a total of 32 percent of mitigation actions related to flooding.
Pepin County, second lowest flooding county, seems to concentrate the greatest efforts towards
flooding with 21/37 (57 percent) of mitigation actions oriented to flooding (Crawford – 6/23, 26
percent; Grant -5/40, 13 percent).
In terms of structural mitigation, counties rank the need for culverts, sewers, bank
stabilization, road elevation, and bridges repair/reconstructed/constructed as their primary need
(Table 5.17). They are primarily focused on obtaining funding from the federal government for
structural projects but also indicate asking at all levels on some actions, including nonstructural
actions. They reported seeking funds from the federal government- 16, state government- 8, and
local government- 34 (Pepin making 28 requests from the local government).
The State plan ranked the need for education and outreach as its first priority followed by
technical support, training, NFIP, and repetitive loss funding (Table 5.17). Counties ranked the
NFIP as the priority need, followed by maintenance work (cleaning/checking for debris),
repetitive loss funding, influencing local policy, and education/outreach (Table 5.17). Neither the
state nor counties mention the Community Rating System in their mitigation plans.
Iowa & Counties
Iowa had a significant decrease (348 to 154) in the amount of flood disasters from the
period 1990 – 1999 to 2000 – 2010 (Table 5.19). The property damage flood costs for the Great
Flood of 1993 alone was reportedly $ 59.9 million or 94 percent of the flooding cost for that
decade (Table 5.18).
In the period 2000 – 2010 significant flooding increases have occurred when you remove
1993 from the equation. The highest repetitive flooding occurrences and flooding costs can be
attributed to Allamakee ($12.9 million) and Clayton ($16.6 million) counties. These counties
alone account for 50 percent of the flooding in the 2000 – 2010 period.
Clayton County, the highest flooding county, has a mitigation plan. This plan has a total
of 15 mitigation actions with two of those actions being flood related. The actions specifically
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are to provide increased flood mitigation efforts and enhancements to structural mitigation and
provide an increased awareness to NFIP participation. These are very broad actions that would
be expected within a state plan but more exact in a county plan.
In Iowa, Mississippi River border counties (MRBCs) without plans accounted for 154 of
the total 207 flood disasters in the 2000 – 2010 period (Table 5.19). The total cost of property
damage due to flooding was 59.8 million dollars which is just slightly higher that the cost of the
1993 Great Flood (Table 5.18). Counties with plans averaged $7.56 million per county and those
without plans $8.55 million in flood costs for the 2000 to 2010 period. On the surface, it seems to
indicate that those counties with mitigation plans have less property damage on average.
Comparing data from 1990 to 1999 and 2000-2010, unmitigated counties have experienced a
flood cost loss reduction of 91.1 percent whereas mitigated counties have a 61.2 percent average
loss reduction. Therefore, it seems that hazard mitigation plans have had little, if any, effect on
reducing property damage on MRBC’s in Iowa.
Flood mitigation actions make up 57 percent (29 of 51) of the total mitigation actions in
the Iowa state plan signaling that the state is very aware of flooding risks. Out of the 10 counties
in Iowa bordering the Mississippi River only three (Clayton, Jackson, and Scott) have mitigation
plans. Since we already know Clayton has only two total flood actions, Jackson (33) and Scott
(56) primarily provide for the 33 percent ratio (91 of 279) of flood actions.
Comparing the state plan to county plans in terms of mitigation need (Table 5.20), both
state and counties identify a structural mitigation need for culverts, levees, dams, and floodwalls
in the top five mitigation needs. The state cites a need for road elevation and repair; bank
stabilization, and bridge improvements such as repair/construction/reconstruction. The counties
number one primary need reported is improved sewer infrastructure and that they need to
move/build/rebuild properties that are in the floodplain.
In terms of nonstructural mitigation, both the state and counties report a need to address
repetitive loss property funding and promote the NFIP. The State includes mention of the

75

Community Rating System but there was no mention the CRS in any of the county plans. Their
primary nonstructural mitigation action is “policy influence” or to play a role in moving local
government in terms of shaping land use/regulating the floodplain and other flood related
subjects. Their second ranked action was to enforce regulations related to floodplain
management. Finally, the other highly ranked action for Iowa counties was “maintenance” which
relates to checking and cleaning debris from various sources flowing into the Mississippi River.
Iowa counties look to the federal government (five requests) and state government (four
requests) for funding. Only Clayton county sought funding (twice) from the local government.
These counties are very vague about seeking funding overall, but efforts would be concentrated at
the federal and state level. It is assumed that they believe the majority of nonstructural actions
would be funded through their operations budget.
Illinois & Counties
In Illinois, there was an overall reduction of property damage costs (Table 5.21) and
flood disasters (Table 5.22) in both mitigated and non-mitigated counties bordering the
Mississippi River. The average loss per MRBC is $2,659,987 overall. Mitigated MRBCs
claimed on average $2,806,443 while unmitigated county property damage claimed, on average,
half that amount ($1,488,335). Mitigated MRBCs accounted for nearly 45 million of the 47.9
million in property damage. The total amount of flood costs in the mandated period (2000 –
2010) was $47.4 million dropping from $210.2 million in the 1990s. There are only two counties
on the Mississippi River border without mitigation plans (Randolph County and Whiteside
County). The highest flooding county during the 2000 – 2010 period is Mercer County ($16.4
million) making up 35 percent of overall flooding and $11 million of this total was reported in
2003. The majority of flooding during this period occurred in 2010 ($21.4 million) with $10
million attributed to Carroll County and $5 million to Mercer. Overall, the cost of flooding has
gone down since 2000 from an average $570,000 per disaster declaration to $400,000 average per
occurrence.
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The Illinois state plan has 41 flood mitigation actions (20 percent) out of a total of 207
mitigation actions. None of the flood mitigation actions are of the structural type (Table 5.23).
Counties (16 of 18 with plans), on the other hand, have 220 (57 percent) structural mitigation
actions. Road elevation and repair ranked first with 44 total actions specifically focused on this
problem. Culvert building/widening followed as a close second with 42 total actions. Bridges
(23), bank stabilization (22) and sewers (19) are the remaining structural actions within the top
five.
Counties had a total of 187 nonstructural items and cited a tremendous need for studies
(52 total actions) followed by equipment funding (24), maintenance, education/outreach, and
warning improvements. The State, however, ranks training as the first priority followed by
repetitive loss funding, technical support, studies, and NFIP (Table 5.23). The State plan does
mention promoting the Community Rating System; however there were three action items from
the counties sample. These findings suggest that the CRS is very low priority in Illinois.
Funding sources identified by the counties were primarily geared toward the federal
government for structural projects and the state for nonstructural actions. The overall funding
breakdown was federal (92), state (55), and local (131).
Missouri & Counties
Missouri’s MRBCs experienced very little change in total number of flooding disasters
(Table 5.25) from the 1990s to 2000s but does show a slight decrease overall (124 to 116). Those
two counties without hazard mitigation plans (Clark and Lewis County) reported an increase from
seven to 31 flood disasters and accounted for 27 percent of flood disaster declarations. Overall
the two counties that did not have mitigation plans claimed twenty percent of the flooding
property damage cost (Table 5.24). Despite a decrease in number of flood events, the cost of
flooding continues to rise. Actually it more than doubled ($25.4 million to $66.1 million) from
the 1990 – 1999 period to 2000 – 2010 decade when mitigation plans were mandated by DMA
2000. The average per disaster occurrence has increased in the 2000 period by $170,000, or from
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$120,000 to $290,000 per disaster occurrence. The highest flooding counties presently are Marion
County ($7.3 million, has plan), Clark ($4.4 million, no plan), and Cape Girardeau County ($3.6
million, has plan). Most concerning is Marion County previously had an average $192,000
average per disaster occurrence, and since 2000, this has increased to $3.65 million per
occurrence.
The Missouri state plan has six of 17 mitigation actions related to flooding (29 percent).
None of these flood actions are structural in nature (Table 5.26). The State is focused on
repetitive loss issues, NFIP, CRS, education/outreach, and technical support. Counties actually
look pretty decent with 14 of 16 having plans and 28 percent of their mitigation actions (136/480)
are focused on flooding. The overall total of structural actions reported by counties is 13 while
nonstructural mitigation actions amounted to 123 total. In their detailed funding sections, they
sought government funding as follows: federal- 62, state- 53, local- 90. All structural projects had
federal funding requests; often the counties noted asking all three levels of government for
funding.
Their primary structural action needs are road elevation/repair, reforest/greening, bank
stabilization, levees, dams, and floodwalls. They ranked nonstructural actions as 1) influencing
local flooding policy, 2) enforcing present floodplain regulations, 3) maintenance (check/clean
debris in local stream outputs), 4) NFIP, 5) environmental considerations. While the State
acknowledges the CRS to be a high priority, this action was only mentioned once out of all 123
nonstructural actions indicating it is not a very popular initiative in the Missouri counties.
Interestingly, counties made 16 actions related to influencing local policy and 16 actions
regarding enforcing local regulations. This suggests that counties are highly motivated to impact
land use and floodplain management while the state does not acknowledge such things at all.
Kentucky & Counties
Kentucky appears to have an overall reduction in property damage losses (from $4
million to $2.8 million) with a marginal increase in flood disasters (23 to 25 declarations) in
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MRBCs (Table 5.27 and Table 5.28). However, the average cost per disaster declaration has
gone up $60,000 per occurrence after the 2000 mandate. Kentucky has the smallest overall
increase in flood cost average per disaster out of the five states (n = 10) seeing an increase within
this focus of this study. MRBCs have the lowest overall property damage rate of all ten states
examined on the Mississippi River border. It is the only state within the sample that has active
mitigation plans in place for all MRBCs.
The state plan for Kentucky has a total of 24 flood mitigation actions (34 percent) out of
a total 67 mitigation actions. The counties have a ratio of 47 percent with 43 flood mitigation
actions out of 92 actions total. It is very evident that both the State and counties take flood
mitigation planning seriously.
In terms of structural mitigation, Kentucky cited elevating structures as their primary
need followed by any “not yet identified” water reduction projects (two total). The counties
appear to be building their plans from state guidance (Table 5.29) as their second ranked action
item is the same as the state “not yet identified” water reduction projects. Their main priority in a
total of 13 structural actions is to move/rebuild or build out of the floodplain, third is road
elevation/repair, fourth-- bank stabilization. The fifth ranked priority for the counties is retention
ponds and reservoirs. This is interesting because this structural action item is starting to become
prevalent within the areas above Louisiana and below the confluence of the Ohio River and
Mississippi River.
The State plan views nonstructural mitigation as the priority (22 actions) with influence
policy decisions ranking first; and the followed by repetitive loss funding, NFIP, education and
outreach, and technical support (Table 5.29). Counties (25 nonstructural actions) ranked
promoting the NFIP first, followed by education/outreach, maintenance, repetitive loss funding,
and exploring environmental considerations. There was no mention of the Community Rating
System by any counties within Kentucky.
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Counties indicated funding sources from the federal government are a priority for
structural projects supplemented by a local government match. Overall, the requests to the
federal government total 17 and local requests total 21. The counties seek state funding for nine
nonstructural actions.
Tennessee & Counties
Flood costs in Tennessee climbed from $7.5 million in the 1990s to $114.7 million in the
2000s (Table 5.30). $80.4 million can be attributed to Shelby County and $20.6 million to Tipton
County. Mississippi River border counties with mitigation plans (Shelby, Tipton) had
considerable more property damage costs and flood disaster declarations (Table 5.31) than river
border counties without mitigation plans (Dyer, Lake, Lauderdale). The average loss in the 20002010 for mitigated river border counties was $50.5 million in comparison to $4.5 million average
loss per MRBC without mitigation planning. Tennessee has the second largest increase in the
average cost per disaster declaration ($940,000) from $490,000 to $1.43 million per incident.
The Tennessee state plan had a total of six (10 percent; nonstructural) flood actions out of
57 total mitigation items (Table 5.32). Tennessee counties had a ratio of 61/113 (54 percent) of
mitigation items directed toward flooding. Tennessee counties have 49 structural actions and the
main priority is building retention ponds and reservoirs (18 actions). Counties complete ranking
their structural priorities as 2) culverts, 3) channel improvements, 4) roads elevated/repaired, and
5) construct/reconstruct bridges.
Tennessee state plan prioritized nonstructural mitigation as follows: 1) repetitive loss, 2)
studies, 3) NFIP, 4) CRS, and 5) training. The counties concentrate their need on four priority
nonstructural mitigation actions: 1) studies, 2) NFIP, 3) technical support, 4) maintenance. None
of the counties mention the Community Rating System. All structural items were dependent on
receiving federal funding (57 requests) followed by nonstructural funding requests from the state
(12) and local (28) governments.
Arkansas & Counties
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The cost of flooding and number of flooding disaster declarations continues to rise in
Arkansas MRBCs (Table 5.33 and Table 5.34). The change in property damage between the
1990s ($1.7 million) to 2000s (15.1 million) is a bit alarming. The overall flood cost average
increase per disaster declaration in the 2000 – 2010 period is $150,000 per occurrence which has
doubled from $150,000 to $300,000 per disaster reported. While Crittenden County has the
highest flood cost overall, Desha County’s cost of flooding since the 2000 – 2010 period from
1990s had the most significant average increase. Flooding costs have grown from an average
$209,000 to $680,750 per disaster declaration.
There were no county mitigation plans available to evaluate in Arkansas MRBCs.
However, the State plan has a total of eight (13 percent, nonstructural) flood mitigation actions
out of a total 62 mitigation action items (Table 5.35). These are ranked as 1) NFIP, 2) repetitive
loss, 3) technical support, 4) CRS, 5) training.
Mississippi & Counties
Mississippi counties bordering the Mississippi River experienced a rise in flood costs
from the 1990s ($17.2 million) to the 2000s ($25.9 million) with the highest flooder consistently
being Warren County (Table 5.36). Disaster declarations (14) in Warren County in the 1990s
yielded a total flood cost of $13.7 million, and then jumped to $53.9 million in the 2000s. The
change in average cost per disaster for Warren County is $2.19 million, moving from an average
$980,000 per flood disaster to $2.19 million per flood disaster. Flooding in April, 2003
accounted for $10 million in Warren County which was 39 percent of the total flood costs in all
border counties for the 2000 to 2010 period. Mississippi MRBCs had considerable increase in
flood disaster declarations (78 to 125) from the 1990s to 2000s (Table 5.37). However, property
losses were on the decrease in MRBCs overall. The seven MRBCs with plans averaged $492,615
per loss compared to unmitigated MRBCs average $4.28 million per loss.
The Mississippi state plan concentrates 43 percent of total mitigation actions (63) towards
flooding (27). Two structural actions identified are levees, dams, and floodwalls improvements
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and installing warning systems. The top priorities for nonstructural flood mitigation are: 1) NFIP,
2) technical support, 3) enforcing regulations for floodplain management, 4) communication
(networking); and 5) conduct studies. Promoting the Community Rating System is within the
action items, as well as promoting the NFIP, and seeking funding for repetitive loss.
Counties (7) with plans have a total 22 flood mitigation actions out of 108 mitigation
actions total (20 percent) ranked promoting the NFIP first; followed by maintenance (checking
and clearing drainage); technical support; repetitive loss funding; and warning improvements. It
is clear that both the counties and State understand they have a need for improving/acquiring
warning systems (Table 5.38). The primary structural mitigation needs for counties are to move,
rebuild and build out of the floodplain, and focus on culverts, road elevation/repair, and sewer
infrastructure.
Counties primarily look to the federal government (7 requests) to provide funding for
structural mitigation projects and depend heavily on local funding (10 requests) to match federal
funds and support nonstructural mitigation. Only Desoto County sought funding from the State
for nonstructural mitigation projects.
Louisiana & Parishes
Property damage (Table 5.39) due to flooding has dropped considerably in Louisiana
MRBCs in the 2000 to 2010 period while flood disaster declarations (Table 5.40) were on the rise
(2000s - $14.1 million; 1990s - $257.2 million). However, these results do not give any indication
that having a hazard mitigation plan is reducing these costs. Actually, the cost of flooding for the
11 MRBCs without plans averaged $700,253 whereas the average for mitigated river border
counties was $1,065,333. Flooding over the 50 year period of study was highest during the
decade 1990 to 1999 with a total $257.2 million in flood costs. In January, 1990, six counties-West Feliciana, West Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupee, and Ascension each
reported $41.6 million in property damage costs, which is approximately $250 million total.
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The Louisiana state mitigation plan has 16 total mitigation actions that are very broadly
based and do not mention flooding specifically at all. Three specific items focus on developing
mitigation planning towards historical preservation efforts. Three actions are aimed at analyzing
and developing education and outreach strategies. Four actions emphasize a need to develop
technical support initiatives. Two action items are directed at identifying cost effective projects
at various levels of government (state, local, municipal). The remainder has to do with improving
mitigation planning and focusing on legislative and regulatory activities. This plan is remarkably
underdeveloped and does not provide much guidance for local planning initiatives which is the
primary focus of state plans. There is no mention of the primary federal initiatives towards
flooding such as the NFIP or Community Rating System.
Louisiana MRBC’s (17 total) have six parishes engaged in mitigation planning. There
were 197 flood actions identified out of a total 256 mitigation actions overall. These Louisiana
parishes have the highest ratio of flood mitigations (77 percent) of all states within the study
sample. Their first ranked structural mitigation item is the need for pumping stations in 25
different identified locations (Table 5.41). They also identified elevation structures, installing
culverts, improving sewer infrastructure, and making channel improvements as high priorities.
Their main priorities for nonstructural mitigation were tied with needs for education and outreach
as well as influencing flood related policies. Studies, repetitive loss funding, and participation in
the Community Rating System (8 actions) are the other three primary needs. Interestingly,
Louisiana MRBC’s have the highest amount of participation in the CRS. There are six parishes
within the sample that have achieved a CRS classification.
The parishes look to the federal government primarily for funding their structural
mitigation actions (144 requests) and expect matching funds to come from their local
government. In all, the local government (174 requests) is sought out to supplement federal
funding and provide for nonstructural mitigation. Orleans (4 requests) and Iberville (1 request)
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have indicated they would solicit funding from state government related to their mitigation
actions.
State and County Profiles Summary Analysis
While Mississippi and Kentucky MRBCs may have improved outcomes related to
mitigation planning, the overall analysis suggests that having mitigation plans does not decrease
the number of flood disasters or cost of flooding. Looking at the overall results, there seems to
be no improvement in flood disaster mitigation as a result of non-structural program initiatives as
recommended by White (1945) or after the DMA 2000 took effect. White (1945) argued that
despite more spending in structural mitigation, the cost of flooding continued to rise. These
findings suggest that despite both structural and non-structural mitigation initiatives, the cost of
flooding continues to rise.
Less than eight percent (nine counties total) of the 108 counties/parishes evaluated in this
study participate in the Community Rating System (CRS). None of the Mississippi River border
counties within Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi and Arkansas are
actively participating in the CRS (FEMA, 2012). Of these seven states there are cities bordering
the Mississippi River that do participate: LaCrosse, Wisconsin (class 8); Davenport, Iowa (class
8); West Memphis, Arkansas (class 7); and Greenville, Mississippi (class 8).
In Illinois, the river border counties of Whiteside (class 8), Rock Island (class 7)
participate in the CRS and the City of Moline (class 8). Within the State of Missouri only St.
Charles County (class 7) participates in the CRS. Louisiana has the most river border parishes
participating in the CRS (total of 6 parishes) which are East Baton Rouge (class 6); Ascension
(class 8); St. Charles (class 8); St. John the Baptist (class 8); Orleans (class 8); and Jefferson
(class 6).
Content Analysis Findings Compared to 2014 FEMA Local Official Survey
Comparing this analysis of mitigation planning to the FEMA Local Official Survey
(2014), there are differences in what FEMA LOS (2014) believes to be the most sought after
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mitigation needs and also concerning the extent of mitigation planning. FEMA OLS (2014)
reports that one in three counties have mitigation plans and the “perception persists” that there is
no flooding risk in their community. Analysis of mitigation plans in this study indicates that
flooding is the top natural hazard risk and 57 percent this sample has mitigation plans. Giving
generously to the FEMA OLS (2014) claim that “perceptions persists” among local officials that
there is no flood risk in their community, states and counties are somewhat capricious in focusing
on flood mitigation. According to FEMA LOS (2014) the primary mitigation action being taken
by communities is storm water planning but it is unclear what exactly this may entail as it is a
very vague and abstract strategic action.
An attempt was made to compare and contrast the action items from this study to the
FEMA LOS (2014). Structural and nonstructural mitigation items were evaluated together in
order to rank the overall need and compare findings. The state plan rankings are based upon how
many states cited the mitigation action and the county rankings are based upon how many states
had their counties report a mitigation action.
FEMA LOS (2014) has identified ten action items as the top needs for local flood
mitigation efforts. The actions would all be very useful to both the states and counties.
Specifically 60 percent of the FEMA LOS 2014 mitigation actions are indeed in the top priorities
of the states and counties even if they have not been coded exactly the same as the FEMA LOS
2014. These are: funding; addressing repetitive loss (acquisition); erosion control; expertise
(studies); technical support (mapping/building data bases); and education and outreach
development.
States and counties have a strong agreement that NFIP promotion needs to be addressed.
The federal government could be very instrumental in addressing this need and providing support
for this endeavor. Second, both the states and counties see a need to influence policies related to
flooding and floodplain management. There is an obvious awareness by the state and local
mitigation planning officials that federal initiatives cannot effectively be achieved until state and
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local governments align themselves with the federal government. Finally, both states and
counties identify the need for expansion and/or improvements with levees, dams, and floodwalls.
It is abundantly clear that they seek funding help from the federal government to satisfy this need.
Particular to the state priorities and not addressed by FEMA LOS 2014 (federal) or
counties in the top priorities is the need to promote the Community Rating System. In fact, this
action item is not prevalent in county plans. The states also prioritize training and
communication networks. Counties identified road elevation and repairs; maintenance-- checking
and cleaning debris from obstructing streams and waterways; and improvements to sewer
infrastructure. These action items are not acknowledged as priority needs by either the federal or
state government.
Social Vulnerabilities: Populations and households potentially in the floodplain
In order to make determinations about social vulnerabilities in the floodplain, it is
important to try to identify who might be in the floodplain and why. Thus far, social vulnerability
indexes have depended on county level data in order to make inferences about hazard
vulnerabilities. The problem here is that measuring vulnerability at the county level may not
reveal concentrations of vulnerability in higher risk areas. This effort is beset by the limited
amount of data available for study at the census tract level. In this study, available population
and housing data was selected at the census tract level from 2012 American Community Survey
five year estimates and compared to the same data at the county level. The use of Arc GIS to
map this enormous amount of data served to provide a better visual aid for analysis. The total
area of study was divided into four mapped segments: Upper Mississippi River Region; Upper
Middle Mississippi Region; Lower Mississippi River Region; and Louisiana Region (Figure 5.5).
There are eight side by side maps within each segment that identify the specified social
vulnerability variables at the county and census tract level. These maps are accompanied by
pullouts for six high density urban areas: Minneapolis/St. Paul, Quad Cities, St. Louis, Memphis,
Baton Rouge, and New Orleans. The variables are as follows: overall poverty (Figures 5.6 –
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5.15); white poverty (Figures 5.16 – 5.25); black poverty (Figures 5.26 – 5.35); elderly poverty
(Figures 5.36 – 5.45); elderly population overall (Figures 5.46 – 5.55); median household income
(Figures 5.56 – 5.65); renter versus owner occupied housing (Figures 5.66 – 5.75); and housing
built in 1969 or prior (Figures 5.76 – 5.85).
The total population of all counties within this study is 10,243,374 and the total
population within the census tracts bordering the Mississippi River is 2,264,845. It is estimated
that 22 percent of the total population in this study is considered to potentially be within the
floodplain (Table 5.42). Total households for this population is 4,011,674 and potentially
896,807 (also 22 percent) of these households are within the floodplain (Table 5.42). Looking at
the region overall, large population centers are most evident in Minnesota, Iowa, and Louisiana
(Table 5.42). The lowest population density lies in the middle region just below the confluence of
the Ohio River with exception to the metropolitan area of Memphis, Tennessee (Table 5.42).
One of the most interesting findings in this study is the fact that poverty is pushed up
against the Mississippi River thus exposing a more vulnerable population to a potentially more
risky area to live (Table 5.42). Poverty conditions become increasingly prevalent in the lower
Mississippi region and within urban areas (see Figures 5.6 – 5.15). Breakdowns for each state
provide an idea of what percent of populations and households may be in the floodplain and also
what the highest level of poverty is within poverty pockets obscured by much lower overall
county poverty levels (Table 5.42).
Race does have significance in the overall poverty characteristics along the Mississippi
River. Black poverty along the Mississippi River is highest in urban areas and more prevalent in
the middle and southern regions. There is a large section of black poverty on the Illinois border
in the Quad Cities region and a large section of white poverty in Baton Rouge. Even though
black poverty is much more pronounced, both white and black poverty is similarly situated by
region.
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What is most concerning about the poverty population are the small dense pockets of
elderly poverty along the entirety of the river and especially in Illinois. There are large sections
of elderly poverty in urban areas especially in St. Louis and Memphis and one glaringly large
area at the tip of the bird’s foot in Louisiana. Elderly population overall should be a concern for
mitigation planning. The upper region, upper middle, and lower middle region especially on the
Arkansas side of the river have large elderly populations. In urban areas, the most prevalent areas
for elderly populations are in the Quad Cities region, Memphis, and Baton Rouge.
In addition to high concentrations of poverty, over 30 percent of households are rental
units. The counties in the lower Mississippi River region have even higher pockets of rental
housing buffered up against the river than the upper region. The urban areas all have a large
presence of rental housing buffered along the river, especially in Memphis and Baton Rouge.
Furthermore, housing built prior to 1969, which would be grandfathered into the National
Flood Insurance Program and Community Rating System, is extremely dominant on the river
border. The most dense areas are within the urban centers and in the lower region along the
Arkansas side and upper Louisiana. This housing stock would less likely be retrofitted and more
vulnerable to flooding.
Mapping these social vulnerabilities at the regional level using Arc GIS provided an
opportunity to scan the region for problem areas. Greater analysis within each state then provided
further evidence of social vulnerability characteristics and these are explained in greater detail
below.
Minnesota Characteristics:
Minnesota counties have the largest population (3,179,161) bordering the Mississippi
River. Within these counties, the census tracts bordering the river make up a total of 437,001
people (14 percent). Household totals are 1,247,595 with 167,229 (13 percent of total
households) potentially within the floodplain. There are approximately 21,000 structures (44
percent) in or near the floodplain dating prior to 1969 and would likely be grandfathered in to the
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NFIP program. Rental homes make up 28 percent of the total households within these census
tracts and, for the most part, poverty levels are far greater than their county average with
exception to Houston, Wabasha, and Wright County. Higher levels of poverty, as much as 56
percent (Winona County) are evident in census tracts bordering the Mississippi River. These
findings suggest that high pockets of poverty are being pushed up to the river’s edge and creating
greater vulnerabilities.
Wisconsin Characteristics:
The population within the MRBCs in Wisconsin is 302,974 which ranks this state as
eighth overall in terms of population and total households (119,384). Census tracts bordering the
Mississippi River within the Wisconsin MRBC’s have a population of 121,233 (40 percent) with
a total of 50,624 households (47 percent) that could be potentially at risk for flooding or be within
the floodplain. Approximately 29 percent of these housing structures are rentals which creates
greater vulnerability to hazard risk. There are two counties that have high poverty pockets
(Crawford, 16.6 percent; LaCrosse, 31.1 percent) buffered against the river borders and these two
most populated counties within the Wisconsin sample. Structures built in 1969 or earlier make up
44 percent of the housing stock.
Iowa Characteristics:
Iowa MRBC’s have a huge vulnerability in the high level of poverty buffering the
Mississippi River. The population of the Iowa counties within this study is 490,616 and total
households equal 198,055 which ranks Iowa sixth overall in terms of population density but it has
the highest percentage of population (90 percent) potentially within the floodplain and has the
second highest population of all states within the potential floodplain area. Poverty pockets along
the river range from 15.1 percent to 49 percent (Scott County) and include all counties with
exception to Jackson County. The population within these census tracts totals 440,858 (90
percent) and is within a total of 177,101 households (89 percent) that are potentially at flood risk
or within the floodplain. Rental housing makes up 27 percent of households. There are 105,642
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structures (60 percent) that predate 1969 and therefore are grandfathered into the NFIP program.
These findings show that the overall housing stock is very dated along the river’s edge.
Missouri Characteristics:
Missouri ranks second in total population density in MRBCs (population 1,909,143) and
a total of 748,535 households. There are potentially 189,894 people (10 percent) at risk of being
in the floodplain (72,483 households) in the counties bordering the Mississippi River in Missouri.
Some census tracts that buffer the edge of the river have high poverty pockets such as St. Louis
County (16.35 percent), New Madrid (17 percent), Pemiscot (20 percent), Cape Girardeau (29
percent), and Ste. Genevieve (64 percent). Rental properties make up 25 percent of the housing
stock and 40 percent of the housing stock was built before 1969.
Most interesting about Missouri is that while this state has the second largest population
in this study, it has the second lowest population rate (10 percent) within the potential floodplain
area. Missourians, given the proper resources, can potentially further reduce their population
within the floodplain.
Illinois Characteristics:
Census tracts bordering the Mississippi River in the MRBC’s show high concentrations
of poverty buffering the river. Ten counties have poverty levels of 21 percent to 65 percent with
Alexander County being the highest, followed by St. Clair County with 50.3 percent. The
housing stock is dated with 55 percent of these structures being built prior to 1969. The
population at risk of being within the floodplain is 177,454 (16 percent) out of an overall MRBCs
population of 1,088,248. The total amount of households within the Illinois MRBCs is 472,217
with 87,431 households (also 16 percent) potentially within the floodplain and 21 percent of these
households are occupied by renters.
Kentucky Characteristics:
There are 17,764 people and 7,311 households which accounts for 71 percent of the total
population/households (25,064/10,356) within the census tracts bordering the Mississippi River
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in Kentucky making them potentially within the floodplain. These figures reflect a broad
estimate of who might be in the floodplain given that census tract borders in lower populated
counties cover far more terrain than those with higher population density. Kentucky has the
lowest population density of all states within this study. Kentucky’s border counties show
poverty levels ranging from 13.2 to 24.2 percent but two of these counties have border census
tracts with poverty levels six percent higher: Ballard County (13.2 overall; 19.6 census tract) and
Fulton County (24.2 overall; 30.4 census tract). Rental housing in the bordering census tracts
accounts for 20 percent of overall households with exception to Fulton County (38 percent).
Over half the structures within census tracts bordering the Mississippi River were built prior to
1969 (51.4 percent) which is much higher than the overall average of the four counties (23
percent).
Tennessee Characteristics:
Nine census tracts border the Mississippi River in the five MRBC’s and there is an
overall higher poverty rate in some of these census tracts that should be noted: Shelby County
(20.2 percent overall; 44 percent in census tract) and Tipton (14 percent overall; 21 percent in
census tract). All of Lake County is included within the two census tracts reported and has a
poverty rate of 30 percent (32.5 percent in one census tract). The counties overall have poverty
ranging from 14 – 30 percent which is rather high overall.
When looking at population density within these census tracts, there are potentially
30,565 people living within 10,557 households (three percent) that may potentially be within the
floodplain. Rental units make up over 40 percent of this housing stock. In Shelby County, rental
properties make up 67 percent of total households within the census tracts bordering the
Mississippi River. Upon further inspection of the Shelby County census tracts bordering the
river, one tract (CT 43) shows a very low poverty rate (5 percent) and the median household
value is $80,000 compared to the overall county average of $25,465 suggesting that a more
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affluent community is pocketed within the riverfront. Approximately 25 percent of the housing
stock within these census tracts was built prior to 1969.
Overall, Tennessee has the lowest percentage population within the floodplain, however,
Memphis, Tennessee (Shelby County) has a high density overall, thus Tennessee ranks fifth out
of the ten states in terms of population. Therefore, this three percent is still a significant number
of people (total population/household is 1,064,261/390,461) potentially within the floodplain.
Arkansas Characteristics:
The population within the census tracts bordering the river totals 43,000 or 28 percent of
the total population (153,763). Findings show that this includes 15,000 households which is 26
percent of total households (57,508) that may potentially be within the floodplain. Arkansas is
the second lowest density state within the study sample.
The Arkansas MRBCs have a poverty rate of 25 – 32 percent and there are concentrations
of poverty within the census tracts bordering the river as high as 50.4 percent (Chicot County).
Rental housing makes up 38 percent of the housing stock with exception to Phillips County (58
percent) and Mississippi County (59 percent) and approximately 10 percent of the housing stock
was built prior to 1969.
Mississippi Characteristics:
Mississippi MRBCs have a total population of 393,168 with a total of 142,445
households. The population within the census tracts bordering the river is 103,404 with a total of
38,629 households (27 percent) at risk of being within the floodplain. Mississippi MRBCs have a
poverty rate of 23 – 38 percent with poverty pockets within the census tracts as high as 51 percent
(Washington County - CT 4). Rental housing makes up 39 percent of the housing stock with
exception to higher rental percentages in Bolivar County (53 percent), Warren County (58
percent), and Washington County (66 percent). Seven percent of structures were built prior to
1969 which is rather low in comparison to other states/counties.
Louisiana Characteristics:
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Louisiana’s 16 parishes have a poverty rate ranging from 11 (Ascension, Plaquemines) to
45 percent (East Carroll). However, to further explore at the census tract level bordering the
Mississippi River, Ascension Parish (11 percent) has a 35 percent poverty rate buffering the river.
The actual county poverty rate hides the higher poverty pockets buffered against the Mississippi
River and this pattern is very predominant in Louisiana: East Baton Rouge Parish (18.5 - 56.4
percent); Jefferson (15 - 44 percent); Pointe Coupee (19 - 37 percent); St. James (16 – 41
percent); St. John the Baptist (16 – 30 percent).
The total population within these census tracts bordering the Mississippi River and
potentially within the floodplain is 703,672 , with a total of 264,442 households. The population
in the floodplain represents 43 percent of the total Louisiana parish population/households
(1,636,976/625,118). While Louisiana ranks third overall in terms of total population, it has the
highest number of population/households potentially within the floodplain. Of these households
over 94,000 or 36 percent are rental properties and 46 percent (122,223) total households built
prior to 1969. The highest pockets of rental housing are found within census tracts in East Baton
Rouge Parish (99 percent); Jefferson Parish (99 percent); West Feliciana Parish (84 percent);
Plaquemines Parish (78 percent); and Orleans Parish (72 percent).
Summary analysis of social characteristics
In the overall Arc GIS analysis (see Figures 5.5 through 5.84) there are several
concerning factors to consider. This analysis shows the potential population and households at
risk in the floodplain (Table 5.42) in each state. Potentially 22 percent of all households
(896,806) within this study are near or within the floodplain (Table 5.42) Louisiana (703,672),
Minnesota (437,001), and Iowa (440,858) all have nearly double the amount of people potentially
in the floodplain (Table 5.42) in comparison to the other seven states within the study. In terms
of percent of population and households within the floodplain in each county (108) analyzed,
those ranked in the top three are: Iowa (89 percent), Kentucky (71 percent), and Louisiana (43
percent).
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Other interesting trends in housing demographics include median household incomes
(Figures 5.55 – 5.64) are much lower and more prevalent in the middle to southern region and all
urban areas regardless of region. The greatest volume of dated housing (Figures 5.75 – 5.84),
such as those units built in 1969 and or before (grandfathered into the NFIP), are actually in the
north and upper middle regions of the river. The most dated housing density is located in Iowa
and Illinois and within urban centers such as the Quad City area and Minneapolis/St. Paul
Minnesota. In the southern region, dated housing exists primarily in urban centers such as St.
Louis, Missouri; Memphis, Tennessee; and Baton Rouge, Louisiana with exception to a few areas
along the Arkansas border and upper Louisiana.
Those who rent property within the floodplain are also more vulnerable to disasters.
Over 30 percent of properties located within the floodplain are rental units. In some places this
number goes as high as 99 percent (East Baton Rouge Parish). Rental households trend higher in
the southern region, the top ranking states with high rental volumes are Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Tennessee.
When looking at poverty in these counties overall, there is a higher concentration of
poverty bordering the river (Figures 5.5 – 5.14). These pockets of poverty range upwards of 50
percent in most cases and can go as high as 65 percent in some areas. The most concerning are
the following: Illinois (65 percent), Missouri (64 percent), Arkansas (59 percent), (Louisiana (56
percent) and Minnesota (56 percent).
Overall, the ArcGIS analysis shows that white poverty (Figures 5.15 – 5.24) has a high
prevalence in the south and urban areas with a large pocket present specifically in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. Black poverty (Figures 5.25 – 5.34) is more widely distributed with higher density in
urban areas and south, but also much higher on the Illinois side of the Quad Cities.
Elderly populations (Figures 5.45 – 5.54) are significantly distributed in the upper and
middle regions bordering the Mississippi River and in the southern region along the Arkansas
border and within Louisiana. There are greater pockets of elderly (Figures 5.35 – 5.44) within
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Quad Cities, Memphis, Baton Rouge and New Orleans. High concentrations of elderly poverty
(Figures 5.35 – 5.44) can be found in the most southern region of Louisiana at the tip of the
Bird’s Foot; along the entire border of the State of Mississippi; and within counties bordering the
river in upper Louisiana. Other elderly poverty pockets are also concentrated in urban areas such
as Rock Island, IL; St. Louis, Missouri; Memphis, Tennessee; Baton Rouge and New Orleans,
Louisiana.
Ultimately, Arc GIS analysis shows that urban areas have the highest density for social
vulnerabilities but potentially the greatest value of this analysis is the revelation of pockets of
vulnerabilities that would otherwise be undetected. As more data becomes available at the census
tract and block level, this tool will prove beneficial to exposing more hazard vulnerabilities and
provide a more comprehensive analysis.
Overall vulnerability summary
In the 2000 to 2010 period following the DMA (2000) mandates for mitigation planning,
this study shows Wisconsin, Iowa, and Mississippi had the most disaster declarations within the
sample of this study. Therefore, flooding events occurred most often within these three states.
The highest flooding costs were attributed to Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Tennessee (Table 5.5).
Also troubling here is that the cost of flooding per event was much higher in these same states;
and property damages costs per event were upwards of three to five times higher in comparison to
other states in the study. The majority of these costs can be attributed to the four Minnesota
counties of Houston, Wabasha, Winona, Wright; Wisconsin counties of Crawford, Vernon, Grant,
LaCrosse; and Shelby and Tipton counties in Tennessee. In terms of populations within the
floodplain, the states of Iowa, Kentucky, and Louisiana have the highest concentrations. These
attributes—highest number of flood events, highest cost per event, and population within the
floodplain, are strong indicators for concern.
This study also concludes that despite DMA (2000) mandates for hazard mitigation, the
cost of flooding has continued to rise. In addition, regardless of engaging in both structural and
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non-structural mitigation, these costs continue to increase. There is low participation in federal
programs associated with the DMA (2000) mandates with only 64 of 108 counties actually having
mitigation plans. Furthermore, only nine counties actually participate in the CRS program. Out
of 2,562 total mitigation actions identified in these 64 counties, 41 percent (1,062) were related to
flooding. That figure is rather impressive compared to state plans where the overall ratio of flood
actions to all other actions was 25 percent. One very disturbing observation was that less than
one percent of all mitigation plans considered mitigation actions related to the private sector.
Most mitigation actions listed within the mitigation plans are unfunded. Basically this is
a list of action items that are nothing more than a wish list unless an actual disaster occurs
prompting the federal government to make appropriates for these needs. Counties that do not
have mitigation plans are not supposed to receive any federal funds. The main findings from the
content analysis determine two things: 1) where local officials have focused their efforts on
mitigation and 2) where they intend to seek funding. Structural mitigation is very high on their
priority list as was observed by White (1945). Local officials also believe that the federal
government is the primary resource for funding along with a small match by local governments.
Non-structural mitigation actions are expected to be funded by both federal and state government
when it comes to things such as technology support and education and outreach. Otherwise, nonstructural mitigation efforts appear to fall in line with regular duties assigned to the local
emergency manager’s office.
Mitigation needs within the scope of the study varied according to region. The most
alarming needs that should be addressed are those actions related to warning improvements,
evacuation and shelter planning, and creating emergency response plans (Wisconsin, Iowa,
Illinois, Mississippi). There is demand across the board for infrastructure repairs such as road
elevation, culvert alteration, bridge repair, levee, and floodwall improvements. There are needs
based on regions from the top to the bottom of the river. The northern region needs warning and
response capabilities; the middle region needs resources to move structures out of the floodplain
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and funding to build retention ponds and reservoirs; and the lower southern region has a demand
for structure retrofits and pumping stations.
Finally, Arc GIS analysis shows a considerable percentage of people near or within the
floodplain, especially in Minnesota, Iowa, Kentucky, and Louisiana. This analysis shows more
poverty overall lower household median incomes in the urban areas and lower Mississippi River
regions. There are high poverty pockets on the river edge that are concealed from analysis by
overall county rates. There are also significant populations of elderly and poor elderly along the
river edge that should be caution for emergency planning. Arc GIS analysis of social vulnerability
risk provides a missing piece of the overall risk analysis.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS
Do these findings provide support for the original research question: Is there evidence
that growth machine dynamics continue to render the federal flood control system ineffective?
Secondly, despite implementing both structural and non-structural mitigation does the cost of
flooding continue to rise?
This study does provide evidence that growth machine dynamics are negatively
impacting mitigation efforts within the federal flood control system; and despite both structural
and non-structural mitigation, the cost of flooding continues to rise. Kathleen Tierney (2010)
argued that since the 1990s disaster research has started to shift from sociology’s systems theory
or functionalist paradigms toward growth machine theory as the “unifying theoretical paradigm”.
This study actually suggests that growth machine dynamics were evident in flood control far
earlier than we realize. Harvey Molotch (1997) coined the term “growth machine” to describe the
relationship between local elites and officials where their motivation is to consistently attempt to
draw large revenues into the community to create growth-inducing projects that will general more
profit and revenue for elites and political coffers regardless of whether it is actually good for the
community. It is easy now to identify what Gilbert White (1945) was referring to as the “status
quo” as actually growth machine dynamics in play.
Growth machine theory incorporates the element of political power and issues such as
disparity and inequality as it relates to political power influence on the construction of disaster
(Tierney, 2010). Freudenburg et al. (2009) argue that growth machine behavior is actually
fostered at the federal level and has become a “politically legitimated process” resulting in a
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“circular evasion of responsibility” and creates a problem of concentrating the benefits and
spreading risk among the unwitting population.
In this study we see various examples, not only through the historical development and
focusing events that created path dependencies but in the policy mandates themselves. American
culture grew from the belief in manifest destiny which is heavily steeped in exceptionalism and
expansionism. From the beginning, the way we altered the river and its natural environment is
evidence of growth machine dynamics in play. Steamboat development accelerated this process
through river erosion, a result of cutting timber to fuel steamboats and then to prevent timber
snags during navigation.
Early settlers brought with them the European practice of using levees to protect their
land from flooding. However, levees alone were no match for the Mississippi River. What is
true in growth machine dynamics presently was also true in early development, there were no
limits and many errors made related to incompetence in river hydrology and engineering. As
settlement grew and experiments in navigation continued, demand increased for a centralized
system of flood control. A federal system for flood control (Project Flood) was then realized
after the devastating flood in 1927.
Project Flood was structurally designed to protect against flooding equal to one foot
higher than any previous flooding occurrence. Along with this mandate, the federal government
exempted itself from any potential legal action related to structural failures. The legislation was
paramount to the progression of growth machine dynamics and principal evidence in explaining
how growth machine theory becomes the predominant theory providing explanation for how
political power serves as the dynamic force that ultimately explains disaster as a social construct
(Tierney, 2010). Political power is the force that creates the system, and is a force on or input to
the system; it operates as a force within and between subsystems; and it also impacts outputs and
feedback that becomes further input. The political power of the growth machine weakens
systems theory explanations.
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In 1945, Gilbert White then observed growth machine processes in play as he claimed the
flood control system was designed based on the “preservation of the status quo”-- through
processes such as dirt moving, structural fixes, and grants/aid (White, 1945, 209). White (1945)
found that as funding increased for structural mitigation, so did the cost of flooding. Perrow
(2007) further charges growth machine actors as being profiteers from disaster. White’s (1945)
influence on non-structural mitigation policy was manipulated by growth machine actors to result
in a “patchwork of disparate programs” (Moss, 1999, 321); thus, costs continued to increase.
Increasing costs could then be attributed to the myriad ways in which growth machine actors
gamed the system, especially through the NFIP.
Mitigation planning mandated by DMA 2000 has become a tool to perpetuate “growth
machine” dynamics. These plans are designed explicitly to maximize funding opportunities from
the federal government on high dollar structural projects. This study concluded that cost of
flooding continues to increase despite the creation of all-hazard mitigation plans mandated
through DMA 2000; and even more shockingly, findings indicate flood costs have increased as a
result of mitigation plan mandates. Counties with mitigation plans report more flood costs than
counties without mitigation plans perhaps because they are in compliance with mandates for
mitigation funding. Compliance mandates potentially create conditions where localities may
over-report in order to generate more funding. If disaster strikes in counties without mitigation
plans, they are dependent on media attention which generates disaster sympathy phenomenon
from the general public. In turn, this behavior generates federal leniency and emergency aid
appropriations. The “status quo” is that congressional representatives will respond quickly to
provide aid or they will experience negative exploitation if they vote against emergency
appropriations.
Disaster aid as a result of political manipulation creates another example of a moral
hazard, a condition where localities behave in a more risky manner and expect all federal
taxpayers to incur the cost. Even counties with mitigation plans are engaging in behavior that
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creates a moral hazard; as substantiated in this analysis—there are low participation rates in
federal programs (CRS, NFIP) designed to reduce flood risk and flood costs.
Speaking of lower participation rates in these federal programs, consider what is in the
guidance of the DMA 2000 on mitigation planning as it relates to the NFIP. Within the plans
themselves, the circular pattern of evasiveness is evident. For example, what actually happens
when the local mitigation plan states as a non-structural action “promote the NFIP program”?
They guide citizens to the FEMA website on the NFIP and flooding where they are directed to
call their local insurance provider for all information regarding this matter. Here they fall into the
trap of the NFIP and WYO program.
As Keiserman (2015) testified before Congress, the Write Your Own (WYO) program
had created a scenario where insurance companies were drawing a 33 percent fee against every
premium dollar that was paid into the NFIP program. They profited even further on the back end
drawing more fees in claims settlements. Then, the WYO program was not finished here with
egregiously frauding customers. These folks were actually paying the NFIP to provide millions
of dollars in legal defense for insurance companies in their fraudulent claims denials (Keiserman,
2015). Generating participants for the NFIP program resulted in profitability for elite insurance
corporations both at policy creation and then again during the claims period should disaster occur.
The benefit falls largely on these corporations while the program participants invest to cover risk
and then struggle to collect enough return to restore their property. The disaster impacts and
lengthy claims process eventually produces far more losers than winners. This non-structural
federal mitigation initiative is faulty by design yet continues to be a major component in
mitigation.
As reiterated throughout this study, mitigation plans are very steeped in taking actions
related to structural fixes of which White (1945) cautioned were not actually addressing the
flooding problem. High dollar projects such as levees and floodwalls are strongly coveted by
primary growth machine actors-- local officials and elites. Nowhere in the foreseeable future do
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we see any suggestion that policy guidance in the United States might be strengthened to provide
for greater security in structural designs beyond the 50/50 chance of failure (Freudenburg et al.,
2009). Given the federal government cannot be held liable (as established in the Flood Control
Act of 1928) we continue to throw money at projects designed to fail and provide a false sense of
security to residents.
Reform Federal Mitigation “All-Hazard” Planning
Local hazard mitigation plan actions, in general, are primarily focused on emergency
response actions; and then, specific to flooding, they are concerned primarily with funding and
structural mitigation or dirt moving/land adjusting projects. What is most concerning is that, even
71 years after White (1945) addressed poor performance in emergency response; there are still
inadequacies in emergency response planning. There are six items identified within local
mitigation plans that specifically focus on the need to develop emergency response plans and
establish first responders. There were ten items requesting improvements to/or the development
of warning systems. There are 19 items focused specifically on the need to develop emergency
evacuation and sheltering plans. This need is primarily based in the upper Mississippi region and
specifically, counties within Wisconsin, Missouri, and Illinois. A serious concern here is that,
even though these plans go through an approval process at the state and federal level, there is no
oversight process that would alert the state or federal government to quickly dispatch aid to
resolve this immediate need.
This study, focused specifically on flood mitigation within the local hazard mitigation
plan, also exposes potential weaknesses within the planning process. As stated previously, the
State plans have actions that are basically painted in very broad strokes. Therefore, one would
expect that local plans would be far more detailed and specific. In conducting the content
analysis of these plans, it became clear that the low quality of local mitigation plans offer support
to previous research findings especially Lyle et al. (2012) in terms of wide variability and
weaknesses in organizing principles.
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Intriguingly, though, this analysis led to further consideration of the all-hazards approach
to mitigation planning and its effectiveness. It appears the “all-hazards approach” to mitigation is
inherently flawed in that while it guides the planning process toward commonalities, it creates the
dilemma of moving it away from identifying and addressing needs that are hazard specific. These
conditions create a state of aporia where the closer one moves toward one goal, the farther he
moves from another equally important goal (Boin and Nieuwenburg, 2011). The result is an
irresolvable contradiction that impedes effective comprehensive planning. There is a problem of
bounded rationality at the federal level in creating an “all-hazard” model guideline and then
placing a planning mandate at the local level as a matter of frontline discretion. Boin and
Nieuwenburg (2011) explains how mandating a plan from the higher level creates “hard to
predict” outcomes. In this case, the federal government lacks the information to create feasible
plans and prioritize conflicting goals and create feasible terms. Rather the federal government is
quite ambiguous in establishing directives and providing feedback beyond addressing
commonalities. Lacking specificity, we have problems such as states and local governments not
implementing land-use planning that would effectively eliminate dangerous development within
the floodplain. Local planning officials tend to write plans geared toward federal funding
opportunities which are steeped in ambiguity and lacking feasibility—basically it is a “wish list”.
State guidance is also quite ambiguous and they basically play an interceding or mediating role
between the federal and local government.
The most glaring problem is there is no process during the mitigation plan approval stage
where the state or federal government should be accountable to address immediate needs for
emergency response action items. If a county declares they have no emergency response plan, no
means to organize emergency responders, no evacuation plan, no sheltering plan, or no warning
system, it should invoke an immediate response from the federal and state government followed
by an expedited resolution. Here is where the top-down centralized approach to mitigation
becomes flawed. If the county does not have a mitigation plan, the state should be accountable to
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the federal government via their mitigation plan approval. The “all hazards” mitigation plan
crafted by the state should reflect analysis of each risk reported by counties and an analysis of
mitigation need reported by each county. Thus, in addition to top-down directives for local “all
hazard” mitigation, the federal government should employ a procedure where the assessment
results in a bottom-up assessment that guides the state and federal government on mitigation
needs and planning.
This study refutes Lindell and Perry’s (2007) claim that all-hazard mitigation is the most
effective and efficient. The findings within this study suggest that “all-hazard” mitigation
planning directives from the federal government need to provide more regional specificity and
improved standardization. Emergency response capabilities, which primarily address
commonalities, should be designated as a stand-alone section which would indicate risks or
shortages to capabilities followed by mitigation actions to alleviate this risk. Each hazard risk
should have a section regarding risk evaluation followed by a mitigation action plan. This
practice allows the planning community to focus more specifically on each primary hazard risk
and assess what resources and capabilities are on hand for this specific risk and what is needed
specifically for managing this hazard impact. These suggestions provide a remedy for Caruson
and MacManus’s (2011) concerns regarding commonality theory and commonality as the primary
organizing principle. It is highly likely that over time, a consistent set of best practices for each
hazard would be tethered out from this process and captured through the process of top down and
bottom up feedback.
Action items should be further evaluated to determine priority level and cost. Each
action item should have a strategic plan proposal and itemized cost analysis. The state “allhazard” mitigation plans should then be designed from a bottom-up assessment of county needs
and provide regional specificity. Federal “all-hazard” plans should then identify need by region,
establish response priorities, and direct mitigation appropriations to the appropriate regions. This
new mitigation planning approach would allow for a continuous dynamic process of reporting
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and feedback, thus incentivizing local and state governments to monitor their need more
diligently in order to influence federal priorities. The regional specificity element moves state
and federal governments to address hazard risk regionally, thus avoiding the pitfall of equity
distributions over efficiency distributions of funding.
It was very clear within this analysis that flood mitigation needs had both commonalities
and differences based on regional location. All counties showed needs for road repairs and
elevation; culvert alterations; bridge repairs/alterations; and levee and flood wall improvements.
Specific to the southern region of the river is a need for structure retrofits, and specific to
Louisiana there is a need for pumping stations. The middle river region has a demand for moving
buildings out of the flood plain, retention ponds and reservoirs; and the upper region needs to
develop their emergency response plans, warning improvements and evacuation/sheltering
assistance. Effective mitigation, then, at the federal level, would be to focus on directing
mitigation funding to the critical regions first for items that will significantly improve flood
disaster outcomes.
Nonstructural Mitigation and Federal Programs
Digging deeper into the content analysis and evaluating the state role in mitigation
planning, their action strategies are focused primarily on providing nonstructural mitigation in the
form of administrative and technical support to counties. State mitigation plans overall are
focused on promoting awareness of the NFIP, the CRS, and identifying and addressing repetitive
loss properties. Their method of promoting these federal programs is to direct the local
government to develop education and outreach initiatives on these topics or develop their own
ideas of addressing these topics. The directives follow a centralized top-down approach but they
are not accompanied by funding appropriations.
For example, the federal government says promote the NFIP, the state government says
promote the NFIP, and then the local government says promote the NFIP. From the content
analysis, it was very clear that there was a need for education and outreach development.

105

However, what should a NFIP education and outreach initiative require? Reverting to federal
guidance, the primary strategy is to refer the individual to their local insurance agent so the local
insurance agent can provide this service. As the Hurricane Sandy saga continues over the WYO
program and lack of oversight within the NFIP administration, this is a real conundrum. State
and local governments both agree that NFIP promotion needs to be addressed. The federal
government’s public-private partnership with the insurance industry basically disconnects the
state and local government from the process. This ambiguous directive from the federal
government for NFIP promotion results in a circular directive where no action actually occurs.
Reform or Revoke the National Flood Insurance Program
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act provided for necessary changes in the NFIP
that brought flood insurance policy premiums closer to their true cost of risk and would make the
program solvent. It allowed for certain circumstances to trigger the removable of discounted
rates for grandfathered properties. When claims reached a certain level of market value (50
percent), the homeowner would need to either make structural retrofits or pay higher premiums.
Following Hurricane Sandy, there were so many properties meeting these criteria, the government
balked at enforcing this legislation. In this case, the economic consequences would have been so
severe, that these areas could not recover. Little did they know that systemic failures within the
WYO program and the federal public-private partnership would ultimately create a comparable
disaster.
The NFIP is now 47 years old and beyond its usefulness. The intent at this zeitgeist was
to be equitable and provide affordable insurance through government subsidy for properties built
prior to 1968. This intent did not arise without consideration to future target reduction planning.
At some point moving toward efficiency should have been established as a goal in order to avert
the moral hazard of concentrating the benefit and passing the high cost of subsidizing risk to all
taxpayers. A roll-back in subsidized flood insurance is needed in order to bring local government
in line with the federal mitigation initiatives.
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In 2007, U.S. Representatives Ginny Brown-Waite and Vern Buchanan proposed a
National Catastrophe Insurance Program that would establish coverages against natural hazards
for earthquake and hurricane prone residents and dissolve the NFIP into this plan. Critics argued
that the same issues impacting the NFIP would just increase in scale and cost to the federal
government. Ultimately this initiative was rejected. In the late 2000s Congress started to only
approve short extensions for the NFIP and at times allowed the program funding to lapse. These
changes prompted the private insurance industry to offer a Natural Catastrophe Insurance
Program underwritten by affiliates with Lloyds of London to NFIP policy holders. Individual
natural catastrophe insurance might be an attractive solution if the federal government would
mandate all U.S. citizens to purchase a policy. In this scenario, each policy premium would be
based on regional risk factors and the consumer could select additional coverages for relocation
expenses, lost wages, and other miscellaneous expenses. A policy solution of this nature could
potentially thwart the tendency for Congress to appropriate large sums of disaster relief money
for individual needs. Instead, more money could be directed towards rebuilding infrastructure
and post-disaster mitigation needs.
Reform the Community Rating System Program
There are very low participation rates within the Community Rating System program
which was established along with the NFIP. Communities participating in the CRS program
receive flood insurance discounts by retrofitting their flood prone structures and regulating landuse within the floodplain. The CRS has four different classifications or series, with 19 objectives
total. Each mitigation action has a minimum and maximum point values range to be assigned for
CRS credit to reduce insurance premiums. Class 10 is the lowest classification with points
ranging from 0 to 499 and has no insurance discount. Insurance premium discounts begin at five
percent in Class 9 and increase in five percent increments through to Class 1 (4,500 points, 45
percent discount). 300 series has seven objectives (maximum 981 points) addressing public
information (e.g. elevation certificates, mapping information, outreach, hazard disclosure etc.) ;
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400 series has five objectives addressing floodplain mapping and regulation (5,841 points); 500
series addresses flood damage reduction (4,692) which includes acquisitions, retrofits, drainage
improvements and floodplain management planning; 600 series (790 points) has three objectives
directed at flood preparedness which covers levee and dam safety and flood warning systems.
The CRS program is not popular within this study sample, there is little movement
towards participation and those that do participate (nine counties total) have low classifications.
There are several things to consider. First, are citizens who are required to have flood insurance
unaware of CRS incentives? Second, do they lack the ability to collectively organize to move the
local government to be more proactive? Do community leaders believe that meeting these
objectives is not feasible? Further research is needed to determine why there are such low
participation rates and why participating community ratings are heavily skewed towards the
lowest classification levels.
The primary weakness of this program is incentivizing premium holders as a means to
garner participation. Given that growth machine dynamics are in play, premium holders lack the
power to be an effective change agent. Federal mitigation funding should be synchronized to the
objectives within this program in order to effectively incentivize local communities and increase
participation.
Improve FEMA Nationwide Survey of Local Officials (NSLO)
Looking at the FEMA NSLO (2013), the first concerning factor is whether or not the
survey sample is truly representative of the nation or, even more specifically, flood risk
communities such as the region of focus in this study. Secondly, 64 percent of respondents (n =
1,710) identified their jurisdiction to be rural communities thus skewing the results to represent
small population centers. Third, 41 percent of these local officials fall into a category designated
as “other”, 34 percent are local emergency managers or floodplain managers, and 25 percent are
mayors or city managers; therefore, the role of the local official for nearly half the study cannot
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be identified and qualified. Fourth, it is uncertain how many respondents actually came from the
same community, therefore the summary data reported by FEMA may be confounded.
In this FEMA NLSO (2013) survey, three out of four local officials believe they have a
flood risk in their community, yet only one in ten of these officials actually believe their
community is at risk (FEMA, 2013). These local officials reported that only one in three of these
communities actually have a FEMA approved mitigation plan in effect. This report does not
distinguish the differences in results between communities with a plan and those without a plan.
Comparing the FEMA NLSO (2013) to this study, there were 108 total counties in this
sample and 64 plans available for evaluation thus 59 percent of this region have mitigation plans
in place. This study relies on the content analysis of these 64 mitigation plans to determine what
the primary mitigation needs are for their communities. FEMA NLSO (2013) reported that the
top five mitigation (structural) needs reported by local officials are building drainage
improvements (52 percent), elevation (44 percent), erosion control (41 percent), acquisition (31
percent), and flood-proofing (26 percent). In this study, the top structural mitigation needs are 1)
road repairs and elevation, 2) widening culverts, and 3) fixing sewers, 4) stabilizing banks, and 5)
repairing or replacing bridges. In terms of what sort of support is needed from FEMA, the local
officials reported 1) funding (73 percent), 2) technical expertise, 3) flood mapping, 4) planning
assistance, and 5) outreach materials (FEMA NLOS, 2013). In this study, the top five
nonstructural mitigation needs are 1) conducting studies, 2) promoting the NFIP, 3) debris
maintenance/drainage funding, 4) repetitive loss (acquisition), and 5) policy remedies for
floodplain management.
FEMA NLOS (2013) states that CRS participation is rising with 76 percent of
respondents reportedly (n = 1,296) actively participating. However, looking at the Mississippi
River border counties, less than eight percent or nine counties in three states are participating in
the CRS program. States and counties in this study strongly agree that NFIP promotion needs to
be addressed though it is not mentioned at all in the FEMA NLOS (2013). States and counties in
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this study appear very aware that state and local mitigation planning is limited without policy
changes at the state and local level that will align them with the federal policies and programs.
FEMA NLOS (2013) makes no mention of this need. There are commonalities between FEMA
NLOS (2013) and this study; but a regional analysis such as this study does provide more insight.
Therefore, as stated earlier, a better way to evaluate the need at the local level is for the
federal government to critically assess mitigation plans during the approval process and set their
mitigation objectives from local mitigation plan data. Covington and Simpson (2006) noted there
are two phases of planning that must be achieved- development and implementation. This study
speaks to the problem that we are stuck within the first phase without a clear path to reach the
second phase. If the federal government cannot effectively accomplish this, then its mitigation
efforts will remain as problematic as herding kittens.
Clearly the greatest weakness in the way we do flood control is that policy makers only
want to go so far as to recommend to local governments what they should do, but ultimately yield
to local government to decide whether or not they wish to comply with these recommendations.
Upon experiencing a flooding disaster, the status quo behavior of the federal government is a
two-fold response. First, federal relief arrives based on the stipulations within flood policy.
Secondly, federal relief arrives based upon public pressure on Congress and disaster sympathy
phenomenon. Therefore, if the first relief is not sufficient because the local governments failed to
be proactive, the second relief enables this behavior to continue.
Mitigation Planning and Potential Social Vulnerabilities for Populations within the
Floodplain
Results of this study indicate there is a potential for 22 percent of the population and
nearly 900,000 households to be located within the floodplain. Even more concerning is the risk
associated with high concentrations of poverty pushed up against the Mississippi River and a high
volume of rental housing (30 percent). As noted by Cutter et al. (2000) risk assessment
guidelines created by FEMA for all hazard mitigation plans does not include factors beyond
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presence or absence of natural hazard risk. Therefore, determinations about social vulnerability
and factors that increase risk such as high poverty levels are not included in the planning process.
This shortcoming alone usurps the aim of effective and comprehensive planning. Thus, the next
question is: How can social vulnerability analysis be incorporated into all hazard mitigation
planning?
The most recent iteration of Cutter et al.’s (2013) social vulnerability index (SoVI) would
not be an effective tool for flood hazard mitigation planning given that the social and economic
characteristics were evaluated by using county level data. The problem is that measuring socioeconomic characteristics at the county level may conceal concentrated pockes of social
vulnerabilities that could negatively impact outcomes in flooding disaster. Even using census
tract level data, which as not as robust as county level data, would be problematic because census
tracts can be quite large in lower density rural areas. Despite this limitation (as noted within this
study), mitigation planners are overlooking a source of vital information and a significant
consideration in flood hazard risk. Local officials must incorporate social vulnerabilities in local
hazard mitigation planning and it must be done in a manner that couples social vulnerability to
different types of natural hazard risk.
The primary reason for coupling social vulnerability and natural hazard vulnerability is
moving mitigation planning toward a better understanding of differential impacts on certain
populations in response and recovery. For example, Clutter et al. (2010) points out, those
communities that have a high volume of service industry employment are at greater risk given
they are traditionally lower wage type jobs, and the businesses themselves are more vulnerable in
recovery. Populations occupying rental housing often face greater constraints than traditional
homeowners when it comes to being able to recover and resettle because they have greater
dependency on affordable housing availability.
Secondly, those populations in poverty will often behave differently during a disaster
threat and impact because their resources are more limited. It is important to consider how
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community emergency response capabilities, resources, and the population needs intersect. Areas
with higher density or extreme poverty pockets would be more difficult to accommodate than
other areas especially when it comes to evacuation. Local mitigation planners can be more
effective if they have a greater understanding of their population. The all-hazard mitigation
planning process, therefore, should include an evaluation of the social, economic, and house
characteristics of their population.
Previously, Arc GIS software has been used by some mitigation planners to plot such
things as critical infrastructure and building inventories owned by local governments. Arc GIS
software offers even greater potentially to create an overall comprehensive assessment with the
capability to add and subtract layers of data and perform analyses that were previously limited to
Excel software. Not only can planners take stock of critical infrastructure and building
inventories, it can also be used catalog the types of hazard risks. It also has the capability to allow
the planner to assess social vulnerability characteristics with the Census Bureau and American
Community Survey data. Mapping these characteristics would offer planners a comprehensive
visual aid to detect problematic areas and further assess the need for resources or redistribution of
resources. One of the most notable advantages of using Arc GIS for analysis is that a high
volume of data can be organized and manipulated in a variety of ways to explore vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, the increasing availability of Census and American Community Survey data
gathered for census tract and block level is promising. In this study, the use of Arc GIS at a
regional level helped provide greater insight to the differences between regions along the
Mississippi River. It also exposed a pattern of social vulnerabilities being buffered against the
river and hidden pockets that would likely otherwise go unnoticed.
Future Research Recommendations
Evaluating all-hazard mitigation planning through a content analysis method opens
possibilities to look at the plans in a variety of ways and can offer valuable insights to improve
mitigation planning. However, there are several challenges to this process. The plans are not
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easily obtainable and often previous plans are not available for comparison. FEMA directives for
plan changes occur more often than the actual plan updates. Despite attempts by FEMA to direct
these plans toward a more standardized format, they have such wide variation it is difficult to
collect quantitative data. Plan quality is so low, that there will likely need to be several plan
iterations and studies over the next decade to help improve this planning process.
Also missing from the planning process is a way to capture what this planning has
accomplished. Once a project is completed, in most cases, it is removed from the next plan. If
the plan could be designed as a living document, a register showing what has been completed
would be useful for evaluation. Archiving completed work would allow us to make
determinations about what has been addressed and whether or not these changes impact disaster
costs. Specific to flood disasters, we may be able to determine what types of mitigation actions
need to be repeated and within what time frame this should occur. We could also determine
whether we are effectively balancing a healthy distribution of both structural and nonstructural
flood mitigation actions.
There is an opportunity to look at these plans based on the “all-hazard” model and
attempt to make determinations as to how useful or limiting this model may be. With the “allhazard” plan in mind, we can also make better determinations about how we are distributing
mitigation resources based on the level of hazard risk. Does this model allow for better
prioritizing of resources? At the other end of the spectrum, does this model run the risk of
weakening the focus needed to comprehensively address hazard specificities?
Another research consideration should be whether there is a benefit to creating regional
plans versus individual county plans. Not only might this be a more cost effective method, but
also more collaborative. One of the most concerning issues regarding the mandate for mitigation
plans is the lack of compliance. It would be interesting to explore this issue further to see if this
is due to lack of funding, lack of planning expertise, or some other issue that prevents county
participation. Secondly, it would be interesting to see how state oversight of this process may be
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improved. Would a regional planning process allow states to better assess mitigation needs and
respond more efficiently with funding and resources?
One of the most useful practices in terms of non-structural mitigation is education and
outreach and it appears that it would be useful for further study on this topic. What types of
education and outreach methods as a non-structural mitigation strategic action is effective? How
can local emergency management be more effective in reaching out to the population to prepare
them for hazard threats? Are the plans that specifically mention education and outreach in broad
terms actually achieving deliverables? What are these deliverables? What are the most feasible
methods?
Finally, one of the most concerning discoveries in this research is the fact that the
population, socio-economic and housing characteristics are missing in the risk assessments in all
all-hazard mitigation plans. In order to respond better to hazard threats, it seems that knowing
exactly what issues and challenges within the population may impede effective mitigation and
emergency response. Does the population in the area change (increase or decrease) during day
shift working hours? Does the housing stock appear to be resilient? What is the ratio of special
populations? What about the pet population? Does the region have a plan to manage for pets in
the event of an evacuation, sheltering, or extraordinary need for medical support? What are the
local business characteristics and what vulnerabilities exist here? These are the sort of questions
that should be addressed in mitigation planning and more research is needed to explore
opportunities for more comprehensive planning.

114

REFERENCES
Adams, G. & Balfour, D. (2014). Unmasking Administrative Evil. Taylor & Francis: New
York, NY.
American Society of Civil Engineers (2009). So You Live Behind a Levee!: What You
Should Know to Protect Your Home and Loved Ones from Flood. Bklt Edition.
Ball, R. (1978). Sociology and General Systems Theory. The American Sociologist.
13(1). 65-72.
Barry, J. (1997). Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How it Changed
America. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY.
Barrett, J. & Brat, I. (2011). Missouri to Appeal Levee Ruling. Wall Street Journal
(Online) Retrieved November 17, 2011 from http://proquest.mi.com/pqdweb?
index=18&sid=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=3&.
Bates, F. & Pelanda, C. (1994). An Ecological Approach to Disasters. In Russell R.
Dynes and Kathleen J. Tierney (Eds.) Disasters, Collective Behavior, and Social
Organization. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses.
Berke, P. & French, S. (1994). The Influence of State Planning Mandates on Local Plan
Quality. Journal of Planning Education and Research. 13, 237.
Berke, P., Crawford, J., Dixon, J. & Ericksen, N. (1999). Do cooperative environmental
Planning mandates produce good plans? Empirical results from the New Zealand
experience. Enviroment and Planning B: Planning and Design. 26: 643-664.
Berke, P. & Campanella, T. (2006). Planning for Postdisaster Resiliency. The ANNALS of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 604: 192-207.
Berke, P., Smith, G. & Lyles, W. (2009). State Hazard Mitigation Plan Evaluation and
Model Practices: Analysis of Federal Mitigation Policy in the U.S.: Mitigation
Plans, Expenditures, Civic Engagement, and Local Capacity. Center for the Study
of Natural Hazards and Disasters, Department of Homeland Security Center of
Excellence – Disasters, Coastal Infrastructure, and Emergency Management,
Institute for the Environment, and Department of City and Regional Planning at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC.

115

Bertalanffy, L. (1950). An Outline of General Systems Theory. British Journal of the
Philosophy of Science. 1. 134-165.
Biggert Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012. Public Law 112-141.
Boin, A. (2005). From crisis to disaster: Towards an integrative perspective. In R. W.
Perry & E. L. Quarantelli (Eds.), What is a disaster? New answers to old
questions. (pp.153-172). Philadelphia: Xlibris.
Boin, A. & ‘tHart, P. (2006). The Crisis Approach. In H. Rodriguez, E. L. Quarantelli, &
R. Dynes (Eds.), (pp. 42-54) Handbook of Disaster Research. New York, NY:
Springer Science + Business Media, LLC.
Boulding, K. (1956). General Systems Theory; the skeleton of science. Management
Science. 2(3). 56-68.
Branston, J and Finn, K. (2011). Mississippi River flood passes record at Natchez
retrieved May 15, 2011 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/11/usflooding.
Brody, S. (2003). Are We Learning to Make Better Plans?: A Longitudinal Analysis of
Plan Quality Associated with Natural Hazards. Journal of Planning Education
and Research. 23(2). 191-201. Retrieved from jpe.sagepub.com at Univ of
Louisville August 21, 2013.
Brody, S., Carrasco, V. & Highfield, W. (2004). Measuring the collective planning
capabilities of local jurisdictions to manage ecological systems in southern
Florida. Journal of Planning Education and Research. 25. 294-310.
Burby, R. (2006). Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy:
Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas. The
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 604. 171-191.
Burby, R. & French, S. (1990). Sharing Environmental Risks. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Burby, R., Beatley, P., Berke, R., Deyle, S., French, D., Godschalk, E. Kaiser, J., Kartez,
R., Patterson, R., & Platt, R. (1999). Unleashing the Power of Planning to Create
Disaster-Resistant Communities, Journal of the American Planning Association,
65(3): 247-258.
Burton, I., Kates, R., & White, G. (1978). The environment as hazard. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Burton, I. & Kates, R. (1964) The perception of natural hazards in resource management.
Natural Resources Journal. 3. 412-441.

116

Campanella, R. (2010). Delta Urbanism. Washington, D.C.: The American Planner
Association.
Caruson, K. & MacManus, S. (2011). Gauging Disaster Vulnerabilities at the Local
Level: Divergence and Convergence in a “All-Hazards” System. Administration
& Society 43: 346-371.
Changnon, S. (1996). The Great Flood of 1993: Causes, impacts, and responses. Stanley
Changnon (Ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc.
_____. (2009). The Historical Struggle with Floods on the Mississippi River Basin.
Water International. 23(4). 263-271.
Chen, D. & Stroup, W. (1993). General Systems Theory: Toward a Conceptual
Framework for Science and Technology Education for All. Journal of Science
Education and Technology. 2(3). 447-459.
Collier, D. & Collier, R. (1991). Shaping the political arena: critical junctures, the labor
Movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Covington, J. & Simpson, D. (2006). An Overview of Disaster Preparedness Literature:
Building Blocks for an Applied Bay Area Template. Center for Hazards Research
and Policy Development. Working Paper 06-02.
Cutter, S., Mitchel, J. & Scott, M. (2000). Revealing the Vulnerability of People and
Places: A Case Study of Georgetown County, South Carolina. Annals of the
Association of American Geographers, 90(4). 713-737.
Cutter, S., Boruff, B., & Shirley, W. (2003). Social Vulnerability to Environmental
Hazards. Social Science Quarterly, 84(2), 242-261.
Cutter, S., Emrich, C, Morath, D. & Dunning, C. (2013). A Method for Including Social
Vulnerability into Flood Risk Management Planning. Flood Risk Management.
6(4): 332-344.
Daniel, P. (1977). deep’n as it come: The 1927 Mississippi River Flood. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Day, J. & Boesch, D. et al (2007). Restoration of the Mississippi Delta: Lessons from
Hurricane Katrina and Rita. Science, 315 (5819), 1679-1684.
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. Public Law 106-390.
Easton, D. (1979). A Framework for Political Analysis. University of Chicago Press.

117

Chicago, IL.
Elazar, D. (1966). American federalism. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
_____. (1994). The American mosaic: The impact of space, time, and culture on
American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview.
FEMA (2004). Multi-Hazard Mitigation Planning Guidance Under the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000 (Blue Book). Washington, D.C.
_____. (2008). Multi-Hazard Mitigation Planning Guidance Under the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000 (Blue Book). Washington, D.C.
_____. (2011). A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles,
Themes, and Pathways for Action. Washington, D.C.
_____. (2014). Local Official Survey Findings on Flood Risk. Retrieved February 21,
2015 from https://www.fema.gov/local-official-survey-findings-flood-risk.
_____. (2015). What is Mitigation? Retrieved from https://www.fema.gov/whatmitigation
Flood Control Act of 1928. Seventieth Congress Digest 46, 1928.
Frank, T. (2011). Changes Urged in Flood Control: Designed to protect, system is
destroying. USA Today. Retrieved November 17, 2011 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.
Fremling, C. (2005). Immortal River. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Freudenburg, W., Gramling, R., Laska, S. & Erikson, K. (2009). Catastrophe in the
Making: The Engineering of Katrina and the Disasters of Tomorrow.
Washington, D.C. Island Press.
Gay, M. (2011). Levee Breach Moves One Step Closer. NY Times (Online). Retrieved
June 10, 2011 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/us/01flood.html.
Gerencer, T. (2015). U.S. Floods Cost $34 Billion - Money Nation. Retrieved February
12, 2016, from http://moneynation.com/u-s-floods-cost-34-billion/.
Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. 1 (1894).
Gibbs, K. (2004) Mississippi River and Tributaries Project. Army Corp of Engineers
retrieved June 6, 2011 from http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/bro/mrc_mrc_
map.gif.

118

Godchalk, D., Beatle, T., Brower, D. & Kaiser, E. (1999). Natural hazard Mitigation:
Recasting disaster policy and planning. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Hall, B. & Wood, C. (1992). Big Muddy. New York, NY: Penguin Group.
Houck, O. (2011). Floodway into the Atchafalaya Basin Saves New Orleans. Nola.com
Retrieved May 6, 2011 from http://www.nola.com.
Hasten, M. (2011). Coast Guard, EPA search for Pollution. The News Star.com.
Retrieved June 6, 2011 from http://www.thenewsstart.com/aritcle/201105.
Heller, P. (2011). The Mississippi River Flood and the Katrina Risk. Bloomberg
Businessweek Magazine. Retrieved from the internet June 09,2011from
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_25/b4233068017336.htm.
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014. Public Law 113-89.
Johnson, C. (1976). Political Culture in American States: Elazar’s Formulation
Examined. American Journal of Political Science. 20(3). 491-509.
Kang, J., Peacock, W., & Husein, R. (2010). An Assessment of Coastal Zone Hazard
Mitigation Plans in Texas, Journal of Disaster Research. 5(5): 520-528.
Keiserman, B. (2015). The National Flood Insurance Program: Oversight of Superstorm
Sandy Claims. Statement of FEMA Deputy Associate Administrator for Federal
Insurance to Committee on Financial Services. Retrieved from: https://www.
fema.gov/media-library-data/1434230264592-556e64c75275ca5acc56c6956
f8adb30/NFIP-Sandy-Claims-Testimony-6-2-15.pdf.
Kelman, A. (2006). A River and Its City: The nature of landscape in New Orleans.
University of California Press: Los Angeles, CA.
_____. (2009). Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Rumors of levee sabotage in New
Orleans’s Lower 9th Ward. Journal of Urban History. 35. 627-639.
Klein, C. & Zellmer, S. (2007). Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a century of
unnatural disasters. College of Law, Faculty Publications Paper 12. Retrieved
December 10, 2011 from http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub/12.
Kruse, J. (2004). Testimony on the Value of Mississippi River for U.S. Agriculture.
FAPRI-UMC Briefing Paper #06-04. Mississippi River Caucas, Washington D.C.
Larson, L. (1996). The Great USA Flood of 1993. NOAA/National Weather Service.
Retrieved December 10, 2011 from http://www.nwrfc.noaa.gov/floods/papers/
oh_2/great.htm.

119

Liebowitz, S.; Margolis, Stephen (2000).Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. p. 981.
Lieske, J. (1993). Regional subcultures of the United States. Journal of Politics. 55. 888913.
_____. (2010). The Changing Regional Subcultures of the American States and the
Utility of a New Cultural Measure. Political Research Quarterly. 63(3). 538-552.
Loyola University (2011) American’s Wetland Resource Center. Retrieved December
10, 2011 from http://www.americaswetlandresources.com/_facts/detailedstory/
mississippiformd.html.
Lindell, M. & Perry, R. (2007). Planning and preparedness. In W.L. Waugh Jr. & K.
Tierney (Eds.), Emergency management: Principles and practice for local
government. 2nd ed., Washington, DC: ICMA Press.
Little, R. (2010). Controlling Cascading Failure: Understanding the Vulnerabilities of
Interconnected Infrastructures. Journal of Urban Technology. 9(6). 109-123.
Lyles, W., Berke, P. & Smith, G. (2012). Evaluation of Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
Quality. Center for Sustainable Community Design UNC Institute for the
Environment, Coastal Hazards Center, DHS Center of Excellence—Natural
Disasters, Coastal Infrastructure and Emergency Management. University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
MacDonald, N., Chester, D., Sangster, H., Todd, B. & Hooke, J. (2012). Progress in
Physical Geography. 36(1). 125-133.
McCain, W., Romaire, R., Lutz, C. & Shirley, M. (2007). Louisiana Crawfish Production
Manual. Louisiana State University AG Center, Publication 2637.
McCarthy, B. (2011). Army chief says levee system is holding up amid historic flooding.
Times-Picayune, May 21, 2011. Retrieved from the internet on May 25, 2011
from http://www.nola.com.
McLoughlin, D. (1985). A framework for integrated emergency management. Public
Administration Review 45 (special issue): 165-172.
Mileti, D. (1999). Disasters by Design: A reassessment of natural hazards in the United
States. Joseph Henry Press. Washington, D.C. 105-133.
Minahan, S. (2011). Flood the Farm or the City: The Army Corps of Engineers’ Tough
Question. Midwest Agriculture Law Guide. Retrieved from the internet on June
12, 2016 from www.midwestagriculturelawguide.com.

120

Molotch, H. (1976). The city as growth machine: toward a political economy of place.
American Journal of Sociology, 82: 309-332.
Mowbray, R. (2011). Property owners in the path of Mississippi River flooding are taking
out mortagages to beat the 30-day waiting period on insurance. Retrieved May
22, 2011 from http://www.nola.com.
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. 42 U.S. Code § 4001.
National Weather Service (2011). Advanced Hydrologic Prediction Service. Retrieved on
June 12, 2011 from water.weather.gov.
Neuman, S. (2011). Along The Mississippi, An Old Sense of Dread Arises. NPR.
Retrieved May 15, 2011 from http://www.npr.org/2011/05/10/136174860/alongthe-mississippi-an-old-sense-of-dread-rises.
Nienaber, D. (2011). America’s Artery of Commerce: The Mighty Mississippi.
Retrieved December 10, 2011 from http://cnhi.com/archive/x1753194701.
Norton, R. (2005). More and better local planning: State-mandated local planning in
coastal
North Carolina. Journal of the American Planning Association. 71(1). 55-72.
Oliver-Smith, A. (1998). Global challenges and the definition of disaster. In E.L.
Quarantelli (Ed.) What is disaster: Perspectives on the question. London:
Routledge.
O’Neill, K. (2006). Rivers by Design: State Power and the Origins of U.S. Flood Control.
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Perrow, C. (1999). Normal accidents: Living with high risk technologies. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
_____. (2007). The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural,
Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Perry, R. (2005). Disasters, definitions, and theory construction. In R. W. Perry & E. L.
Quarantelli (Eds.). What is a disaster? New answers to old questions.
Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris.
Platt, R. (1995). Sharing the Challenge: Floodplain Management into the 21st Century.
Report on Reports 37(1). 25-28.
Plume, K. (2011). Once in a Lifetime Flood Submerges Farmland. Retrieved Oct. 22,
2011from http://www.reuters.com.

121

Poe, C. (2006). Reconstructing the Levees: The Politics of Flooding in NineteenthCentury Louisiana. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
2006). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses.
Pope J. (2011). Morganza Floodway Flow Underestimated: Several bays closed to adapt.
The Times-Picayune, May 25, 2011. Retrieved June 6, 2011 from
http://www.nola.com.
Quarantelli, E.L. (2005a). A social science research agenda for the disasters of the 21st
century. In R.W. Perry & E.L. Quarantelli (Eds). What is disaster? New answers
to old questions. Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris.
Rice, D. (2016). Wintertime floods among costliest ever. Retrieved January 09, 2016,
from http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2016/01/08/mississippi-river-floodcost/78366942/.
Robertson, C. (2011). Louisiana Spillway Opened to Relieve Flooding. Retrieved
November 17, 2011 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/us/spillway.html.
Rojecki. A. (2009). Political culture and disaster response: the Great Floods of 1927
and 2005. Media, Culture & Society, 31(6). 957-976.
Scallen, M. (2011). With the Bonne Carre Spillway closed, it’s time to assess damage to
Lake Pontchartrain. Retrieved November 17, 2011 from http://www.nola.com.
Sharing the challenge: Floodplain management into the 21st century: Report of the
Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee to the Administration
Floodplain Management Task Force (1993) The Galloway Report.
SHELDUS (2011). Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States.
Retrieved on January 2011 from Hazard and Vulnerability Research Institution at
the University of South Carolina. http://hvri.geog.sc.edu/SHELDUS/index.cfm?
page=products.
Smith, A. (2015). 'Historic' Floods Threaten 19 Levees Along Mississippi River.
Retrieved December 30, 2015, from http://www.nbcnews.com/news/weather/
historic-missouri-floods-threaten-19-levees-along-mississippi-river-n487776.
Stanford, D. (2011). Trade Slows as Mississippi River Floods. Retrieved December 2,
2011 from http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_23/
b4231012667675.htm.
Sullivan, L. (2016). Business of Disaster: Insurance Firms Profited $400 Million after
Sandy. NPR News Investigations. Retrieved on July 13, 2016 from
http://www.npr.com.

122

Tierney, K. (2010). “Societal Dimensions of Earthquakes and Other Hazards: Findings in
Search of Theory.” Proceedings of the 9th U. S. National and 10th Canadian
Conference on Earthquake Engineering. Oakland, CA: Earthquake Engineering
Research Institute.
Termorshizen, J., Opdam, P. & Van Den Brink, A. (2007). Incorporating ecological
sustainability into landscape planning. Landscape and Urban Planning 79. 374384.
U.S. A.C.E. (2006). The Mississippi River & Tributaries (MR & T) Project. Retrieved
from the internet Mar 3, 2011 from http://www2.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/bro/
misstrib.htm.
_____. (2013). The Mississippi River & Tributaries System 2011 Post Flood Report.
Retrieved from the internet on September 14, 2013 from http://www.mvd.
usace.army.mil.
U.S. Census Bureau (2010). State and County Quick Facts. Retrieved May 8, 2013 from
http://quickfacts.census.gov.
_____. (2013). 2008 – 2012 Selected Housing and Population Characteristics, American
Community Survey 5 year estimates. Retrieved on August 2016 from
http://factfinder.census.gov.
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2001). Racial and Ethnic Tensions on American
Communities: Poverty, Inequality, and discrimination. Volume VII: The
Mississippi River Delta Report. Retrieved October 22, 2011 from
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/msdelta/main.html.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (2013). National Flood Insurance Program:
Continued Attention Needed to Address Challenges. GAO-13-858T. Washington,
D.C.
U.S.G.S. (2007). About the Upper Mississippi River System. Retrieved June 6, 2011
from http://www.umesc.usgs.gov/umesc_about_umrs.html.
_____. (2016). Floods: Reoccurrence intervals and 100 year floods. Retrieved January 5,
2017 from http://water.usgs.gov/edu/100yearflood.html.
White, G. F. (1945). Human Adjustment to flood. Research Paper 29. Department of
Geography, University of Chicago.
Winer, H. (2010). Re-Engineering the Mississippi River as a Sediment Delivery System.
Roberts, T, Rosati, J., and Wang, P. (eds.). Proceedings, Symposium to Honor Dr.
Nicholas C. Kraus, Journal of Coastal Research, Special Issue, 59. 229-234.

123

APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 2 FIGURES
Figure 2.1
Mississippi River Historical Course Changes
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Figure 2.2
Project Flood
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Figure 2.3
Mississippi River sediment plume in May 2011
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER FOUR TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 4.1
Minnesota and Counties: Ratio of Flood Mitigation to All Mitigation Actions
State

County

MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN

Anoka
Benton
Dakota
Goodhue
Hennepin
Houston
Ramsey
Sherburne
Stearns
Wabasha
Washington
Winona
Wright
Total

Flood Mitigation
Actions
10
4
7
14
no plan available
no plan available
4
no plan available
3
no plan available
no plan available
19
no plan available
61

127

Total
Mitigation
Actions

Ratio
(%)
60
73
94
27

17
5
7
52

35

11

71

4

56

34

416

15

Table 4.2
Iowa and Counties: Ratio of Flood Mitigation to All Mitigation Actions
State County
IA Allamakee

Flood Mitigation Actions Total Mitigation Actions Ratio (%)

no plan available

IA Clayton

2

IA Clinton

no plan available

IA Des Moines

no plan available

IA Dubuque

no plan available

IA Jackson

33

IA Lee

no plan available

IA Louisa

no plan available

IA Muscatine

no plan available

15

13

83

40

IA Scott

56

181

31

IA Total

91

279

33

128

Table 4.3
Missouri and Counties: Ratio of Flood Mitigation to All Mitigation Actions
State

County

MO

Cape
Girardeau
Clark
Jefferson
Lewis
Lincoln
Marion
Mississippi
New Madrid
Pemiscot
Perry
Pike
Ralls
Scott
St. Charles
St. Louis
St. Genevieve
Total

MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO
MO

Flood Mitigation
Actions

11

Ratio
(%)

33

33

30

37

81

9
10
5
5
7
10
2
6
4
15
13
9
136

37
50
21
18
37
32
34
31
43
37
38
32
480

24
20
24
28
19
31
6
19
9
41
34
28
28

no plan available
no plan available

129

Total
Mitigation
Actions

Table 4.4
Wisconsin and Counties: Ratio of Flood Mitigation to All Mitigation Actions
State

County

WI
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI
WI

Buffalo
Crawford
Grant
La Crosse
Pepin
Pierce
Trempealeau
Vernon
Total

Flood Mitigation
Actions

no plan available
6
5
no plan available
21
no plan available
no plan available
no plan available
32

130

Total
Mitigation
Actions

Ratio
(%)

23
40

26
13

37

57

100

32

Table 4.5
Illinois and Counties: Ratio of Flood Actions to All Mitigation Actions
State

County

IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL
IL

Adams
Alexander
Calhoun
Carroll
Hancock
Henderson
Jackson
Jersey
Jo Daviess
Madison
Mercer
Monroe
Pike
Randolph
Rock Island
St. Clair
Union
Whiteside
Total

Flood Mitigation
Actions

1
8
12
90
8
6
15
3
192
23
9
2
6
no plan available
15
10
9
no plan available
409

131

Total
Mitigation
Actions

Ratio
(%)

12
23
28
107
40
39
36
10
212
52
37
15
38

8
35
43
84
20
15
42
30
91
44
24
13
16

38
12
21

39
83
43

720

57

Table 4.6
Arkansas and Counties: Ratio of Flood Actions to All Mitigation Actions
State

County

AR
AR
AR
AR
AR
AR
AR

Chicot
Crittenden
Desha
Lee
Mississippi
Phillips
Total

Flood Mitigation Total
Actions Mitigation
Actions

Ratio
(%)

no plan available
no plan available
no plan available
no plan available
no plan available
no plan available

0

132

0

0

Table 4.7
Louisiana and Counties: Ratio of Flood Actions to All Mitigation Actions
State

County

LA
LA
LA

Ascension
Concordia
East Baton
Rouge
East Carroll
Iberville
Jefferson
Madison
Orleans
Plaquemines
Pointe Coupee
St. Bernard
St. Charles
St. James
St. John the
Baptist
Tensas
West Baton
Rouge
West Feliciana
Total

LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA

Flood Mitigation Total
Actions Mitigation
Actions

no plan available
no plan available
22
no plan available
16
2
no plan available
40
no plan available
no plan available
15
102
no plan available
no plan available

Ratio
(%)

22
20
7
63
16
128

0
0
100
0
80
29
0
63
0
0
94
80
0
0

no plan available
no plan available

0
0

no plan available
197

0
77

133

256

Table 4.7
Louisiana and Counties: Ratio of Flood Actions to All Mitigation Actions
State

County

LA
LA
LA

Ascension
Concordia
East Baton
Rouge
East Carroll
Iberville
Jefferson
Madison
Orleans
Plaquemines
Pointe Coupee
St. Bernard
St. Charles
St. James
St. John the
Baptist
Tensas
West Baton
Rouge
West Feliciana
Total

LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA
LA

Flood Mitigation Total
Actions Mitigation
Actions

no plan available
no plan available
22
no plan available
16
2
no plan available
40
no plan available
no plan available
15
102
no plan available
no plan available

Ratio
(%)

22
20
7
63
16
128

0
0
100
0
80
29
0
63
0
0
94
80
0
0

no plan available
no plan available

0
0

no plan available
197

0
77

134

256

Table 4.8
Kentucky and Counties: Ratio of Flood Mitigation to All Mitigation Actions
State

County

KY
KY
KY
KY
KY

Ballard
Carlisle
Fulton
Hickman
Total

Flood Mitigation
Actions

8
18
9
8
43

135

Total
Mitigation
Actions

Ratio
(%)

24
24
22
22
92

33
75
41
36
47

Table 4.9
Tennessee and Counties: Ratio of Flood Mitigation to All Mitigation Actions

State

County

TN
TN
TN
TN
TN
TN

Dyer
Lake
Lauderdale
Shelby
Tipton
Total

Flood Mitigation
Actions

no plan available
no plan available
no plan available
43
18
61

136

Total
Mitigation
Actions

Ratio
(%)

72
41
113

0
0
0
60
44
54

Table 4.10
Mississippi and Counties: Ratio of Flood Mitigation to All Mitigation Actions
State

County

MS
MS
MS
MS
MS
MS
MS
MS
MS
MS
MS
MS

Adams
Bolivar
Claiborne
Coahoma
DeSoto
Issaquena
Jefferson
Tunica
Warren
Washington
Wilkinson
Total

Flood Mitigation
Actions

6
no plan available
6
2
2
no plan available
3
1
no plan available
no plan available
2
22

137

Total
Mitigation
Actions

Ratio
(%)

23
23
6
8
22
6
20
108

26
0
26
33
25
0
14
17
0
0
10
20

Table 4.11
State and Counties: Overall Total - Ratio of Flood Mitigation to All Mitigation Actions
States
10

Counties
108
Total

Total Mitigation Flood Total Mitigation
Actions
Actions
1052
2564

138

41%

Table 4.12
Non-structural Action Item Category
Coded

Non-Structural Mitigation Action

Replos

Actions that specifically address the problem of repetitive
loss properties
Actions that specifically address participating in the
Community Rating System
Actions that specifically address the National Flood
Insurance Program
Actions related to influencing policies related to flood
mitigation
Actions related to education and outreach to community
stakeholders such as private industry, government, general
population,
public
agencies, non-profit
agencies, etc.
Actions related
to conducting
studies, evaluating
processes, or developing plans
Actions that involve technical work such as building
databases, creating map products, creating inventories, and
other technical
support
Actions
that identify
training needs

50

Actions related to purchasing items and equipment such as
sandbags, signage, boats, portable generators
Actions related to maintaining equipment, performing
inspection and maintenance on structural elements and
floodplain,
removing
debris from
streams
Actions involving
improving
warning
systems

39

Actions involving developing evacuation routes and
sheltering sites
Actions related to enforcing policies associated with
floodplain management
Actions related to promotion and protection of the natural
environment
Actions related to improving communication and
networking between agencies
Actions related to levee accreditation

19

CRS
NFIP
Policy
Eduout
Study
Tech
Train
Equip
Maint
Warn
Evacshel
Enforce
Enviro
Comm
Leveeacc
Resp
Other

Actions that involve creating response plans and
establishing first responders
Actions otherwise specified
Total Non-Structural Mitigation Items

139

Count

59
12
48
45
92
36
5

50
18

32
15
10
4
6
9
549

Table 4.13
Structural Action Item Categories
Structural Action Item
Culverts
Roads Elevate/Repair
Reorganize Sewers
Bank Stabilization
Build Bridges
Build Pumping Stations
Elevate Structures
Build Levees Dams Flood Wall
Build Retention/Reservoirs
Move/Rebuild/Build Structures
Channel Improvements
Otherwise Specified
Build Perm Generators
Build Warning Systems
Reforest/Green
Reorganize Electric Grid
Build Shelters
Flood Gates
Build Potable Water Store
Build Roadway Gates
Totals

Total
75
67
47
33
32
30
29
30
28
26
26
23
12
10
9
6
6
8
4
2
503

140
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Table 5.1
Model One: Coefficients Table
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Constant
28226526.24 28969839.27
Timeline
304007.04
2418355.45
Time-Plan
-28853442.31 48463198.30
TimeAfterPlan
3200873.20
6419107.43
a. Dependent Variable: AllCountyYes

141

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
.046
-.235
.187

t.
.974
.126
-.595
.499

Sig.
.339
.901
.557
.622

Table 5.2
Model Two Coefficients Table

Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Constant
19470479.90
45429224.40
Timeline
2117653.74
3792358.38
Time-Plan
-48455542.00 75997850.30
TimeAfterPlan
1920725.49
10066161.20
a. Dependent Variable: AllCountiesNo

142

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
.206
-.252
.072

t.
.429
.558
-.638
.191

Sig.
.672
.581
.529
.850

Table 5.3
Model Three Coefficients Table
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Constant
18477323.50 11309277.43
Timeline
-725399.48
944080.24
Time-Plan
-19484673.88 18919116.18
TimeAfterPlan
5195403.22
2505898.15
a. Dependent Variable: Cost *p ≤ .05
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Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.265
-.381
.729

t.
1.634
-.768
-1.030
2.073

Sig.
.114
.449
.312
.048*

Table 5.4
Model Four Coefficients Table

Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Constant
9749202.74
26789600.81
Timeline
1029406.89
2236352.67
Time-Plan
-9368768.43 44815910.91
TimeAfterPlan -1994530.02
5936012.41
a. Dependent Variable: Cost
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Standardized
Coefficeints
Beta
-.265
-.381
-.127

t.
1.634
-.768
-1.030
-.336

Sig.
.114
.449
.312
.739

Figure 5.1
Regression Discontinuity Model One “PLAN YES”
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Figure 5.2
Regression Discontinuity Model Two “PLAN NO”
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Figure 5.3
Regression Discontinuity Model Three “UPPER PLAN YES”
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Figure 5.4
Regression Discontinuity Model Four “LOWER PLAN YES”

Year
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Table 5.5
Property damage costs by decade for 50 years (SHELDUS)

State

2000-2009

1990-1999

1980-1989

1970-79

1960-1969

Total

Minnesota

242,325,655

2,477,500

4,265,872

10,266,667

7,494,648

266,830,342

Wisconsin

146,177,840

8,247,024

266,349

27,736,869

505,693

182,933,775

Iowa

59,816,833

637,964,447

3,231,817

500,000

560,606

702,073,703

Illinois

47,431,769

210,239,965

101,884,721

3,432,694

1,004,512

363,993,661

Missouri

25,440,510

18,872,279

9,795,181

12,056,374

942

66,165,286

Kentucky

2,843,976

4,061,036

335,659

2,471,881

4,130,161

13,842,713

Tennessee

114,729,530

7,525,261

5,720,798

2,504,184

363,858

130,843,631

Arkansas

15,190,714

1,772,545

4,989,502

1,078,788

0

23,031,549

Mississippi

25,903,500

17,245,090

85,531,169

47,045,139

13,929

175,738,827

Louisiana

14,119,000

257,268,400

86,573,426

5,079,461

730,230

363,770,517

Total

693,979,327

1,165,673,547

302,594,494

112,172,057

14,804,579

2,289,224,004
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Table 5.6
Flood disaster declarations by decade over 50 years (SHELDUS)
200009

199099

198089

197079

196069

Total

Minnesota

89

29

26

16

23

183

Wisconsin

160

50

11

76

43

340

Iowa

153

349

138

1

6

647

Illinois

121

158

275

42

77

673

Missouri

115

123

71

131

19

459

Kentucky

25

23

55

96

29

228

Tennessee

80

51

30

50

18

229

Arkansas

51

17

30

6

0

104

125

78

60

85

8

356

69

60

99

24

41

293

988

938

795

527

264

3512

State

Mississippi
Louisiana
Total
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Table 5.7
State mitigation plan action items analysis

State Mit
Plan

Total
Mit
Action

Total
Flood
Mit
Actions

Percent
Flood
Actions

Structural
Actions
Total

%

NonStructural
Actions
Total

%

Minnesota

18

10

56

5

50

5

50

Wisconsin

98

18

18

0

0

18

100

Iowa

51

29

57

15

51

14

49

207

42

20

0

0

42

100

Missouri

19

5

26

0

0

5

100

Kentucky

66

24

36

2

8

22

92

Tennessee

57

5

9

0

0

5

100

Arkansas

61

7

11

0

0

7

100

Mississippi

62

27

44

2

7

25

93

Louisiana

18

0

0

0

0

0

0

Illinois
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NFIP
Yes

CRS
Yes

Rep
Loss
Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Table 5.8
State Mitigation Action Analysis: Structural Mitigation Action Items
State Plans Structural Actions

WI

Culverts

MN

IA

1

1

2

1

1

Roads Elevate/Rpr

IL

KY

TN

MO

AR

MS

LA

Total

Sewers
Bank Stabilization

1

1

2

Bridges

1

1

2

1

1

Pumping Stations
Elevate Structures

1

Levees Dams F Wall

1

1

2

1

4

Retention/Reservoirs
Move/Rebuild/Build

1

1

Channel Improve

1

1

Otherwise Specified

1

Perm Generators

1

1

2
1

Warning Systems

1

Reforest/Green

1

Electric Grid

1

1

2

1

1

Build Shelters

0

Flood Gates

0

Potable Water Store

0

Roadway Gates

0

Totals

0

5

13

0
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2

0

0

0

2

0

22

Table 5.9
State Mitigation Action Analysis: Non-structural Action Items
Action Item
WI MN IA IL KY TN MO AR MS LA Total
Study
1
1
4
1
2
9
NFIP
1
1
1
4
3
1
1
2
6
20
Repetitive Loss
1
1
2
6
3
2
2
2
1
20
Maintenance
1
0
Policy Influence
1
1
2
4
2
10
Education Outreach
5
1
1
2
3
1
1
14
Purchase Equipment
1
1
2
4
6
3
1
1
4
19
Technical Support
Enforce Regulations
3
3
6
Evac & Sheltering
1
1
Warning
1
1
2
Improvements
Environmental
1
1
Considerations
Other
1
1
1
1
2
6
CRS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
7
Communication
1
1
4
3
9
Emergency Response
2
1
3
Training
2
3
7
1
1
1
15
Total
17
5 15 41 22
6
6
8 25
0
145
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Table 5.10
County Mitigation Plan Flood Action Analysis: Structural Action Items
Action Item
Stabilize/armour
banks

WI/3

MN/7

IA/3

IL/16

KY/4

TN/2

MO/14

AR/0

MS/7

LA/6

Total

4

0

1

22

1

0

1

0

0

4

33

Roads/elevating

2

2

1

59

2

5

7

0

1

2

81

Widen culverts
Repair/replace
bridges

3

2

4

42

0

9

0

0

1

14

75

2

1

0

23

0

4

0

0

0

2

32

Fix sewers

3

0

7

23

0

1

0

0

1

10

45

Electric line issues

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

6

Flood gates
Retrofit structures
in floodplain

0

1

2

1

0

0

0

0

0

4

8

0

2

1

7

0

0

0

0

1

18

29

Build shelters
Build floodwall
levees

1

0

0

2

0

1

0

0

0

2

6

1

3

5

12

0

2

1

0

0

6

30

Warning systems

0

2

2

2

0

0

0

0

0

4

10

Install generators

0

0

3

7

0

0

0

0

0

1

11

Build pump stations
Retention ponds
reservoirs
Buildings out of
floodplain

0

0

2

2

0

1

0

0

0

25

30

0

0

1

7

1

18

0

0

0

1

28

1

0

4

10

4

0

0

0

3

4

26

Channel improve
Reforestation
/greenway
Other
improvements

0

1

0

7

0

8

0

0

0

10

26

0

0

0

2

0

0

4

0

0

5

11

0

1

4

8

4

0

0

0

0

5

22

18

16

37

236

12

49

13

0

7

121

509

Totals
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Table 5.11
County Mitigation Action Analysis: Non-Structural Mitigation Action Items
Action Item

WI

MN

IA

IL

KY

TN

MO

AR

MS

LA

Total

Study

1

10

4

52

1

5

9

0

1

9

92

NFIP

3

4

5

12

11

3

12

0

4

5

59

Repetitive Loss

2

9

6

12

2

0

8

0

2

9

50

Maintenance

3

2

5

16

4

1

13

0

3

3

50

Policy Influence
Education
Outreach
Purchase
Equipment
Technical
Support
Enforce
Regulations
Evacuation &
Sheltering
Warning
Improvements
Environmental
Considerations

2

3

10

4

0

0

16

0

1

12

48

1

2

2

15

5

0

8

0

0

12

45

0

5

5

24

0

0

4

0

0

1

39

1

8

0

4

0

2

9

0

3

9

36

0

0

6

8

0

0

16

0

0

2

32

1

0

4

10

0

0

4

0

0

0

19

1

0

0

12

0

0

4

0

1

0

18

0

0

0

3

2

0

10

0

0

0

15

Other

0

0

3

6

0

0

1

0

0

3

13

CRS

0

0

0

3

0

0

1

0

0

8

12

Communication
Emergency
Response

0

0

2

3

0

0

4

0

0

1

10

1

0

0

1

0

0

4

0

0

0

6

Training

0

1

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

2

5

16

44

52

187

25

11

123

0

15

76

549

Total
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Table 5.12
Minnesota Flood Property Damage 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Minnesota
Counties
Anoka
Benton
Dakota
Goodhue
Hennepin
Houston
Ramsey
Sherburne
Stearns
Wabasha
Washington
Winona
Wright
Total

Total Property
Damage 50
yrs
6,084,150
9,537,484
26,928,713
11,525,197
7,427,483
56,167,123
9,314,483
7,495,817
12,872,817
27,656,815
6,915,817
51,625,290
33,279,150
249,325,655

Total PD
2000

Total PD
1990

Total PD
1980

Total PD
1970

Total PD
1960

4,883,049
8,478,049
24,878,049
7,679,715
4,893,049
54,088,333
7,280,049
6,903,049
12,280,049
25,121,333
4,878,049
48,884,833
32,078,049
242,325,655

0
0
0
1,653,125
0
69,792
0
0
0
174,792
0
579,792
0
2,477,500

1,389
18,056
847,619
114,286
835,722
180,952
834,722
18,056
18,056
280,952
834,722
280,952
1,389
4,265,872

625,000
466,667
625,000
1,500,000
1,125,000
1,250,000
625,000
0
0
1,500,000
625,000
1,300,000
625,000
10,266,667

574,713
574,713
574,713
578,071
574,713
578,046
574,713
574,713
574,713
579,738
578,046
579,713
574,713
7,494,648
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Table 5.13
Minnesota Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Minnesota
Counties
Total Disasters 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Anoka
6
1
1
1
1
2
Benton
9
1
2
2
0
4
Dakota
8
2
1
2
1
2
Goodhue
20
3
2
2
5
8
Hennepin
8
1
2
2
1
2
Houston
31
2
1
2
5
21
Ramsey
9
1
1
2
2
3
Sherburne
6
1
0
2
0
3
Stearns
10
1
0
2
0
7
Wabasha
30
4
2
3
5
16
Washington
7
2
1
2
1
1
Winona
33
3
2
3
8
17
Wright
6
1
1
1
0
3
Total
183
23
16
26
29
89
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Table 5.14
Minnesota Mitigation Actions: State to County Comparison
Minnesota: State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs
Structural
Mitigation
Ranked:

1

2

3

Counties

Culverts
Levees, Dams,
Floodwalls

Bank
Stabilization
Warning
Systems

Bridges
Elevate
Structures

Nonstructural
Mitigation
Ranked:

1

2

State

Studies

Counties

Studies

NFIP
Rep Loss
Funding

State
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3
Rep Loss
Funding
Tech Support

4
Levees
Dams
Floodwalls
Culverts

4
Education
Outreach
Equipment
Funding

5
Reforest/
Green
Flood
Gates

5
CRS
NFIP

Table 5.15
Wisconsin Flood Property Damage 50 years (SHELDUS)
Wisconsin
Counties
Buffalo
Crawford
Grant
La Crosse
Pepin
Pierce
Trempealeau
Vernon
Total

Total Property
Damage 50 yrs
10,171,784
40,108,276
23,176,364
21,561,360
7,376,884
6,269,681
15,106,350
59,163,076
182,993,775

Total PD 2000
6,136,067
35,541,667
18,356,267
17,740,667
3,725,000
2,600,000
8,569,207
53,508,967
146,177,840

Total PD
1990
448,000
1,034,286
1,282,952
320,000
100,000
50,000
2,915,000
2,096,786
8,247,024
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Total PD
1980
7,500
238,810
238,810
48,810
0
55,556
58,056
48,810
266,349

Total PD
1970
3,536,440
3,414,950
3,419,771
3,408,106
3,503,106
3,503,106
3,536,440
3,414,950
27,736,869

Total PD
1960
46,778
93,564
93,564
43,778
48,788
61,019
27,649
93,564
505,693

Table 5.16
Wisconsin Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Years (SHELDUS)
Wisconsin
Counties
Buffalo
Crawford
Grant
La Crosse
Pepin
Pierce
Trempealeau
Vernon
Total

Total
Disasters
41
57
67
35
19
17
40
64
340

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

4
7
7
4
5
5
3
8
43

10
10
12
8
8
8
10
10
76

2
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
11

8
7
7
5
2
1
10
10
50

17
32
40
16
4
2
15
8
134
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Table 5.17
Wisconsin Mitigation Actions: State to County Comparison
Wisconsin: State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs
Structural
Mitigation
Ranked:

1

2

3

4

5

State

none

none

Culverts

Sewers

none
Roads
Elevated

none

Counties

none
Bank
Stabilization

1
Education
Outreach

2
Technical
Support
Maintenance
Check/Clean
Drainage

3

4

Training

NFIP

5
Rep Loss
Funding

Rep Loss
Funding

Policy
Influence

Education
Outreach

Nonstructural
Mitigation
Ranked:
State
Counties

NFIP
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Bridges

Table 5.18
Iowa Flood Property Damage 50 Years (SHELDUS)
Iowa
Counties
Allamakee
Clayton
Clinton
Des Moines
Dubuque
Jackson
Lee
Louisa
Muscatine
Scott

Total Property
Damage 50 yrs
90,996,322
107,060,963
10,710,416
93,992,726
108,507,520
86,879,454
92,720,430
88,466,968
10,253,631
12,485,274
702,073,703

Total PD
2000
12,951,000
16,652,833
3,366,000
7,235,000
2,060,000
2,080,000
6,164,000
3,175,000
2,180,000
3,953,000
59,816,833

Total PD
1990
77,932,828
90,295,636
7,318,352
85,626,156
106,415,253
84,770,322
84,877,360
84,913,979
7,358,352
8,456,209
637,964,447
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Total PD
1980
97,342
97,342
26,064
1,131,570
17,116
13,981
1,179,070
377,989
215,279
76,064
3,231,817

Total PD
1970
0
0
0
0
0
0
500,000
0
0
0
500,000

Total PD
1960
15,151
15,151
0
0
15,151
15,151
0
0
500,000
0
560,167

Table 5.19
Iowa Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Iowa
Counties
Allamakee
Clayton
Clinton
Des
Moines
Dubuque
Jackson
Lee
Louisa
Muscatine
Scott
Total

Total
Disasters
63
80
55
72

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

1
1
0
0

0
0
0
0

12
12
13
17

30
38
26
43

20
28
16
12

61
52
89
64
50
62
648

1
1
1
0
1
0
6

0
0
1
0
0
0
1

13
12
17
14
14
14
138

41
34
44
38
26
28
348

6
5
26
12
9
20
154
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Table 5.20
Iowa Mitigation Actions: State to County Comparison
Iowa: State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs
Structural
Mitigation
State

1
Levees Dams
Floodwalls

Culverts

3
Roads
Elevate/Repair

Counties

Sewers

Levees Dams
Floodwalls

Culverts

Nonstructural
Mitigation

1

2
Rep Loss
Funding
Enforce
Regulations

3
Emergency
Response
Rep Loss
Funding

State
Counties

Training
Policy
Influence

2
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4
Bank
Stabilization
Move/Build
Rebuild out of
Floodplain

5
Bridges
Otherwise
specified
need

4

5

Study

NFIP

NFIP

Maintenance

Table 5.21
Illinois Flood Property Damage 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Illinois
Counties
Adams
Alexander
Calhoun
Carroll
Hancock
Henderson
Jackson
Jersey
Jo Daviess
Madison
Mercer
Monroe
Pike
Randolph
Rock
Island
St. Clair
Union
Whiteside
Total

Total
Property
Damage 50
yrs
23,784,240
24,759,778
23,215,405
17,272,767
24,370,476
7,732,443
25,010,094
23,270,653
8,556,377
25,143,667
22,717,623
23,055,546
23,138,176
21,519,013
10,702,293

Total PD
2000

Total PD
1990

610,000
1,840,115
0
11,015,500
2,835,000
1,875,250
2,410,949
46,000
2,641,000
51,000
16,433,000
0
20,000
10,000
3,217,670

17,386,480
17,187,452
17,432,645
66,342
15,744,119
63,564
16,938,119
17,441,666
68,342
19,447,566
116,341
17,394,748
17,335,417
15,848,214
1,316,342

5,652,322
5,614,208
5,647,321
5,823,624
5,658,191
5,658,191
5,542,779
5,647,322
5,773,624
5,524,808
5,798,706
5,542,779
5,647,322
5,542,779
5,798,706

51,292
49,019
51,292
363,971
49,020
51,292
49,247
51,520
70,080
51,292
366,244
49,020
51,292
49,020
366,244

84,146
68,983
84,146
3,331
84,146
84,146
69,000
84,146
3,331
69,000
3,331
69,000
84,146
69,000
3,331

24,931,225
23,983,295
10,830,593
363,993,661

221,000
1,838,615
2,966,670
47,431,769

19,048,814
16,412,452
391,342
210,239,965

5,592,411
5,614,208
5,855,052
101,884,721

49,623
49,020
1,614,198
3,432,694

69,000
69,000
3,331
1,004,512
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Total PD
1980

Total PD
1970

Total PD
1960

Table 5.22
Illinois Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Illinois
Total
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Counties
Disasters
Adams
34
7
2
13
9
3
Alexander
52
3
1
15
13
21
Calhoun
31
7
2
12
10
0
Carroll
38
3
3
20
4
7
Hancock
40
7
1
12
5
14
Henderson
29
7
2
12
2
5
Jackson
53
3
2
14
12
14
Jersey
36
7
3
12
11
3
Jo Daviess
38
3
3
19
5
8
Madison
31
3
2
12
12
2
Mercer
40
3
4
20
5
8
Monroe
29
3
1
14
11
0
Pike
30
7
2
12
7
2
Randolph
26
3
1
14
7
1
Rock
56
3
4
21
13
15
Island
St. Clair
32
3
3
14
9
3
Union
35
3
1
15
9
7
Whiteside
44
3
5
22
7
7
674
78
42
273
151
120
Total
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Table 5.23
Illinois Mitigation Actions: State to County Comparisons
Illinois: State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs
Structural
Mitigation

1

2

3

4

5

State

no action

no action

no action

Counties

Sewers

Levees Dams
Floodwalls

Culverts

no action
Move Build
Rebuild out of
Floodplain

no action
Otherwise
specified
need

Nonstructural
Mitigation

1

4

5

State

Training

2
Rep Loss
Funding

Studies

NFIP

Counties

Studies

Equipment
Funding

Education
Outreach

Rep Loss
Funding

3
Technical
Support
Maintenance
Check/Clean
Debris
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Table 5.24
Missouri Flood Property Damage 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Missouri
Counties

Total
Total PD
Total PD
Total PD Total PD
Total
Property
2000
1990
1980
1970
PD
Damage
1960
50 yrs
7,879,492 3,596,000
160,833 3,218,425
904,190
4348

Cape
Girardeau
Clark
6,684,761 4,425,000 1,412,502
251,020
596,195
4348
Jefferson
2,857,776
600,000 1,465,048
163,369
629,316
4348
Lewis
3,215,461
956,000 1,412,202
251,020
596,195
4348
Lincoln
5,350,186 2,675,000 1,731,348
346,202
597,511
4348
Marion
9,666,357 7,300,000 1,519,048
251,070
596,195
4348
Mississippi 2,821,946 1,121,000
102,434
736,944
861,525
4348
New
2,235,390 1,122,000
70,434
181,388
861,525
4348
Madrid
Pemiscot
1,125,400
47,010
35,434
181,388
861,525
4348
Perry
2,907,889
230,000 1,608,286
162,869
906,690
4348
Pike
2,797,970
385,000 1,470,448
346,202
596,195
4348
Ralls
2,666,489
255,000 1,469,048
346,202
596,195
4348
Scott
4,410,593
763,500
82,767 2,681,388
882,894
4348
St. Charles
5,316,923 1,852,000 2,519,948
346,202
598,647
4348
St. Louis
3,782,615
103,000 2,411,548
168,619
129,652
4348
St.
2,446,038
10,000 1,400,952
162,869
872,173
4348
Genevieve
Total
66,165,286 25,440,510 18,872,279 9,795,181 12,056,374 94,200
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Table 5.25
Missouri Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Missouri
Total
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Counties
Disasters
Cape
Girardeau
59
1
13
6
11
28
Clark
37
1
3
2
4
28
Jefferson
25
1
8
5
8
3
Lewis
12
1
3
2
3
3
Lincoln
25
2
4
4
11
4
Marion
14
1
3
3
5
2
Mississippi
35
1
14
6
6
8
New
Madrid
31
1
13
5
6
7
Pemiscot
29
1
13
5
5
5
Perry
37
1
14
4
12
6
Pike
17
2
3
4
6
3
Ralls
14
1
3
4
4
2
Scott
35
1
14
6
6
8
St. Charles
33
2
5
4
18
4
St. Louis
35
1
7
7
16
4
St.
Genevieve
21
1
12
4
3
1
459
19
132
71
124
116
Total
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Table 5.26
Missouri Mitigation Actions: State to County Comparisons
Missouri: State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs
Structural
Mitigation

1

2

3

4

5

State

none

none

none

none

Counties

Roads
Elevate/Repair

Reforest
Green

Bank
Stabilization

none
Levees
Dams
Floodwalls

2
NFIP

4
Technical
Support

CRS

Counties

Policy Influence

Regulation
Enforcement

3
Education
Outreach
Maintenance
Check/Clean
Debris

5

State

1
Rep Loss
Funding

NFIP

Environmental
Considerations

Nonstructural
Mitigation
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none

Table 5.27
Kentucky Flood Property Damage 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Kentucky
Counties
Ballard
Carlisle
Fulton
Hickman
Total

Total
Property
Damage 50
yrs
6,355,738
2,338,060
3,0746,88
2,074,227
13,842,713

Total PD
2000

Total PD
1990

Total PD
1980

Total PD
1970

Total PD
1960

962,143
610,000
928,417
343,417
2,843,976

3,625,036
17,000
393,000
26,000
4,061,036

137,665
70,165
73,915
63,915
335,659

608,355
608,355
646,817
608,355
2,471,881

1,032,540
1,032,540
1,032,540
1,032,540
4,130,161
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Table 5.28
Kentucky Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Kentucky
Counties
Ballard
Carlisle
Fulton
Hickman
Total

Total
Disasters
62
57
55
54
228

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

7
7
7
8
29

25
25
21
25
96

15
16
14
12
57

10
3
7
3
23

5
8
6
6
25
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Table 5.29
Kentucky Mitigation Actions: State to County Comparisons
Kentucky: State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs
Structural
Mitigation

Elevate
Structures
Move/Rebuild
Build out of
Floodplain

2
Otherwise
Specified
Need
Otherwise
Specified
Need

State

1
Policy
Influence

2
Education
Outreach

Counties

NFIP

Education
Outreach

State
Counties
Nonstructural
Mitigation

1

3

4

5

none

none

none

Road
Elevate/Repair

Bank
Stabilization

Retention Ponds
Reservoirs

3

4
Rep Loss
Funding

5
Technical
Support

Rep Loss
Funding

Environmental
Considerations

NFIP
Maintenance
Check/Clean
Debris
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Table 5.30
Tennessee Flood Property Damage 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Tennessee
Counties
Dyer
Lake
Lauderdale
Shelby
Tipton
Total

Total Property
Damage 50 yrs
12,066,650
2,151,660
5,945,150
83,174,345
27,505,825
130,843,630

Total PD
2000
9,865,667
54,677
3,719,668
80,437,020
20,652,500
114,729,530

Total PD
1990
1,523,452
1,471,952
1,557,952
1,515,452
1,456,452
7,525,261
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Total PD
1980
194,160
144,160
144,160
94,160
5,144,160
5,720,798

Total PD
1970
468,100
463,100
518,100
807,442
247,442
2,504,184

Total PD
1960
15,273
17,772
5,272
320,272
5,278
363,858

Table 5.31
Tennessee Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Tennessee
Counties
Dyer
Lake
Lauderdale
Shelby
Tipton
Total

Total
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Disasters
41
3
10
8
12
8
35
4
9
5
10
7
37
2
11
6
11
7
76
7
12
5
11
41
40
2
8
6
7
17
41
3
10
8
12
8
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Table 5.32
Tennessee Mitigation Actions: State to County Comparisons
Tennessee: State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs
Structural
Mitigation

1

2

3

4

5

State

none

none

none

none

Counties

Retention Ponds
Reservoirs

Channel Repairs

Culverts

none
Roads
Elevate/
Repair

Bridges

Nonstructural
Mitigation

2

3

4

5

State

1
Rep Loss
Funding

Studies

CRS

Training

Counties

Studies

NFIP

NFIP
Technical
Support

Maintenance

none
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Table 5.33
Arkansas Flood Property Damage 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Arkansas
Counties

Total
Total PD
Total PD
Total PD
Total PD
Total
Property
2000
1990
1980
1970
PD
Damage
1960
50 yrs
Chicot
4,151,940 2,924,000
200,000
800,667
0
0
Crittenden
8,502,528 7,589,750
51,000
850,667
11,111
0
Desha
4,389,440 2,751,000
837,273
801,167
0
0
Lee
831,778
10,000
0
810,667
11,111
0
Mississippi 2,102,947
789,714
456,000
800,667
56,566
0
Phillips
3,052,917 1,126,250
51,000
875,667 1,000,000
0
Total
23,031,546 15,190,714 1,772,545 4,989,502 1,078,788
0
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Table 5.34
Arkansas Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Arkansas
Total
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Counties
Disasters
Chicot
25
0
0
4
3
18
Crittenden
20
0
1
5
2
12
Desha
13
0
0
5
4
4
Lee
8
0
1
6
0
1
Mississippi
22
0
2
4
7
9
Phillips
16
0
2
6
1
7
104
0
6
30
17
51
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Table 5.35
Arkansas Mitigation Actions: State to County Comparisons
Arkansas: State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs
Structural
Mitigation

1

2

3

4

5

State

none

none

none

none

Counties

no data

no data

no data

no data

none
no
data

Nonstructural
Mitigation

1

State

NFIP

2
Rep Loss
Funding

3
Education
Outreach

4
Technical
Support

Counties

no data

no data

no data

no data
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5
CRS
no
data

Table 3.36
Mississippi Flood Property Damage 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Mississippi
Counties
Adams
Bolivar
Claiborne
Coahoma
DeSoto
Issaquena
Jefferson
Tunica
Warren
Washington
Wilkinson
Total

Total
Property
Damage 50
yrs
12,073,837
10,030,641
30,537,342
8,309,838
12,531,030
9,902,571
11,530,087
7,490,530
53,899,592
10,033,712
9,399,646
175,738,827

Total PD
2000
1,348,000
1,425,500
322,000
277,500
5,337,500
604,000
1,073,000
300,500
13,741,000
1,349,500
125,000
25,903,500

Total PD
1990
2,023,020
2,095,327
1,903,020
920,137
681,329
1,769,686
1,853,020
677,829
2,589,565
2,055,327
676,829
17,245,090

180

Total PD 1980

8,560,285
6,371,951
6,421,951
6,795,187
6,375,187
6,381,951
8,455,285
6,375,187
14,676,951
6,481,951
8,455,285
85,531,169

Total PD
1970
142,533
137,624
21,890,371
136,776
136,776
1,146,696
142,533
136,776
22,885,826
146,696
142,533
47,045,139

Total
PD
1960
0
2,381
0
2,381
2,381
2,381
6,250
2,381
6,250
2,381
0
13,939

Table 5.37
Mississippi Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Mississippi
Counties
Adams
Bolivar
Claiborne
Coahoma
DeSoto
Issaquena
Jefferson
Tunica
Warren
Washington
Wilkinson
Total

Total
Disasters
38
46
28
31
42
25
23
19
49
38
16
356

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
8

7
9
10
6
6
9
7
6
10
9
7
85

9
4
4
7
6
4
4
5
7
6
4
60
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10
8
7
6
7
5
5
4
14
8
3
78

12
24
7
11
21
6
5
3
17
16
2
125

Table 5.38
Mississippi Mitigation Actions: State to County Comparisons
Mississippi: State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs
Structural
Mitigation

2
Warning
Systems

3

4

5

none

none

none

Counties

1
Levees Dams
Floodwalls
Move/Build
Rebuild out of
Floodplain

Culverts

Road
Elevation/Repair

Sewers

Elevate
Structures

Nonstructural
Mitigation

1

State

NFIP

Counties

NFIP

2
Technical
Support
Maintenance
Check/Clean
Debris

State

3
Enforce
Regulations

4

5

Communicate

Studies

Technical Support

Rep Loss
Funding

Studies
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Table 5.39
Louisiana Flood Property Damage 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Louisiana
Counties
Ascension
Concordia
East Baton
Rouge
East Carroll
Iberville
Jefferson
Madison
Orleans
Plaquemines
Pointe
Coupee
St. Bernard
St. Charles
St. James
St. John the
Baptist
Tensas
West Baton
Rouge
West
Feliciana
Total

Total Property
Damage 50
yrs
51,460,119
1,774,790
51,6764,66

Total PD
2000

Total PD
1990

Total PD
1980

Total PD
1970

Total
PD
1960

2,600,000
608,000
2,452,000

41,833,711
50,000
42,073,711

6,519,897
781,250
6,639,879

505,747
343,391
505,747

3,837,755
50,701,133
13,131,675
5,316,755
8,397,327
5,900,008
45,750,119

1,748,000
2,400,000
345,000
1,272,000
365,000
130,000
590,000

270,000
41,983,711
350,000
850,000
550,000
500,000
41,763,711

1,289,583
5,806,546
12,431,546
2,664,583
7,481,546
5,264,879
2,889,879

501,613
505,747
0
501,613
0
0
505,747

28,559
5,129
5,129
28,559
78,125
5,129
78,125

8,376,675
7,828,719
5,679,467
6,572,386

330,000
500,000
85,000
327,000

610,000
1,092,044
152,044
642,044

7,431,546
6,231,546
5,264,879
5,264,879

0
0
172,414
33,333

5,129
5,129
5,129
5,129

3,495,873

332,000

300,000

2,039,583

501,613

322,677

47,669,466

25,000

41,743,711

5,389,879

505,747

5,129

46,201,785

10,000

42,503,711

3,181,546

505,747

78,125

363,770,517

14,119,000

257,268,400

86,573,426

5,079,461

730,230

183

0
301,149
5,129

Table 5.40
Louisiana Flood Disaster Declarations 50 Year (SHELDUS)
Louisiana
Total
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Counties
Disasters
Ascension
18
1
2
8
4
3
Concordia
18
3
3
1
1
10
East Baton
Rouge
28
3
2
8
10
5
East Carroll
15
2
3
3
2
5
Iberville
21
3
2
7
6
3
Jefferson
26
3
0
9
4
10
Madison
16
2
2
4
3
6
Orleans
18
1
0
9
3
5
Plaquemines
10
3
0
5
1
1
Pointe
Coupee
14
1
2
5
3
3
St. Bernard
16
3
0
8
3
2
St. Charles
19
3
0
8
4
4
St. James
17
3
1
5
4
4
St. John the
Baptist
16
3
1
5
4
4
Tensas
22
3
2
3
2
12
West Baton
Rouge
14
3
2
6
2
1
West
Feliciana
13
1
2
5
4
1
Total
239
41
24
99
60
69
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Table 5.41
Louisiana Mitigation Actions: State to County Comparisons
Louisiana: State to County Ranked Comparison of Top Mitigation Needs
Structural
Mitigation

1

2

3

4

5

none
Elevate
Structures

none

none

Counties

none
Pumping
Stations

Culverts

Sewers

none
Channel
Improvements

Nonstructural
Mitigation

1

2

3

4

5

State

none

none

Counties

Policy Influence

none
Education
Outreach

none
Rep Loss
Funding

none
Technical
Support

State
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Studies

Table 5.42
Census Tract Population/Households in/near Floodplain and High Poverty Percentage

Census
Tract Total
State
Population
Minnesota 437,001
Wisconsin 121,223
Iowa
440,858
Missouri
189,894
Illinois
177,454
Kentucky
17,764
Tennessee
30,565
Arkansas
43,000
Mississippi 103,404
Louisiana
703,672

Percent
14
40
90
10
16
71
3
28
27
43

Census
Tract Total
Households
167,229
50,624
177,101
72,483
87,431
7,311
10,557
15,000
38,629
264,442
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Percent
13
47
89
10
16
71
3
27
27
43

Highest
Poverty
Level
Percent
56
31
49
64
65
30
44
59
66
45

Figure 5.5
Upper Mississippi River Region: Overall Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
was mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the
intellectual property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.6
Upper Middle Mississippi River Region: Overall Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.7
Lower Mississippi River Region: Overall Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.8
Louisiana Region: Overall Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.9
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN: Overall Poverty - Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.10

Quad Cities (Side View): Overall Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Table 5.11
St. Louis: Overall Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.12
Memphis, TN Overall Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.13
Baton Rouge, LA: Overall Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.14
New Orleans, LA: Overall Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.15
Upper Mississippi River Region: White Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.16
Upper Middle Mississippi River Region: White Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.17
Lower Mississippi River Region: White Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.18
Lower Mississippi River Region: White Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.19
Louisiana Region: White Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.20
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN: White Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.21
Quad Cities (side view): White Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.22
St. Louis, MO: White Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 2.23
Memphis, TN: White Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.24
Baton Rouge, LA: White Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.25
New Orleans, LA: White Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.26
Upper Mississippi River Region: Black Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.27
Upper Middle Mississippi River Region: Black Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.28
Lower Mississippi River Region: Black Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.29
Louisiana Region: Black Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.30
Minneapolis, MN: Black Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.

212

Figure 5.31
Quad Cities (side view): Black Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.32
St. Louis, MO: Black Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.33
Memphis, TN: Black Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.34
Baton Rouge, LA: Black Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.35
New Orleans, LA: Black Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.36
Upper Mississippi River Region: Elderly Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.37
Upper Middle Mississippi River Region: Elderly Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.38
Lower Mississippi River Region: Elderly Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.

220

Figure 5.39
Louisiana Region: Elderly Poverty

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.40
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN: Elderly Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.41
Quad Cities (side view): Elderly Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.

223

Figure 5.42
St. Louis, MO: Elderly Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.43
Memphis, TN: Elderly Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.44
Baton Rouge, LA: Elderly Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.45
New Orleans, LA: Elderly Poverty – Census Tract Level

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.46
Upper Mississippi River Region: Elderly Households

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.47
Upper Middle Mississippi River Region: Elderly Households

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.48
Lower Mississippi River Region: Elderly Households

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.49
Louisiana Region: Elderly Households

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.50
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN: Elderly Households

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.51
Quad Cities (side view): Elderly Households

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.52
St. Louis, MO: Elderly Households

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.53
Memphis, TN: Elderly Households

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.54
Baton Rouge, LA: Elderly Households

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.55
New Orleans, LA: Elderly Households

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.56
Upper Mississippi River Region: Median Household Income

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.57
Upper Middle Mississippi River Region: Median Household Income

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.58
Lower Mississippi River Region: Median Household Income

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.

240

Figure 5.59
Louisiana Region: Median Household Income

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.60
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN: Median Household Income

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.61
Quad Cities (side view): Median Household Income

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.62
St. Louis, MO: Median Household Income

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.63
Memphis, TN: Median Household Income

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.64
Baton Rouge, LA: Median Household Income

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.65
New Orleans, LA: Median Household Income

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.66
Upper Mississippi River Region: Renter Occupied Housing

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.67
Upper Middle Mississippi River Region: Renter Occupied Housing

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.68
Lower Mississippi River Region: Renter Occupied Housing

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.

250

Figure 5.69
Louisiana Region: Renter Occupied Housing

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.70
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN: Renter Occupied Housing

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.71
Quad Cities (side view): Renter Occupied Housing

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.72
St. Louis, MO: Renter Occupied Housing

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.73
Memphis, TN: Renter Occupied Housing

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.74
Baton Rouge, LA: Renter Occupied Housing

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.75
New Orleans, LA: Renter Occupied Housing

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.76
Upper Mississippi River Region: Housing Built Prior to 1969

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.77
Upper Middle Mississippi River Region: Housing Built Prior to 1969

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.78
Lower Mississippi River Region: Housing Built Prior to 1969

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.79
Louisiana Region: Housing Built Prior to 1969

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.80
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN: Housing Built Prior to 1969

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.81
Quad Cities (side view): Housing Built Prior to 1969

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.82
St. Louis, MO: Housing Built Prior to 1969

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.83
Memphis, TN: Housing Built Prior to 1969

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.84
Baton Rouge, LA: Housing Built Prior to 1969

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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Figure 5.85
New Orleans, LA: Housing Built Prior to 1969

American Community Survey 2012 (5 year estimates) county and census tract data
mapped using ArcGIS ® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual
property of Esri and are used herein under license.
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